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Attributes | |
ACN | 584009 |
Time | |
Date | 200306 |
Day | Fri |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : zzz.airport |
State Reference | US |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | tower : jxn.tower |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | MD-80 Super 80 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : captain oversight : pic |
Qualification | pilot : atp |
ASRS Report | 584009 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | company : air carrier |
Function | flight crew : first officer |
Events | |
Anomaly | non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure other anomaly other |
Independent Detector | other flight crewa other flight crewb |
Resolutory Action | none taken : anomaly accepted other |
Consequence | other |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | FAA Company |
Primary Problem | Company |
Narrative:
Transition to other air carrier MD80. In june 2003 I had my first opportunity to fly a different air carrier MD80. I had my formal training in august 2002. I found that flying the new equipment is very frustrating and distracting. It was hard for me to believe that we are flying these airplanes without the benefit of actual equipment training or the aid of a check airman for the first leg. I studied the aircraft flight manual and the modular drawings of each system, but I found it odd that we don't have a picture of the entire cockpit to help locate each component. It was similar to flying an aircraft that you had never seen before. I was fortunate that my first leg was in day VFR conditions and no abnormals or emergencies occurred. There were many large differences like the FMS system and I also found little things like the clock positions of the engine instruments were different than our MD80's, (something not mentioned in training) which makes interpreting the instruments in critical sits slow and cumbersome. We spent the entire leg trying to figure out how the new equipment worked, looking each item up as we progressed. When something would occur we didn't know why it was happening and if it was normal or abnormal. I must mention that we had the benefit of having an 'other' air carrier B767 pilot in the jumpseat. It had been several yrs since he had flown the MD80, but he was a help, if he hadn't been there we might still be at the gate. I believe this situation is similar to switching from a standard MD80 to a B737 or B767 without any of the FMS training (something I don't think would be considered). We had two legs, on the other air carrier MD80 wandering blindly from here to there. On our third leg a check airman did appear. It was a miracle. His insight and experience was welcome and I only wished he had been there on the first two legs. I feel that the lack of training and supervision is setting up crews for a possible violation, incident or accident. The prudent course of action would be for a check airman to be on each flight where both crewmembers had no other air carrier MD80 experience, or to have the crews sign up electronically in advance for a check airman if they felt they needed some help or additional training. The current system is only an incident waiting to happen.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: MD-80 CAPT RECOUNTS THE PROBS THE CREW HAD FLYING ACFT ACQUIRED FROM A DIFFERENT ACR.
Narrative: TRANSITION TO OTHER ACR MD80. IN JUNE 2003 I HAD MY FIRST OPPORTUNITY TO FLY A DIFFERENT ACR MD80. I HAD MY FORMAL TRAINING IN AUGUST 2002. I FOUND THAT FLYING THE NEW EQUIP IS VERY FRUSTRATING AND DISTRACTING. IT WAS HARD FOR ME TO BELIEVE THAT WE ARE FLYING THESE AIRPLANES WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF ACTUAL EQUIP TRAINING OR THE AID OF A CHK AIRMAN FOR THE FIRST LEG. I STUDIED THE ACFT FLT MANUAL AND THE MODULAR DRAWINGS OF EACH SYSTEM, BUT I FOUND IT ODD THAT WE DON'T HAVE A PICTURE OF THE ENTIRE COCKPIT TO HELP LOCATE EACH COMPONENT. IT WAS SIMILAR TO FLYING AN ACFT THAT YOU HAD NEVER SEEN BEFORE. I WAS FORTUNATE THAT MY FIRST LEG WAS IN DAY VFR CONDITIONS AND NO ABNORMALS OR EMERGENCIES OCCURRED. THERE WERE MANY LARGE DIFFERENCES LIKE THE FMS SYSTEM AND I ALSO FOUND LITTLE THINGS LIKE THE CLOCK POSITIONS OF THE ENG INSTRUMENTS WERE DIFFERENT THAN OUR MD80'S, (SOMETHING NOT MENTIONED IN TRAINING) WHICH MAKES INTERPRETING THE INSTRUMENTS IN CRITICAL SITS SLOW AND CUMBERSOME. WE SPENT THE ENTIRE LEG TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW THE NEW EQUIP WORKED, LOOKING EACH ITEM UP AS WE PROGRESSED. WHEN SOMETHING WOULD OCCUR WE DIDN'T KNOW WHY IT WAS HAPPENING AND IF IT WAS NORMAL OR ABNORMAL. I MUST MENTION THAT WE HAD THE BENEFIT OF HAVING AN 'OTHER' ACR B767 PLT IN THE JUMPSEAT. IT HAD BEEN SEVERAL YRS SINCE HE HAD FLOWN THE MD80, BUT HE WAS A HELP, IF HE HADN'T BEEN THERE WE MIGHT STILL BE AT THE GATE. I BELIEVE THIS SIT IS SIMILAR TO SWITCHING FROM A STANDARD MD80 TO A B737 OR B767 WITHOUT ANY OF THE FMS TRAINING (SOMETHING I DON'T THINK WOULD BE CONSIDERED). WE HAD TWO LEGS, ON THE OTHER ACR MD80 WANDERING BLINDLY FROM HERE TO THERE. ON OUR THIRD LEG A CHK AIRMAN DID APPEAR. IT WAS A MIRACLE. HIS INSIGHT AND EXPERIENCE WAS WELCOME AND I ONLY WISHED HE HAD BEEN THERE ON THE FIRST TWO LEGS. I FEEL THAT THE LACK OF TRAINING AND SUPERVISION IS SETTING UP CREWS FOR A POSSIBLE VIOLATION, INCIDENT OR ACCIDENT. THE PRUDENT COURSE OF ACTION WOULD BE FOR A CHK AIRMAN TO BE ON EACH FLT WHERE BOTH CREWMEMBERS HAD NO OTHER ACR MD80 EXPERIENCE, OR TO HAVE THE CREWS SIGN UP ELECTRONICALLY IN ADVANCE FOR A CHK AIRMAN IF THEY FELT THEY NEEDED SOME HELP OR ADDITIONAL TRAINING. THE CURRENT SYSTEM IS ONLY AN INCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.