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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 578380 |
Time | |
Date | 200303 |
Day | Sat |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : 2w5.airport |
State Reference | MD |
Altitude | msl single value : 1400 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tracon : pct.tracon |
Operator | general aviation : personal |
Make Model Name | Cessna 150 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Operator | other |
Make Model Name | Helicopter |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : atp pilot : cfi |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 10 flight time total : 10000 flight time type : 3000 |
ASRS Report | 578380 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | oversight : pic |
Events | |
Anomaly | airspace violation : entry non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other other : intercepting customs heli flc |
Resolutory Action | flight crew : landed as precaution |
Consequence | Other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Chart Or Publication Environmental Factor FAA Flight Crew Human Performance Airspace Structure |
Primary Problem | FAA |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Situations | |
Airspace Structure | special use : dcadiz.othersua |
Narrative:
Lack of available and clear information on ADIZ. The information on the washington/baltimore ADIZ was changed frequently in a short period of time, it was poorly distributed, and changes had short lead time on implementation. Event: intercepted by customs on return from esn to 2w5, penetration of the ADIZ without prior communication. I was not the PIC on this flight. I am the owner of the aircraft, and mr X was PIC. He made the calls and got the briefings. I was present during preflight preparations, and I heard him get a full briefing from the FSS. There was a 25 minute hold to get to speak with a briefer, and then the connection was broken toward the end of the flight plan filing. This required another call with another long hold and an attempt to get all of the information. When talking to the briefer, I heard PIC ask about the procedures for going from vkx, aircraft's home base, to esn and received and wrote down the squawks for both directions. From what I heard, he was very thorough, and he specifically confirmed with the briefer that he was to call in over 2w5 to pick up the clearance to return to vkx. Following the discussion with the briefer, we spent time reviewing the old procedures, because we had been told that the procedures were the same as before 'orange alert.' PIC also repeated what procedures we were going to follow to the FSS specialist, with frequencies, and they were not corrected. The problem was that no one mentioned that the requirement for 2 way communications now applies at the 30 mile ring. That information was not made available at the airport or through the FSS. Information is very hard to find on the ADIZ. In fact after returning from this mishap, I looked on the internet for 2 hours before I found any written descriptions of the new ADIZ. There are no posted NOTAMS and we requested all NOTAMS from FSS. Prior to the flight we thoroughly reviewed the latest VFR and IFR charts. They were very misleading, as the current charts are incorrect. The chart aid does not contain any definition of the ADIZ, and there is nothing in the approach chart section. We looked several places in that publication prior to this flight. There was one small picture of the ADIZ next to the telephone at the airport, but it had no written description. We did not find satisfactory information that would have prevented what happened anywhere. Prior to going to the aircraft for departure, I also looked at both bulletin boards at the airport, and there were no NOTAMS on the ADIZ. None of the management staff were at the airport, in fact there were very few people on the airport. We reviewed my old NOTAMS (now incorrect procedures) as I had been told both at the office (flight standards, FAA) and by the airport manager that everything was back as it was. Background: I had gone to the airport on a friday just after the 'orange alert' was lifted. I went out to run up the aircraft and check it over because it had not been flown since october. I needed to get a flight review, and PIC was going to do that with me. I was planning to fly that weekend with PIC in order to get current (we made that flight within days and this flight was one week later). Following the engine run-up, I went to the maintenance hangar where I saw the airport manager. We spoke and I asked if there were any changes in the procedures as compared to what they were before the 'orange alert.' he said, 'no.' I recalled the process which was to sign in at the office, call FSS and TRACON, squawk continuously, call after lift off etc., and I asked if we can do touch and go lndgs. He said, 'no' and advised me of the frequency change for TRACON, which I already had. This conversation led me to believe that I had all of the information necessary to fly out of the airport safely, and I did make extensive efforts to ensure that I had the current information. However, I did not have the telephone conversation with the briefer prior to the flight. Had I made that call, I would have specifically inquired about changes and from what I heard PIC say, I felt that he had questioned about procedures. Had I been the PIC on the return flight from esn, I would have called approach. I dialed in the frequencies and monitored them (I have only one communication). PIC wanted to show me where his house was located, and he intended to carefully observe the class B airspace and thought it would be better to wait and call over 2w5 as he told the briefer we would do. He dialed in the squawk we were given immediately after departing esn and made a direct line, following the GPS, toward 2w5. I monitored the charts and the LORAN and as we were discussing the names of the towns south of andrews, customs helicopter intercepted us and we spoke with them on 121.5. PIC asked where they wanted us to land, and they agreed that 2w5 was ok. So we landed and they took PIC's certificate number, the aircraft registration and airworthiness, and my telephone numbers. Then we completed the flight to vkx uneventfully. I recognize that it is the PIC responsibility to be knowledgeable of the flight to be conducted, however, the information must be accessible and clear. One should not have to go to multiple sources to get that kind of information.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: C-150 INADVERTENTLY PENETRATED DC ADIZ. INTERCEPTED BY CUSTOMS HELI AND FORCED TO LAND AT 2W5.
Narrative: LACK OF AVAILABLE AND CLR INFO ON ADIZ. THE INFO ON THE WASHINGTON/BALTIMORE ADIZ WAS CHANGED FREQUENTLY IN A SHORT PERIOD OF TIME, IT WAS POORLY DISTRIBUTED, AND CHANGES HAD SHORT LEAD TIME ON IMPLEMENTATION. EVENT: INTERCEPTED BY CUSTOMS ON RETURN FROM ESN TO 2W5, PENETRATION OF THE ADIZ WITHOUT PRIOR COM. I WAS NOT THE PIC ON THIS FLT. I AM THE OWNER OF THE ACFT, AND MR X WAS PIC. HE MADE THE CALLS AND GOT THE BRIEFINGS. I WAS PRESENT DURING PREFLT PREPARATIONS, AND I HEARD HIM GET A FULL BRIEFING FROM THE FSS. THERE WAS A 25 MINUTE HOLD TO GET TO SPEAK WITH A BRIEFER, AND THEN THE CONNECTION WAS BROKEN TOWARD THE END OF THE FLT PLAN FILING. THIS REQUIRED ANOTHER CALL WITH ANOTHER LONG HOLD AND AN ATTEMPT TO GET ALL OF THE INFO. WHEN TALKING TO THE BRIEFER, I HEARD PIC ASK ABOUT THE PROCS FOR GOING FROM VKX, ACFT'S HOME BASE, TO ESN AND RECEIVED AND WROTE DOWN THE SQUAWKS FOR BOTH DIRECTIONS. FROM WHAT I HEARD, HE WAS VERY THOROUGH, AND HE SPECIFICALLY CONFIRMED WITH THE BRIEFER THAT HE WAS TO CALL IN OVER 2W5 TO PICK UP THE CLRNC TO RETURN TO VKX. FOLLOWING THE DISCUSSION WITH THE BRIEFER, WE SPENT TIME REVIEWING THE OLD PROCS, BECAUSE WE HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE PROCS WERE THE SAME AS BEFORE 'ORANGE ALERT.' PIC ALSO REPEATED WHAT PROCS WE WERE GOING TO FOLLOW TO THE FSS SPECIALIST, WITH FREQUENCIES, AND THEY WERE NOT CORRECTED. THE PROB WAS THAT NO ONE MENTIONED THAT THE REQUIREMENT FOR 2 WAY COMS NOW APPLIES AT THE 30 MILE RING. THAT INFO WAS NOT MADE AVAILABLE AT THE ARPT OR THROUGH THE FSS. INFO IS VERY HARD TO FIND ON THE ADIZ. IN FACT AFTER RETURNING FROM THIS MISHAP, I LOOKED ON THE INTERNET FOR 2 HRS BEFORE I FOUND ANY WRITTEN DESCRIPTIONS OF THE NEW ADIZ. THERE ARE NO POSTED NOTAMS AND WE REQUESTED ALL NOTAMS FROM FSS. PRIOR TO THE FLT WE THOROUGHLY REVIEWED THE LATEST VFR AND IFR CHARTS. THEY WERE VERY MISLEADING, AS THE CURRENT CHARTS ARE INCORRECT. THE CHART AID DOES NOT CONTAIN ANY DEFINITION OF THE ADIZ, AND THERE IS NOTHING IN THE APCH CHART SECTION. WE LOOKED SEVERAL PLACES IN THAT PUBLICATION PRIOR TO THIS FLT. THERE WAS ONE SMALL PICTURE OF THE ADIZ NEXT TO THE TELEPHONE AT THE ARPT, BUT IT HAD NO WRITTEN DESCRIPTION. WE DID NOT FIND SATISFACTORY INFO THAT WOULD HAVE PREVENTED WHAT HAPPENED ANYWHERE. PRIOR TO GOING TO THE ACFT FOR DEP, I ALSO LOOKED AT BOTH BULLETIN BOARDS AT THE ARPT, AND THERE WERE NO NOTAMS ON THE ADIZ. NONE OF THE MANAGEMENT STAFF WERE AT THE ARPT, IN FACT THERE WERE VERY FEW PEOPLE ON THE ARPT. WE REVIEWED MY OLD NOTAMS (NOW INCORRECT PROCS) AS I HAD BEEN TOLD BOTH AT THE OFFICE (FLT STANDARDS, FAA) AND BY THE ARPT MGR THAT EVERYTHING WAS BACK AS IT WAS. BACKGROUND: I HAD GONE TO THE ARPT ON A FRIDAY JUST AFTER THE 'ORANGE ALERT' WAS LIFTED. I WENT OUT TO RUN UP THE ACFT AND CHK IT OVER BECAUSE IT HAD NOT BEEN FLOWN SINCE OCTOBER. I NEEDED TO GET A FLT REVIEW, AND PIC WAS GOING TO DO THAT WITH ME. I WAS PLANNING TO FLY THAT WEEKEND WITH PIC IN ORDER TO GET CURRENT (WE MADE THAT FLT WITHIN DAYS AND THIS FLT WAS ONE WEEK LATER). FOLLOWING THE ENGINE RUN-UP, I WENT TO THE MAINT HANGAR WHERE I SAW THE ARPT MGR. WE SPOKE AND I ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY CHANGES IN THE PROCS AS COMPARED TO WHAT THEY WERE BEFORE THE 'ORANGE ALERT.' HE SAID, 'NO.' I RECALLED THE PROCESS WHICH WAS TO SIGN IN AT THE OFFICE, CALL FSS AND TRACON, SQUAWK CONTINUOUSLY, CALL AFTER LIFT OFF ETC., AND I ASKED IF WE CAN DO TOUCH AND GO LNDGS. HE SAID, 'NO' AND ADVISED ME OF THE FREQ CHANGE FOR TRACON, WHICH I ALREADY HAD. THIS CONVERSATION LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT I HAD ALL OF THE INFO NECESSARY TO FLY OUT OF THE ARPT SAFELY, AND I DID MAKE EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO ENSURE THAT I HAD THE CURRENT INFO. HOWEVER, I DID NOT HAVE THE TELEPHONE CONVERSATION WITH THE BRIEFER PRIOR TO THE FLT. HAD I MADE THAT CALL, I WOULD HAVE SPECIFICALLY INQUIRED ABOUT CHANGES AND FROM WHAT I HEARD PIC SAY, I FELT THAT HE HAD QUESTIONED ABOUT PROCS. HAD I BEEN THE PIC ON THE RETURN FLT FROM ESN, I WOULD HAVE CALLED APCH. I DIALED IN THE FREQUENCIES AND MONITORED THEM (I HAVE ONLY ONE COM). PIC WANTED TO SHOW ME WHERE HIS HOUSE WAS LOCATED, AND HE INTENDED TO CAREFULLY OBSERVE THE CLASS B AIRSPACE AND THOUGHT IT WOULD BE BETTER TO WAIT AND CALL OVER 2W5 AS HE TOLD THE BRIEFER WE WOULD DO. HE DIALED IN THE SQUAWK WE WERE GIVEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER DEPARTING ESN AND MADE A DIRECT LINE, FOLLOWING THE GPS, TOWARD 2W5. I MONITORED THE CHARTS AND THE LORAN AND AS WE WERE DISCUSSING THE NAMES OF THE TOWNS S OF ANDREWS, CUSTOMS HELI INTERCEPTED US AND WE SPOKE WITH THEM ON 121.5. PIC ASKED WHERE THEY WANTED US TO LAND, AND THEY AGREED THAT 2W5 WAS OK. SO WE LANDED AND THEY TOOK PIC'S CERTIFICATE NUMBER, THE ACFT REGISTRATION AND AIRWORTHINESS, AND MY TELEPHONE NUMBERS. THEN WE COMPLETED THE FLT TO VKX UNEVENTFULLY. I RECOGNIZE THAT IT IS THE PIC RESPONSIBILITY TO BE KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE FLT TO BE CONDUCTED, HOWEVER, THE INFO MUST BE ACCESSIBLE AND CLR. ONE SHOULD NOT HAVE TO GO TO MULTIPLE SOURCES TO GET THAT KIND OF INFO.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.