Narrative:

Landed runway 6 manila. Instructed by tower to exit runway on high speed taxiway R1 and contact ground. Cleared runway on taxiway R1 and began to turn onto taxiway R2 just as ground was responding to our initial call. (ATIS stated that controller training was in progress.) ground instructed us to txwys right, C, to parking. Controller's voice inflection was interpreted by crew as not to turn onto taxiway R2 but to continue on high speed taxiway R1 to taxiway C. It appeared to crew that due to aircraft size and position a safe turn onto taxiway R2 would have been questionable. As we approached taxiway C we were instructed to 'hold position' by a different controller, which we did. We then noticed a B737 at the approach end of runway 13 that appeared to have just commenced a takeoff roll but was now stopping. We were clear of and continued to hold short of runway 13. As B737 cleared off runway 13 we were instructed to turn left on taxiway C and taxi to parking. Our safety concern is that a heavy MD11 was cleared to exit runway 6 on a high speed taxiway R1 which intersects the parallel taxiway C, at the departure end of an active runway 13 with no instruction to hold short of that runway and while apparently clearing aircraft for takeoff on that runway. While an actual conflict did not occur, the potential was great since published procedures between aircraft landing on runway 6 and aircraft departing on runway 13 was not complied with by ATC.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD11 FLT CREW LNDG PRLL QUESTIONS ATC'S SEPARATION AND COMPLIANCE WITH COMMERCIAL CHART INFO.

Narrative: LANDED RWY 6 MANILA. INSTRUCTED BY TWR TO EXIT RWY ON HIGH SPD TXWY R1 AND CONTACT GND. CLRED RWY ON TXWY R1 AND BEGAN TO TURN ONTO TXWY R2 JUST AS GND WAS RESPONDING TO OUR INITIAL CALL. (ATIS STATED THAT CTLR TRAINING WAS IN PROGRESS.) GND INSTRUCTED US TO TXWYS R, C, TO PARKING. CTLR'S VOICE INFLECTION WAS INTERPRETED BY CREW AS NOT TO TURN ONTO TXWY R2 BUT TO CONTINUE ON HIGH SPD TXWY R1 TO TXWY C. IT APPEARED TO CREW THAT DUE TO ACFT SIZE AND POS A SAFE TURN ONTO TXWY R2 WOULD HAVE BEEN QUESTIONABLE. AS WE APCHED TXWY C WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO 'HOLD POS' BY A DIFFERENT CTLR, WHICH WE DID. WE THEN NOTICED A B737 AT THE APCH END OF RWY 13 THAT APPEARED TO HAVE JUST COMMENCED A TKOF ROLL BUT WAS NOW STOPPING. WE WERE CLR OF AND CONTINUED TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 13. AS B737 CLRED OFF RWY 13 WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN L ON TXWY C AND TAXI TO PARKING. OUR SAFETY CONCERN IS THAT A HVY MD11 WAS CLRED TO EXIT RWY 6 ON A HIGH SPD TXWY R1 WHICH INTERSECTS THE PARALLEL TXWY C, AT THE DEP END OF AN ACTIVE RWY 13 WITH NO INSTRUCTION TO HOLD SHORT OF THAT RWY AND WHILE APPARENTLY CLRING ACFT FOR TKOF ON THAT RWY. WHILE AN ACTUAL CONFLICT DID NOT OCCUR, THE POTENTIAL WAS GREAT SINCE PUBLISHED PROCS BTWN ACFT LNDG ON RWY 6 AND ACFT DEPARTING ON RWY 13 WAS NOT COMPLIED WITH BY ATC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.