Narrative:

On approach to slc, at 11000 ft MSL, 210 KIAS, the first officer, who was flying, called for flaps 1. I set the flap lever to flaps 1 setting and observed a trailing edge flap light above the flap indicator followed by a trailing edge flap disagreement light on the EICAS panel. A go around was initiated, an emergency declared and tower/approach control vectored the aircraft to avoid other traffic and give us time to complete our non normal checklist. The QRH was followed with alternate flaps selected. A flap 20 degree approach and landing was briefed. Subsequent approach and landing were uneventful, and emergency was terminated after landing. All passenger and cabin crew were kept informed by PA and after landing. No adverse comments or complaints were heard. Company flight control was called on the ground after landing, since time was not available in the air. Company duty pilot/chief pilot was also contacted. Since I had just completed my annual recurrent training a week prior, I felt fully in control of this situation. Our company is transitioning to 'boeing' procedures, complete with new non normal books/quick reference procedures. It so happens I had this exact abnormal in my simulator training. Special emphasis on recognizing and confirming the appropriate malfunction was emphasized, since it is easy to mistake problems and read the wrong checklist. This scenario was sort of 'deja vu' for me, without the benefit of simulator 'freeze' or a 'snapshot' back to where the problem began. I used to feel academic sits in ground school were square fillers, but now I have first hand experience of the benefits of my company's training programs for line operations.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B757 FLT CREW PERFORMS A GAR AFTER RECEIVING A TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREEMENT LIGHT. AFTER PERFORMING THE CHKLISTS, A NORMAL LNDG MADE AT SLC, UT.

Narrative: ON APCH TO SLC, AT 11000 FT MSL, 210 KIAS, THE FO, WHO WAS FLYING, CALLED FOR FLAPS 1. I SET THE FLAP LEVER TO FLAPS 1 SETTING AND OBSERVED A TRAILING EDGE FLAP LIGHT ABOVE THE FLAP INDICATOR FOLLOWED BY A TRAILING EDGE FLAP DISAGREEMENT LIGHT ON THE EICAS PANEL. A GAR WAS INITIATED, AN EMER DECLARED AND TWR/APCH CTL VECTORED THE ACFT TO AVOID OTHER TFC AND GIVE US TIME TO COMPLETE OUR NON NORMAL CHKLIST. THE QRH WAS FOLLOWED WITH ALTERNATE FLAPS SELECTED. A FLAP 20 DEG APCH AND LNDG WAS BRIEFED. SUBSEQUENT APCH AND LNDG WERE UNEVENTFUL, AND EMER WAS TERMINATED AFTER LNDG. ALL PAX AND CABIN CREW WERE KEPT INFORMED BY PA AND AFTER LNDG. NO ADVERSE COMMENTS OR COMPLAINTS WERE HEARD. COMPANY FLT CTL WAS CALLED ON THE GND AFTER LNDG, SINCE TIME WAS NOT AVAILABLE IN THE AIR. COMPANY DUTY PLT/CHIEF PLT WAS ALSO CONTACTED. SINCE I HAD JUST COMPLETED MY ANNUAL RECURRENT TRAINING A WK PRIOR, I FELT FULLY IN CTL OF THIS SIT. OUR COMPANY IS TRANSITIONING TO 'BOEING' PROCS, COMPLETE WITH NEW NON NORMAL BOOKS/QUICK REF PROCS. IT SO HAPPENS I HAD THIS EXACT ABNORMAL IN MY SIMULATOR TRAINING. SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON RECOGNIZING AND CONFIRMING THE APPROPRIATE MALFUNCTION WAS EMPHASIZED, SINCE IT IS EASY TO MISTAKE PROBS AND READ THE WRONG CHKLIST. THIS SCENARIO WAS SORT OF 'DEJA VU' FOR ME, WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF SIMULATOR 'FREEZE' OR A 'SNAPSHOT' BACK TO WHERE THE PROB BEGAN. I USED TO FEEL ACADEMIC SITS IN GND SCHOOL WERE SQUARE FILLERS, BUT NOW I HAVE FIRST HAND EXPERIENCE OF THE BENEFITS OF MY COMPANY'S TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR LINE OPS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.