Narrative:

PF: PIC, left seat. Conditions: night, dry, good visibility, gusty winds, crew well rested, first flight of the day. While departing on a passenger leg from teb-pbi, we received the following taxi clearance out of the FBO: 'aircraft X, taxi to runway 1, hold short of runway 6.' at this moment the first breakdown occurred in the head of the PIC. Though the correct runway numbers 1 and 6 were heard, the PIC visualized the path from FBO to runway 24 with a hold short occurring at the threshold of runway 19. Just as we were exiting the ramp area, and as we were making the erroneous left turn onto taxiway left, we were checking brakes and thrust reversers. Also at that time tower (combined operations) cleared us to cross runway 6, which the PIC had visualized as being runway 19. Prior to crossing runway 19, both pilots visually cleared the final of runways 19/01. The PIC's high level of familiarity with the airport most likely led to a detrimental level of complacency on his part. Upon receipt of the initial taxi clearance, the sic asked the PIC if he was familiar. The PIC's response was yes. As the PIC began the left turn onto taxiway left, the sic felt that something might be wrong, but by the time he was able to consult the airport diagram, the aircraft was crossing the threshold of runway 19. During the visual check of final, the only aircraft sighted was a company citation vii on a wide left base for runway 1, on the circle off of the ILS runway 6 approach. There was no immediate conflict and traffic flow was not affected. The PIC and sic, are in agreement that no level of familiarity can replace the deliberate, methodical review of taxi instructions using the airport diagram. Although the following factors in no way absolve the crew of the responsibility for careful execution of all flight crew duties, the following lessons learned may improve the safety environment and reduce the likelihood of future runway incursions at teterboro airport. 1) taxi clrncs given using taxiway letters can help to alleviate confusion for flight crews. While it may not have had an effect on our outcome, this policy might contribute to an overall reduction in runway incursions. 2) the short segment of taxiway left to the left of the entryway to FBO should be renamed to be a part of taxiway P. Aircraft exiting the FBO ramp, as well as aircraft approaching nebound on taxiway P may be confused at this intersection with the 2 segments of taxiway left making a 90 degree turn at that point.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: RWY INCURSION BY A CITATION X OFF RWY 19 AT TEB, NJ.

Narrative: PF: PIC, L SEAT. CONDITIONS: NIGHT, DRY, GOOD VISIBILITY, GUSTY WINDS, CREW WELL RESTED, FIRST FLT OF THE DAY. WHILE DEPARTING ON A PAX LEG FROM TEB-PBI, WE RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING TAXI CLRNC OUT OF THE FBO: 'ACFT X, TAXI TO RWY 1, HOLD SHORT OF RWY 6.' AT THIS MOMENT THE FIRST BREAKDOWN OCCURRED IN THE HEAD OF THE PIC. THOUGH THE CORRECT RWY NUMBERS 1 AND 6 WERE HEARD, THE PIC VISUALIZED THE PATH FROM FBO TO RWY 24 WITH A HOLD SHORT OCCURRING AT THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 19. JUST AS WE WERE EXITING THE RAMP AREA, AND AS WE WERE MAKING THE ERRONEOUS L TURN ONTO TXWY L, WE WERE CHKING BRAKES AND THRUST REVERSERS. ALSO AT THAT TIME TWR (COMBINED OPS) CLRED US TO CROSS RWY 6, WHICH THE PIC HAD VISUALIZED AS BEING RWY 19. PRIOR TO XING RWY 19, BOTH PLTS VISUALLY CLRED THE FINAL OF RWYS 19/01. THE PIC'S HIGH LEVEL OF FAMILIARITY WITH THE ARPT MOST LIKELY LED TO A DETRIMENTAL LEVEL OF COMPLACENCY ON HIS PART. UPON RECEIPT OF THE INITIAL TAXI CLRNC, THE SIC ASKED THE PIC IF HE WAS FAMILIAR. THE PIC'S RESPONSE WAS YES. AS THE PIC BEGAN THE L TURN ONTO TXWY L, THE SIC FELT THAT SOMETHING MIGHT BE WRONG, BUT BY THE TIME HE WAS ABLE TO CONSULT THE ARPT DIAGRAM, THE ACFT WAS XING THE THRESHOLD OF RWY 19. DURING THE VISUAL CHK OF FINAL, THE ONLY ACFT SIGHTED WAS A COMPANY CITATION VII ON A WIDE L BASE FOR RWY 1, ON THE CIRCLE OFF OF THE ILS RWY 6 APCH. THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE CONFLICT AND TFC FLOW WAS NOT AFFECTED. THE PIC AND SIC, ARE IN AGREEMENT THAT NO LEVEL OF FAMILIARITY CAN REPLACE THE DELIBERATE, METHODICAL REVIEW OF TAXI INSTRUCTIONS USING THE ARPT DIAGRAM. ALTHOUGH THE FOLLOWING FACTORS IN NO WAY ABSOLVE THE CREW OF THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CAREFUL EXECUTION OF ALL FLT CREW DUTIES, THE FOLLOWING LESSONS LEARNED MAY IMPROVE THE SAFETY ENVIRONMENT AND REDUCE THE LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE RWY INCURSIONS AT TETERBORO ARPT. 1) TAXI CLRNCS GIVEN USING TXWY LETTERS CAN HELP TO ALLEVIATE CONFUSION FOR FLT CREWS. WHILE IT MAY NOT HAVE HAD AN EFFECT ON OUR OUTCOME, THIS POLICY MIGHT CONTRIBUTE TO AN OVERALL REDUCTION IN RWY INCURSIONS. 2) THE SHORT SEGMENT OF TXWY L TO THE L OF THE ENTRYWAY TO FBO SHOULD BE RENAMED TO BE A PART OF TXWY P. ACFT EXITING THE FBO RAMP, AS WELL AS ACFT APCHING NEBOUND ON TXWY P MAY BE CONFUSED AT THIS INTXN WITH THE 2 SEGMENTS OF TXWY L MAKING A 90 DEG TURN AT THAT POINT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.