Narrative:

During climb and while talking to sdf departure, we got a TCAS RA showing a target at 12:00 O'clock, level and showing a climb. TCASII commanded a full scale (6000 FPM) climb and I as PF increased climb rate to 3000 FPM (the maximum we could safely do). We called sdf departure to report the RA and ask about the target. He said he had no target within 5 miles of us, so I hit the TCAS press to test button. TCAS test reported 'test ok.' I then asked the lead flight attendant to do a ped walk and he reported back that a computer was in use in violation of the sterile environment condition. The computer, a 'dell inspiration 8000,' with rptedly no transmission capability and no external power pack, was shutdown for the remainder of the flight and TCAS functioned normally with no further false RA's or TA's. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the PIC stated that the flight had been cleared to 10000, so there was no altitude deviation involved. The reporter stated that he had no direct knowledge as to the reliability of the TCAS system, or it's ability to detect 'real' traffic while resolving a false warning instigated by a passenger's electronic device. Reporter advised the company of the incident, but the only feedback was from the union safety representative who simply asked him if he had responded to the RA. The PIC said that the company appears to shy away from these issues of 'ped's'. The PIC talked with the passenger who appeared to be quite contrite over the issue, while failing to state her reasons for using the computer prior to any flight attendant announcement. The reporter believes that the issue of reliability of the TCAS system during a scenario such as this is a key safety issue.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC-9 FLT CREW RECEIVED A FALSE TCAS RA DURING DEP CLIMB AND INCREASED THEIR RATE OF CLB TO AVOID A FALSE TARGET APPARENTLY GENERATED BY A PAX LAPTOP COMPUTER.

Narrative: DURING CLB AND WHILE TALKING TO SDF DEP, WE GOT A TCAS RA SHOWING A TARGET AT 12:00 O'CLOCK, LEVEL AND SHOWING A CLB. TCASII COMMANDED A FULL SCALE (6000 FPM) CLB AND I AS PF INCREASED CLB RATE TO 3000 FPM (THE MAX WE COULD SAFELY DO). WE CALLED SDF DEP TO RPT THE RA AND ASK ABOUT THE TARGET. HE SAID HE HAD NO TARGET WITHIN 5 MILES OF US, SO I HIT THE TCAS PRESS TO TEST BUTTON. TCAS TEST RPTED 'TEST OK.' I THEN ASKED THE LEAD FA TO DO A PED WALK AND HE RPTED BACK THAT A COMPUTER WAS IN USE IN VIOLATION OF THE STERILE ENVIRONMENT CONDITION. THE COMPUTER, A 'DELL INSPIRATION 8000,' WITH RPTEDLY NO XMISSION CAPABILITY AND NO EXTERNAL POWER PACK, WAS SHUTDOWN FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT AND TCAS FUNCTIONED NORMALLY WITH NO FURTHER FALSE RA'S OR TA'S. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE PIC STATED THAT THE FLT HAD BEEN CLRED TO 10000, SO THERE WAS NO ALT DEV INVOLVED. THE RPTR STATED THAT HE HAD NO DIRECT KNOWLEDGE AS TO THE RELIABILITY OF THE TCAS SYS, OR IT'S ABILITY TO DETECT 'REAL' TFC WHILE RESOLVING A FALSE WARNING INSTIGATED BY A PAX'S ELECTRONIC DEVICE. RPTR ADVISED THE COMPANY OF THE INCIDENT, BUT THE ONLY FEEDBACK WAS FROM THE UNION SAFETY REPRESENTATIVE WHO SIMPLY ASKED HIM IF HE HAD RESPONDED TO THE RA. THE PIC SAID THAT THE COMPANY APPEARS TO SHY AWAY FROM THESE ISSUES OF 'PED'S'. THE PIC TALKED WITH THE PAX WHO APPEARED TO BE QUITE CONTRITE OVER THE ISSUE, WHILE FAILING TO STATE HER REASONS FOR USING THE COMPUTER PRIOR TO ANY FA ANNOUNCEMENT. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE ISSUE OF RELIABILITY OF THE TCAS SYS DURING A SCENARIO SUCH AS THIS IS A KEY SAFETY ISSUE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.