Narrative:

We were ferrying between apa and mso to enplane passenger for a trip to bed. WX forecast at mso required an alternate, which was filed as bil. Preflight fuel calculations showed we were carrying enough fuel to fly to mso, shoot an approach, fly to bil and land with 1 hour 50 mins of fuel remaining. Upon arrival to the karso area, ATIS reported WX lower than forecast and below minimums. We elected to hold over mso VOR and calculated we could hold for approximately 1 hour while waiting for the WX to improve before diverting to our alternate. After 20 mins, WX had improved to above minimums. We began accepting vectors for the ILS and started to reconfigure the airplane. I called for 'flaps 5 degrees,' which were selected and followed by a 'flaps fail' amber cas message. The captain (PNF) pulled out the appropriate checklist and followed its instructions. The flaps would not reset and remained fixed between 0-5 degrees we advised ATC that we needed to hold at konna NDB/LOM. We began the 'landing with flaps inoperative' checklist, which directed us to recalculate landing distance. The recalculated distance with flaps 0 degrees was 9300 ft. Mso's runway was only 9000 ft and would not be long enough. We reviewed charts for the area to find a sufficiently long runway, both bil and gtf would work (both in excess of 10500 ft). Using 'afis' we checked WX at both places. Gtf was IFR with light snow. Bil was VFR, so we chose to divert to bil. With flaps at 0-5 degrees and slats extended, we were limited to FL180 (which was unusable due to low altimeter settings) so ATC kept us at 17000 ft. We calculated a maximum range speed of approximately 200 KTS and flew that speed to bil. The FMS showed landing at bil with 1400 pounds (approximately 45 mins) of fuel, initially. As the flight progressed the FMS continued to recalculate fuel at landing, eventually showing 1200 pounds (approximately 35 mins). Since any unexpected delays would be taking from our remaining reserve, we declared 'minimum fuel' to ATC. (They asked if we wanted to land at hln instead, but because hln's runway is only 9000 ft, we declined.) as we approached bil we again reminded approach control of our fuel situation and also advised then of our flap problem, that we would have a long rollout upon landing and that we wanted the fire trucks standing by. On final our approach was stable with an airspeed of vref - vref + 10 KTS. We touched down in the touchdown zone, quickly lowered the nose, deployed the speed brakes and thrust reversers, slowing quickly. We turned off the runway with approximately 1500 ft remaining runway, and just over 1200 pounds of remaining fuel (approximately 35 mins), obviously below the legally required 45 mins. There were several factors working in concert against us: the below forecast and below minimums WX, the flap problem, the sparcity of sufficiently long runways, the poor WX at 1 airport with an acceptable runway. The now-worthless preflight fuel-to-alternate calculations (calculated with flaps up/slats retracted) and the actual higher fuel-to-alternate burn. Any one factor alone would not have been problematic, but when added together created a highly undesirable situation. (I would hesitate to call the event 'dangerous' but certainly our typically broad margins of safety had been narrowed.) perhaps the only way to improve the situation would be to carry extra fuel -- even though we were already carrying far more than legally required. Under the circumstances, I think we worked well together as a crew. We followed the checklists as trained, divided tasks (flying, calling the company, checking WX, searching for viable alternates). We remained calm, discussed and resolved differences of opinion or perception and eventually came to a successful outcome. I think our experience demonstrates the value of flight standards and good training.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MINIMUM FUEL FAR REQUIREMENT NOT MET WHEN A CE-750 FLT CREW EXPERIENCES A FLAP FAILURE AND HAVE TO FIND AN ALTERNATE THAT MEETS THEIR RWY LENGTH LNDG CRITERION WHEN DIVERTING TO BIL, MT.

Narrative: WE WERE FERRYING BTWN APA AND MSO TO ENPLANE PAX FOR A TRIP TO BED. WX FORECAST AT MSO REQUIRED AN ALTERNATE, WHICH WAS FILED AS BIL. PREFLT FUEL CALCULATIONS SHOWED WE WERE CARRYING ENOUGH FUEL TO FLY TO MSO, SHOOT AN APCH, FLY TO BIL AND LAND WITH 1 HR 50 MINS OF FUEL REMAINING. UPON ARR TO THE KARSO AREA, ATIS RPTED WX LOWER THAN FORECAST AND BELOW MINIMUMS. WE ELECTED TO HOLD OVER MSO VOR AND CALCULATED WE COULD HOLD FOR APPROX 1 HR WHILE WAITING FOR THE WX TO IMPROVE BEFORE DIVERTING TO OUR ALTERNATE. AFTER 20 MINS, WX HAD IMPROVED TO ABOVE MINIMUMS. WE BEGAN ACCEPTING VECTORS FOR THE ILS AND STARTED TO RECONFIGURE THE AIRPLANE. I CALLED FOR 'FLAPS 5 DEGS,' WHICH WERE SELECTED AND FOLLOWED BY A 'FLAPS FAIL' AMBER CAS MESSAGE. THE CAPT (PNF) PULLED OUT THE APPROPRIATE CHKLIST AND FOLLOWED ITS INSTRUCTIONS. THE FLAPS WOULD NOT RESET AND REMAINED FIXED BTWN 0-5 DEGS WE ADVISED ATC THAT WE NEEDED TO HOLD AT KONNA NDB/LOM. WE BEGAN THE 'LNDG WITH FLAPS INOP' CHKLIST, WHICH DIRECTED US TO RECALCULATE LNDG DISTANCE. THE RECALCULATED DISTANCE WITH FLAPS 0 DEGS WAS 9300 FT. MSO'S RWY WAS ONLY 9000 FT AND WOULD NOT BE LONG ENOUGH. WE REVIEWED CHARTS FOR THE AREA TO FIND A SUFFICIENTLY LONG RWY, BOTH BIL AND GTF WOULD WORK (BOTH IN EXCESS OF 10500 FT). USING 'AFIS' WE CHKED WX AT BOTH PLACES. GTF WAS IFR WITH LIGHT SNOW. BIL WAS VFR, SO WE CHOSE TO DIVERT TO BIL. WITH FLAPS AT 0-5 DEGS AND SLATS EXTENDED, WE WERE LIMITED TO FL180 (WHICH WAS UNUSABLE DUE TO LOW ALTIMETER SETTINGS) SO ATC KEPT US AT 17000 FT. WE CALCULATED A MAX RANGE SPD OF APPROX 200 KTS AND FLEW THAT SPD TO BIL. THE FMS SHOWED LNDG AT BIL WITH 1400 LBS (APPROX 45 MINS) OF FUEL, INITIALLY. AS THE FLT PROGRESSED THE FMS CONTINUED TO RECALCULATE FUEL AT LNDG, EVENTUALLY SHOWING 1200 LBS (APPROX 35 MINS). SINCE ANY UNEXPECTED DELAYS WOULD BE TAKING FROM OUR REMAINING RESERVE, WE DECLARED 'MINIMUM FUEL' TO ATC. (THEY ASKED IF WE WANTED TO LAND AT HLN INSTEAD, BUT BECAUSE HLN'S RWY IS ONLY 9000 FT, WE DECLINED.) AS WE APCHED BIL WE AGAIN REMINDED APCH CTL OF OUR FUEL SIT AND ALSO ADVISED THEN OF OUR FLAP PROB, THAT WE WOULD HAVE A LONG ROLLOUT UPON LNDG AND THAT WE WANTED THE FIRE TRUCKS STANDING BY. ON FINAL OUR APCH WAS STABLE WITH AN AIRSPD OF VREF - VREF + 10 KTS. WE TOUCHED DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE, QUICKLY LOWERED THE NOSE, DEPLOYED THE SPD BRAKES AND THRUST REVERSERS, SLOWING QUICKLY. WE TURNED OFF THE RWY WITH APPROX 1500 FT REMAINING RWY, AND JUST OVER 1200 LBS OF REMAINING FUEL (APPROX 35 MINS), OBVIOUSLY BELOW THE LEGALLY REQUIRED 45 MINS. THERE WERE SEVERAL FACTORS WORKING IN CONCERT AGAINST US: THE BELOW FORECAST AND BELOW MINIMUMS WX, THE FLAP PROB, THE SPARCITY OF SUFFICIENTLY LONG RWYS, THE POOR WX AT 1 ARPT WITH AN ACCEPTABLE RWY. THE NOW-WORTHLESS PREFLT FUEL-TO-ALTERNATE CALCULATIONS (CALCULATED WITH FLAPS UP/SLATS RETRACTED) AND THE ACTUAL HIGHER FUEL-TO-ALTERNATE BURN. ANY ONE FACTOR ALONE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN PROBLEMATIC, BUT WHEN ADDED TOGETHER CREATED A HIGHLY UNDESIRABLE SIT. (I WOULD HESITATE TO CALL THE EVENT 'DANGEROUS' BUT CERTAINLY OUR TYPICALLY BROAD MARGINS OF SAFETY HAD BEEN NARROWED.) PERHAPS THE ONLY WAY TO IMPROVE THE SIT WOULD BE TO CARRY EXTRA FUEL -- EVEN THOUGH WE WERE ALREADY CARRYING FAR MORE THAN LEGALLY REQUIRED. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, I THINK WE WORKED WELL TOGETHER AS A CREW. WE FOLLOWED THE CHKLISTS AS TRAINED, DIVIDED TASKS (FLYING, CALLING THE COMPANY, CHKING WX, SEARCHING FOR VIABLE ALTERNATES). WE REMAINED CALM, DISCUSSED AND RESOLVED DIFFERENCES OF OPINION OR PERCEPTION AND EVENTUALLY CAME TO A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME. I THINK OUR EXPERIENCE DEMONSTRATES THE VALUE OF FLT STANDARDS AND GOOD TRAINING.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.