A canadair CL65 after takeoff at 500 ft, diverted due to loss of nose down trim on captain's trim sw...

Attributes
ACN	576177
Time
Date	200303
Day	Mon
Local Time Of Day	1201 To 1800
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	agl single value : 500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Daylight
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : zzz.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Navigation In Use	other
Flight Phase	climbout : initial
Route In Use	approach : straight in arrival : on vectors departure : on vectors
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Qualification	pilot : atp
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 110 flight time total : 4800 flight time type : 3250
ASRS Report	576177
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : eicas warning other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	flight crew : landed in emergency condition flight crew : overrode automation flight crew : diverted to another airport flight crew : regained aircraft control
Consequence	other other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Aircraft Environmental Factor Flight Crew Human Performance Maintenance Human Performance
Primary Problem	Aircraft

Narrative:

After takeoff at approximately 500 ft AGL, nose down trim was attempted on the captain's trim switch. The trim input had no effect on aircraft trim, and 'stabilizer trim.' caution message followed by 'mach trim.' caution message appeared on EICAS. Several attempts to re-engage stabilizer trim 1 and 2 and mach trim were unsuccessful. With aircraft trim set at 7.0 (takeoff setting), control forces were heavy to maintain level flight. With ctlability and prolonged manual input causing fatigue, the decision was made to land immediately, while airport was in visual contact. ATC was informed and priority handling was requested and granted. ATC, flight attendant, passenger were informed by first officer as well as completing normal checklists. Expedited handling allowed the aircraft to land runway 18R at ZZZ within 3-4 mins without incident. Time constraints did not allow QRH/checklist to be consulted until after landing. Air carrier maintenance was consulted and informed the captain that the aircraft maintenance computer history indicated several previous failures logged by the computer. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated after the return to the field maintenance operated the stabilizer trim and was able to duplicate the failure 1 time, but the system then operated normally. The reporter said the maintenance people did advise the airplane did have several reports on the stabilizer trim in the main history computer. The reporter said the airplane was taken OTS, and the fix was not reported to the crew.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A CANADAIR CL65 AFTER TKOF AT 500 FT, DIVERTED DUE TO LOSS OF NOSE DOWN TRIM ON CAPT'S TRIM SWITCH. 'STABILIZER TRIM' AND 'MACH TRIM' CAUTION ON EICAS.

Narrative: AFTER TKOF AT APPROX 500 FT AGL, NOSE DOWN TRIM WAS ATTEMPTED ON THE CAPT'S TRIM SWITCH. THE TRIM INPUT HAD NO EFFECT ON ACFT TRIM, AND 'STABILIZER TRIM.' CAUTION MESSAGE FOLLOWED BY 'MACH TRIM.' CAUTION MESSAGE APPEARED ON EICAS. SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO RE-ENGAGE STABILIZER TRIM 1 AND 2 AND MACH TRIM WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. WITH ACFT TRIM SET AT 7.0 (TKOF SETTING), CTL FORCES WERE HVY TO MAINTAIN LEVEL FLT. WITH CTLABILITY AND PROLONGED MANUAL INPUT CAUSING FATIGUE, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO LAND IMMEDIATELY, WHILE ARPT WAS IN VISUAL CONTACT. ATC WAS INFORMED AND PRIORITY HANDLING WAS REQUESTED AND GRANTED. ATC, FLT ATTENDANT, PAX WERE INFORMED BY FO AS WELL AS COMPLETING NORMAL CHKLISTS. EXPEDITED HANDLING ALLOWED THE ACFT TO LAND RWY 18R AT ZZZ WITHIN 3-4 MINS WITHOUT INCIDENT. TIME CONSTRAINTS DID NOT ALLOW QRH/CHKLIST TO BE CONSULTED UNTIL AFTER LNDG. ACR MAINT WAS CONSULTED AND INFORMED THE CAPT THAT THE ACFT MAINT COMPUTER HISTORY INDICATED SEVERAL PREVIOUS FAILURES LOGGED BY THE COMPUTER. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED AFTER THE RETURN TO THE FIELD MAINT OPERATED THE STABILIZER TRIM AND WAS ABLE TO DUPLICATE THE FAILURE 1 TIME, BUT THE SYS THEN OPERATED NORMALLY. THE RPTR SAID THE MAINT PEOPLE DID ADVISE THE AIRPLANE DID HAVE SEVERAL RPTS ON THE STABILIZER TRIM IN THE MAIN HISTORY COMPUTER. THE RPTR SAID THE AIRPLANE WAS TAKEN OTS, AND THE FIX WAS NOT RPTED TO THE CREW.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A canadair CL65 after takeoff at 500 ft, diverted due to loss of nose down trim on captain's trim switch. 'Stabilizer trim' and 'mach trim' caution on EICAS.