37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 582241 |
Time | |
Date | 200305 |
Day | Wed |
Local Time Of Day | 1201 To 1800 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : ntu.airport |
State Reference | VA |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : ngu.tower tower : orf.tower |
Operator | other |
Make Model Name | B707 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : touch and go landing : go around |
Route In Use | approach : traffic pattern approach : visual |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : orf.tower |
Make Model Name | Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer |
Flight Phase | descent : approach landing : go around |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : military |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : cfi pilot : atp |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 72 flight time total : 2500 flight time type : 1774 |
ASRS Report | 582241 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : military |
Function | instruction : trainee |
Events | |
Anomaly | airspace violation : entry conflict : airborne less severe incursion : landing without clearance non adherence : published procedure other spatial deviation |
Resolutory Action | controller : issued new clearance controller : separated traffic |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Flight Crew Human Performance Airspace Structure ATC Facility ATC Human Performance Aircraft |
Primary Problem | Ambiguous |
Air Traffic Incident | Inter Facility Coordination Failure |
Narrative:
We were on a training flight. Student pilot (first flight in kc-130), student navigator, student engineer, engineer ip, navigation ip. We left the warning area off of the virginia coast bound for NAS norfolk -- or so I thought. When I checked in with giant killer, I told them I had ATIS information at NAS norfolk and requested the precision approach to the VFR touch-and-go pattern at NAS norfolk. I proceeded to brief this approach to the crew. While on vectors for the precision approach, I was keeping track of our position using the TACAN. While the vectors we were being given did not jive with what we should have been given for the runway in use at NAS norfolk, I did not think it unusual. Maybe they had changed runways and not updated ATIS. Wouldn't be the first time. They vectored us to final and handed us to the precision approach radar final controller. When I looked at my TACAN needle, it pointed to the left 40 degrees, but the DME as about right. I looked up and saw a runway. Military aircraft were parked on the ramp. I asked in the cockpit what was wrong with the TACAN. Nobody answered but we were thinking TACAN 40 degree lock-off. It has happened before. Especially with the old equipment we fly. The controller started calling on course/on glide path. We got closer to the runway and the controller cleared us to land. He reported short field arresting gear de-rigged. I looked at the runway threshold and it was indeed de-rigged. That, and we had been cleared to land. I thought tower would not have cleared us to land without having a visual. Maybe the TACAN is wrong and my situational awareness is messed up. We did our touch-and-go and on the climb out, contacted NAS norfolk tower still thinking we were at NAS norfolk. The third try finally got a response but not what we wanted to hear, 'aircraft X, where are you?!' my heart stopped. All I could think was, 'what the F___ did we just do?' I replied that we were where they had just finished giving us precision approach radar vectors to. NAS norfolk tower told us to turn right immediately and head north as we were at NAS oceana. I did as instructed. The last thing I was going to do at this point was something on my own. I turned to roughly 360 degrees and asked what altitude they wanted me at. They replied 2000 ft. I climbed and followed the instructions. Little did I know that the instructions were going to take me through the final approach corridor of norfolk international airport. NAS norfolk tower told me to look left and asked if I saw an airport. I replied yes. They said report a 3 mi final with the gear. I did this only to be told that I was lining up on norfolk international. NAS norfolk tower said to turn right immediately and look for an airport at my 12 O'clock position. I did this and verified I saw an airport. They directed me to land and once on the deck, gave me telephone numbers to copy. At this point, I was ready to throw away my wings. How could something like this happen? We had 2 qualified navigators (one of the navs was the student pilot in training) and a student navigator on the flight deck, 2 engineers and myself. None of us picked up on the fact that we were being vectored to the wrong airport. ATC says they told us several times precision approach radar vectors for NAS oceana. Why didn't anybody pick up on this and say something about why we were shooting an approach to an airport at NAS oceana when I had briefed NAS norfolk and had that approach plate up? We had 3 approach plates dialed to the same approach. Nobody said a thing! What could we have done to break the chain of errors? I should have listened to my sixth sense telling me that something was wrong with this picture. I should have questioned the controller to make sure we were on the same sheet of music. When nobody replied to my question about the TACAN being 40 degrees off, I should have pressed for an answer and broken off the approach and gone and held somewhere until we could figure out what was going on. I should have verified with the approach plate field diagram before doing the touch-and-go that the field we were looking at was indeed NAS norfolk. But I trusted the precision approach radar controller more than I trusted my instincts and the TACAN readings. Why? Because in the past, the controller had been right more often than what my navigation instruments were. Chock it up to age of the equipment and past experience. During the ensuing telephone conversations between myself, the tower supervisor at NAS norfolk and the tower supervisor at norfolk international, it came to light that miscom was the order of the day. It was only by luck that no paint was swapped and no metal bent. Tower supervisor at norfolk international said he had to break off several aircraft because of our flight path across the final approach corridor. We have no TCASII on board so we never knew. If chambers tower knew we were at NAS oceana, why did they tell us to turn north instead of dialing up NAS oceana tower frequency and going from there and sorting things out? The tower supervisor at norfolk international said it was not the first time planes had been vectored for precision approach's into NAS oceana believing it was NAS norfolk and then landing a norfolk int'l on the second try thinking it was NAS norfolk. He said at least we had been caught in time to prevent that from happening. NAS oceana said they had tried calling us on the emergency frequencys 121.5 and 243.0 but had received no response. How could that be? We never heard anything! I had 121.5 in 2 radios, 243.0 in the third radio and was using the fourth radio for communication with ATC. We always hear something on the guard frequencys! I hope this narrative provides some insight into how a total breakdown of situational awareness and communication occurred and what can be done to prevent it from recurring. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the original request for the approach and traffic pattern work was found to be for norfolk NAS when the tapes were reviewed. The final controller was not named during the handoff from approach control so the assumption was that it was the ngu controller. There are often controllers in training at these facilities. Status on this day is unknown.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: FLYING A PAR APCH TO OCEANA NAS BELIEVING IT WAS TO NORFOLK NAS ENDS IN GREAT CONFUSION AND INCURSION INTO NORFOLK INTO ARPT'S CLASS C AIRSPACE WITH RESULTING TFC CONFLICTS.
Narrative: WE WERE ON A TRAINING FLT. STUDENT PLT (FIRST FLT IN KC-130), STUDENT NAVIGATOR, STUDENT ENGINEER, ENGINEER IP, NAV IP. WE LEFT THE WARNING AREA OFF OF THE VIRGINIA COAST BOUND FOR NAS NORFOLK -- OR SO I THOUGHT. WHEN I CHKED IN WITH GIANT KILLER, I TOLD THEM I HAD ATIS INFO AT NAS NORFOLK AND REQUESTED THE PRECISION APCH TO THE VFR TOUCH-AND-GO PATTERN AT NAS NORFOLK. I PROCEEDED TO BRIEF THIS APCH TO THE CREW. WHILE ON VECTORS FOR THE PRECISION APCH, I WAS KEEPING TRACK OF OUR POS USING THE TACAN. WHILE THE VECTORS WE WERE BEING GIVEN DID NOT JIVE WITH WHAT WE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN FOR THE RWY IN USE AT NAS NORFOLK, I DID NOT THINK IT UNUSUAL. MAYBE THEY HAD CHANGED RWYS AND NOT UPDATED ATIS. WOULDN'T BE THE FIRST TIME. THEY VECTORED US TO FINAL AND HANDED US TO THE PRECISION APCH RADAR FINAL CTLR. WHEN I LOOKED AT MY TACAN NEEDLE, IT POINTED TO THE L 40 DEGS, BUT THE DME AS ABOUT RIGHT. I LOOKED UP AND SAW A RWY. MIL ACFT WERE PARKED ON THE RAMP. I ASKED IN THE COCKPIT WHAT WAS WRONG WITH THE TACAN. NOBODY ANSWERED BUT WE WERE THINKING TACAN 40 DEG LOCK-OFF. IT HAS HAPPENED BEFORE. ESPECIALLY WITH THE OLD EQUIP WE FLY. THE CTLR STARTED CALLING ON COURSE/ON GLIDE PATH. WE GOT CLOSER TO THE RWY AND THE CTLR CLRED US TO LAND. HE RPTED SHORT FIELD ARRESTING GEAR DE-RIGGED. I LOOKED AT THE RWY THRESHOLD AND IT WAS INDEED DE-RIGGED. THAT, AND WE HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND. I THOUGHT TWR WOULD NOT HAVE CLRED US TO LAND WITHOUT HAVING A VISUAL. MAYBE THE TACAN IS WRONG AND MY SITUATIONAL AWARENESS IS MESSED UP. WE DID OUR TOUCH-AND-GO AND ON THE CLBOUT, CONTACTED NAS NORFOLK TWR STILL THINKING WE WERE AT NAS NORFOLK. THE THIRD TRY FINALLY GOT A RESPONSE BUT NOT WHAT WE WANTED TO HEAR, 'ACFT X, WHERE ARE YOU?!' MY HEART STOPPED. ALL I COULD THINK WAS, 'WHAT THE F___ DID WE JUST DO?' I REPLIED THAT WE WERE WHERE THEY HAD JUST FINISHED GIVING US PRECISION APCH RADAR VECTORS TO. NAS NORFOLK TWR TOLD US TO TURN R IMMEDIATELY AND HEAD N AS WE WERE AT NAS OCEANA. I DID AS INSTRUCTED. THE LAST THING I WAS GOING TO DO AT THIS POINT WAS SOMETHING ON MY OWN. I TURNED TO ROUGHLY 360 DEGS AND ASKED WHAT ALT THEY WANTED ME AT. THEY REPLIED 2000 FT. I CLBED AND FOLLOWED THE INSTRUCTIONS. LITTLE DID I KNOW THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS WERE GOING TO TAKE ME THROUGH THE FINAL APCH CORRIDOR OF NORFOLK INTL ARPT. NAS NORFOLK TWR TOLD ME TO LOOK L AND ASKED IF I SAW AN ARPT. I REPLIED YES. THEY SAID RPT A 3 MI FINAL WITH THE GEAR. I DID THIS ONLY TO BE TOLD THAT I WAS LINING UP ON NORFOLK INTL. NAS NORFOLK TWR SAID TO TURN R IMMEDIATELY AND LOOK FOR AN ARPT AT MY 12 O'CLOCK POS. I DID THIS AND VERIFIED I SAW AN ARPT. THEY DIRECTED ME TO LAND AND ONCE ON THE DECK, GAVE ME TELEPHONE NUMBERS TO COPY. AT THIS POINT, I WAS READY TO THROW AWAY MY WINGS. HOW COULD SOMETHING LIKE THIS HAPPEN? WE HAD 2 QUALIFIED NAVIGATORS (ONE OF THE NAVS WAS THE STUDENT PLT IN TRAINING) AND A STUDENT NAVIGATOR ON THE FLT DECK, 2 ENGINEERS AND MYSELF. NONE OF US PICKED UP ON THE FACT THAT WE WERE BEING VECTORED TO THE WRONG ARPT. ATC SAYS THEY TOLD US SEVERAL TIMES PRECISION APCH RADAR VECTORS FOR NAS OCEANA. WHY DIDN'T ANYBODY PICK UP ON THIS AND SAY SOMETHING ABOUT WHY WE WERE SHOOTING AN APCH TO AN ARPT AT NAS OCEANA WHEN I HAD BRIEFED NAS NORFOLK AND HAD THAT APCH PLATE UP? WE HAD 3 APCH PLATES DIALED TO THE SAME APCH. NOBODY SAID A THING! WHAT COULD WE HAVE DONE TO BREAK THE CHAIN OF ERRORS? I SHOULD HAVE LISTENED TO MY SIXTH SENSE TELLING ME THAT SOMETHING WAS WRONG WITH THIS PICTURE. I SHOULD HAVE QUESTIONED THE CTLR TO MAKE SURE WE WERE ON THE SAME SHEET OF MUSIC. WHEN NOBODY REPLIED TO MY QUESTION ABOUT THE TACAN BEING 40 DEGS OFF, I SHOULD HAVE PRESSED FOR AN ANSWER AND BROKEN OFF THE APCH AND GONE AND HELD SOMEWHERE UNTIL WE COULD FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. I SHOULD HAVE VERIFIED WITH THE APCH PLATE FIELD DIAGRAM BEFORE DOING THE TOUCH-AND-GO THAT THE FIELD WE WERE LOOKING AT WAS INDEED NAS NORFOLK. BUT I TRUSTED THE PRECISION APCH RADAR CTLR MORE THAN I TRUSTED MY INSTINCTS AND THE TACAN READINGS. WHY? BECAUSE IN THE PAST, THE CTLR HAD BEEN RIGHT MORE OFTEN THAN WHAT MY NAV INSTS WERE. CHOCK IT UP TO AGE OF THE EQUIP AND PAST EXPERIENCE. DURING THE ENSUING TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS BTWN MYSELF, THE TWR SUPVR AT NAS NORFOLK AND THE TWR SUPVR AT NORFOLK INTL, IT CAME TO LIGHT THAT MISCOM WAS THE ORDER OF THE DAY. IT WAS ONLY BY LUCK THAT NO PAINT WAS SWAPPED AND NO METAL BENT. TWR SUPVR AT NORFOLK INTL SAID HE HAD TO BREAK OFF SEVERAL ACFT BECAUSE OF OUR FLT PATH ACROSS THE FINAL APCH CORRIDOR. WE HAVE NO TCASII ON BOARD SO WE NEVER KNEW. IF CHAMBERS TWR KNEW WE WERE AT NAS OCEANA, WHY DID THEY TELL US TO TURN N INSTEAD OF DIALING UP NAS OCEANA TWR FREQ AND GOING FROM THERE AND SORTING THINGS OUT? THE TWR SUPVR AT NORFOLK INTL SAID IT WAS NOT THE FIRST TIME PLANES HAD BEEN VECTORED FOR PRECISION APCH'S INTO NAS OCEANA BELIEVING IT WAS NAS NORFOLK AND THEN LNDG A NORFOLK INT'L ON THE SECOND TRY THINKING IT WAS NAS NORFOLK. HE SAID AT LEAST WE HAD BEEN CAUGHT IN TIME TO PREVENT THAT FROM HAPPENING. NAS OCEANA SAID THEY HAD TRIED CALLING US ON THE EMER FREQS 121.5 AND 243.0 BUT HAD RECEIVED NO RESPONSE. HOW COULD THAT BE? WE NEVER HEARD ANYTHING! I HAD 121.5 IN 2 RADIOS, 243.0 IN THE THIRD RADIO AND WAS USING THE FOURTH RADIO FOR COM WITH ATC. WE ALWAYS HEAR SOMETHING ON THE GUARD FREQS! I HOPE THIS NARRATIVE PROVIDES SOME INSIGHT INTO HOW A TOTAL BREAKDOWN OF SITUATIONAL AWARENESS AND COM OCCURRED AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO PREVENT IT FROM RECURRING. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE ORIGINAL REQUEST FOR THE APCH AND TFC PATTERN WORK WAS FOUND TO BE FOR NORFOLK NAS WHEN THE TAPES WERE REVIEWED. THE FINAL CTLR WAS NOT NAMED DURING THE HDOF FROM APCH CTL SO THE ASSUMPTION WAS THAT IT WAS THE NGU CTLR. THERE ARE OFTEN CTLRS IN TRAINING AT THESE FACILITIES. STATUS ON THIS DAY IS UNKNOWN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.