Narrative:

The airspace/runway incursion in question developed as a result of pilot error in conjunction with a faulty radio. The flight returning to lgb was a training flight in preparation for the commercial license. The landing at trm was followed by an immediate 'taxi back' and takeoff. Along the return route of flight, both psp ATIS and riv ATIS were used to gather current altimeter settings. In the vicinity of ajo (at santa ana canyon) we attempted to tune lgb ATIS. At this time, the radio malfunctioned and would not xfer the frequency from 'standby' to 'active' with riv ATIS stuck in the 'active.' after several attempts to switch frequencys, we then turned the unit off to let it cool down and perhaps thereby become functional once again (which it did not). The first error in pilot judgement occurred when a time check was made immediately subsequent to the radio failure. With dead reckoning estimates, we figured we would reach the border of lgb airspace after the tower had closed. We then initiated a descent from 6500 ft to 2000 ft MSL in preparation for landing. We also knew there would not be an airspace conflict at ful or sli, both lying directly along our plotted course, as the towers at those airports had closed. We later discovered that our error in dead reckoning was exacerbated by a watch set 5 mins fast. The second error in judgement occurred when we decided not to use the lost communication transponder code 7600. The skewed reasoning behind this decision was that since we expected lgb to be closed at the time of our arrival, we did not think anyone would be present to observe the 7600 code. What we did not account for at the time was the potential for instrument approachs from socal into lgb who would have been able to use this information. We realized that we may have caused a traffic conflict with a cessna citation that landed 10 mins after we did. The next error in pilot conduct occurred after our flight entered lgb class D airspace. At this time, we were searching for traffic and planning our approach to runway 30. Approximately 1 mi south of the 91 freeway wbound at 2000 ft and abeam the tower, I briefly glanced at the tower. At this time, I did not observe a light-gun signal, nor did I expect to see one. We continued our traffic pattern by entering left downwind for runway 30, and then landed on the runway. We should have spent more time looking at the tower. The realization of our error occurred when the lgb police helicopter trained its spotlight on our aircraft as we moved along taxiway G. In hindsight, we realize that we should not have cut our planning so close, and that we should have confirmed the actual time/operation of the tower before crossing lgb airspace. We should also have been looking for light-gun signals. We could have diverted to cpm (compton), a near-by non twred airport. There, we could have made a cell phone call to receive lgb ATIS, confirming that the tower was indeed open/closed. Had we then discovered that the tower was open, we could have called the tower, notified them of our predicament and coordination entry to lgb airspace and landing at the airport. I have contacted cafi/safety counselor in regards to this matter. I have scheduled ground/flight training covering lost communication procedures and light-gun signals. I have included the importance of lost communication and interception procedures into my syllabus, and plan to instruct my students on the details of lost communication, including demonstrations of light-gun signals from the tower. I also plan to inform all of my flying acquaintances of my error so that they may never repeat my mistake. I also plan to invest in a handheld xceiver so that I will have a back-up.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: C152 ON TRAINING FLT VIOLATES LGB CLASS D AND LAND WITHOUT CLRNC.

Narrative: THE AIRSPACE/RWY INCURSION IN QUESTION DEVELOPED AS A RESULT OF PLT ERROR IN CONJUNCTION WITH A FAULTY RADIO. THE FLT RETURNING TO LGB WAS A TRAINING FLT IN PREPARATION FOR THE COMMERCIAL LICENSE. THE LNDG AT TRM WAS FOLLOWED BY AN IMMEDIATE 'TAXI BACK' AND TKOF. ALONG THE RETURN RTE OF FLT, BOTH PSP ATIS AND RIV ATIS WERE USED TO GATHER CURRENT ALTIMETER SETTINGS. IN THE VICINITY OF AJO (AT SANTA ANA CANYON) WE ATTEMPTED TO TUNE LGB ATIS. AT THIS TIME, THE RADIO MALFUNCTIONED AND WOULD NOT XFER THE FREQ FROM 'STANDBY' TO 'ACTIVE' WITH RIV ATIS STUCK IN THE 'ACTIVE.' AFTER SEVERAL ATTEMPTS TO SWITCH FREQS, WE THEN TURNED THE UNIT OFF TO LET IT COOL DOWN AND PERHAPS THEREBY BECOME FUNCTIONAL ONCE AGAIN (WHICH IT DID NOT). THE FIRST ERROR IN PLT JUDGEMENT OCCURRED WHEN A TIME CHK WAS MADE IMMEDIATELY SUBSEQUENT TO THE RADIO FAILURE. WITH DEAD RECKONING ESTIMATES, WE FIGURED WE WOULD REACH THE BORDER OF LGB AIRSPACE AFTER THE TWR HAD CLOSED. WE THEN INITIATED A DSCNT FROM 6500 FT TO 2000 FT MSL IN PREPARATION FOR LNDG. WE ALSO KNEW THERE WOULD NOT BE AN AIRSPACE CONFLICT AT FUL OR SLI, BOTH LYING DIRECTLY ALONG OUR PLOTTED COURSE, AS THE TWRS AT THOSE ARPTS HAD CLOSED. WE LATER DISCOVERED THAT OUR ERROR IN DEAD RECKONING WAS EXACERBATED BY A WATCH SET 5 MINS FAST. THE SECOND ERROR IN JUDGEMENT OCCURRED WHEN WE DECIDED NOT TO USE THE LOST COM XPONDER CODE 7600. THE SKEWED REASONING BEHIND THIS DECISION WAS THAT SINCE WE EXPECTED LGB TO BE CLOSED AT THE TIME OF OUR ARR, WE DID NOT THINK ANYONE WOULD BE PRESENT TO OBSERVE THE 7600 CODE. WHAT WE DID NOT ACCOUNT FOR AT THE TIME WAS THE POTENTIAL FOR INST APCHS FROM SOCAL INTO LGB WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO USE THIS INFO. WE REALIZED THAT WE MAY HAVE CAUSED A TFC CONFLICT WITH A CESSNA CITATION THAT LANDED 10 MINS AFTER WE DID. THE NEXT ERROR IN PLT CONDUCT OCCURRED AFTER OUR FLT ENTERED LGB CLASS D AIRSPACE. AT THIS TIME, WE WERE SEARCHING FOR TFC AND PLANNING OUR APCH TO RWY 30. APPROX 1 MI S OF THE 91 FREEWAY WBOUND AT 2000 FT AND ABEAM THE TWR, I BRIEFLY GLANCED AT THE TWR. AT THIS TIME, I DID NOT OBSERVE A LIGHT-GUN SIGNAL, NOR DID I EXPECT TO SEE ONE. WE CONTINUED OUR TFC PATTERN BY ENTERING L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 30, AND THEN LANDED ON THE RWY. WE SHOULD HAVE SPENT MORE TIME LOOKING AT THE TWR. THE REALIZATION OF OUR ERROR OCCURRED WHEN THE LGB POLICE HELI TRAINED ITS SPOTLIGHT ON OUR ACFT AS WE MOVED ALONG TXWY G. IN HINDSIGHT, WE REALIZE THAT WE SHOULD NOT HAVE CUT OUR PLANNING SO CLOSE, AND THAT WE SHOULD HAVE CONFIRMED THE ACTUAL TIME/OP OF THE TWR BEFORE XING LGB AIRSPACE. WE SHOULD ALSO HAVE BEEN LOOKING FOR LIGHT-GUN SIGNALS. WE COULD HAVE DIVERTED TO CPM (COMPTON), A NEAR-BY NON TWRED ARPT. THERE, WE COULD HAVE MADE A CELL PHONE CALL TO RECEIVE LGB ATIS, CONFIRMING THAT THE TWR WAS INDEED OPEN/CLOSED. HAD WE THEN DISCOVERED THAT THE TWR WAS OPEN, WE COULD HAVE CALLED THE TWR, NOTIFIED THEM OF OUR PREDICAMENT AND COORD ENTRY TO LGB AIRSPACE AND LNDG AT THE ARPT. I HAVE CONTACTED CAFI/SAFETY COUNSELOR IN REGARDS TO THIS MATTER. I HAVE SCHEDULED GND/FLT TRAINING COVERING LOST COM PROCS AND LIGHT-GUN SIGNALS. I HAVE INCLUDED THE IMPORTANCE OF LOST COM AND INTERCEPTION PROCS INTO MY SYLLABUS, AND PLAN TO INSTRUCT MY STUDENTS ON THE DETAILS OF LOST COM, INCLUDING DEMONSTRATIONS OF LIGHT-GUN SIGNALS FROM THE TWR. I ALSO PLAN TO INFORM ALL OF MY FLYING ACQUAINTANCES OF MY ERROR SO THAT THEY MAY NEVER REPEAT MY MISTAKE. I ALSO PLAN TO INVEST IN A HANDHELD XCEIVER SO THAT I WILL HAVE A BACK-UP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.