Narrative:

Flight was operated from atl to fll with a divert to mia. The takeoff, departure and en route section of the flight were normal and uneventful. Due to WX along the planned arrival flight path the arrival procedure was changed by ATC. Miami approach gave an expected visual approach to runway 9L at fll, then changed to an expected visual approach to runway 13 at fll. Shortly thereafter we were given a frequency change to tower where we were immediately cleared for a visual approach to runway 9L at fll. I flew a flaps 30 degree visual approach to runway 9L. Final approach speed was 146 KTS. An additional 20 KTS were added for unstable WX. There was a thunderstorm approximately 7 mi west of the approach end of runway 9L. On downwind a TCASII TA occurred, followed by an ELT on guard (the first officer was monitoring guard). Shortly thereafter I observed my radar altimeter off flag illuminated. During the turn to final tower issued a windshear alert at the field. The captain notified the tower that he was electing to do a go around (I do not recall him making any 'go around' callout to me). Upon confirmation with the captain that he wanted a go around, I initiated the go around at approximately 3 mi and 1000 ft AGL, and inquired to the captain about the windshear. We were just rolling out on final, so I pushed the throttles up some (I did not push toga or set go around power) and started a climb to 1500 ft AGL (pattern altitude), and motioned for flaps 15 degrees. I used a hand signal because the captain was on the radio. As I requested confign changes, the captain received the missed approach instructions and directed me to 'climb' (no specific altitude) and he also made reference to the windshear alert (in response to my inquiry). I do not recall his specific terminology in reference to the windshear, but heard certain 'buzz' words such as 'climb' and 'windshear warning.' his instructions were non specific and I did not copy the missed approach instructions. In some respects although he did not say 'windshear, recover,' his tone of voice had a little urgency in it so I thought he might be implying that we were encountering windshear. We were now at approximately 1200 ft to 1300 ft MSL with my intentions to level off at 1500 ft MSL (we had about a 200 FPM rate of climb). Due to workload, I knew that we had received missed approach instructions (heading and altitude) but did not get the specifics, and the captain did not have time to set them in the MCP panel. Therefore I was unsure if his instructions (non specific) to 'climb' were for missed approach instructions or for windshear. At that time my focus of attention was immediately redirected from completing go around procedures to evaluating if we were encountering windshear. I evaluated the information given from the tower and the captain, what I saw outside, the lack of any aircraft windshear warning alerts, and crosschecked my airspeed, pitch, vvi, wind vector, altitude and power settings. All cockpit indications appeared stable, with the exception that our airspeed was in the zipper. I remember thinking that the increased airspeed (increasing performance) might be the first part of the windshear and so I did not pull the power off. Simultaneously the captain realized he did not raise the flaps. He immediately said 'the flaps are still at 30 degrees.' I determined that actual windshear conditions were not being encountered and that the airspeed in the zipper was due to a flap overspd, therefore windshear recovery techniques were not initiated. We cleaned up the airplane, I confirmed the missed approach instructions with the captain and a normal go around and missed approach were completed. During the above time frame, flap speed limits were inadvertently exceeded by approximately 20 KTS. WX -- thunderstorm at 6 mi, approach end of runway, LLWS advisories in effect, VMC, winds 130 degrees/10 KTS. Due to WX in the area at fll, I proceeded to hold east of fll until the WX at the field was reported good by tower. I then flew an ILS to runway 27R at fll. At minimums the runway environment was not in sight due to a cloud layer and a rain shower. I initiated and executed a normal missed approach with radar vectors to the south. Due to our fuel state at this time, I accomplished a divert to mia. I flew an uneventful visual approach to runway 12 in mia. Atthe gate in mia, a logbook entry referencing the flap overspd was made. The dispatcher and maintenance were notified. My radar altimeter off flag was not written up because the off flag only illuminated a few times during the first approach in fll and did not illuminate thereafter. What I thought really caused the overspd! CRM -- poor communications by the captain. Captain focusing on communicating on the radio but not with the first officer, by never assertively calling 'go around' to the PF. Captain answered questions with poor terminology such as 'windshear warning, climb,' which was misleading in that we were maybe encountering windshear which was not the case. Procedures -- captain did not do his 'PNF duties.' captain did not raise the flaps when called for. Captain did not call 'positive rate.' captain did not insure that PF heard missed approach instructions, nor did he set them in the MCP window, nor did he use the 'finger point procedure.' procedures -- maneuvers-- we always practice our go around maneuver from an instrument approach, at minimums, with a published missed procedure. This was more of a flyaway from ground/breakout (at 1000 ft AGL to only climb to pattern altitude until new instructions were given). Up until last week there is no published maneuver in our manuals for this. Hitting the toga switch like on a normal go around would give you too much power and flight director pitch guidance to only climb 500 ft. Flight director must be cycled off and on to get useful guidance (as in our new prm breakout maneuver).

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 CREW HAD A FLAP OVERSPD ON A GAR AT FLL.

Narrative: FLT WAS OPERATED FROM ATL TO FLL WITH A DIVERT TO MIA. THE TKOF, DEP AND ENRTE SECTION OF THE FLT WERE NORMAL AND UNEVENTFUL. DUE TO WX ALONG THE PLANNED ARR FLT PATH THE ARR PROC WAS CHANGED BY ATC. MIAMI APCH GAVE AN EXPECTED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9L AT FLL, THEN CHANGED TO AN EXPECTED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 13 AT FLL. SHORTLY THEREAFTER WE WERE GIVEN A FREQ CHANGE TO TWR WHERE WE WERE IMMEDIATELY CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9L AT FLL. I FLEW A FLAPS 30 DEG VISUAL APCH TO RWY 9L. FINAL APCH SPD WAS 146 KTS. AN ADDITIONAL 20 KTS WERE ADDED FOR UNSTABLE WX. THERE WAS A TSTM APPROX 7 MI W OF THE APCH END OF RWY 9L. ON DOWNWIND A TCASII TA OCCURRED, FOLLOWED BY AN ELT ON GUARD (THE FO WAS MONITORING GUARD). SHORTLY THEREAFTER I OBSERVED MY RADAR ALTIMETER OFF FLAG ILLUMINATED. DURING THE TURN TO FINAL TWR ISSUED A WINDSHEAR ALERT AT THE FIELD. THE CAPT NOTIFIED THE TWR THAT HE WAS ELECTING TO DO A GAR (I DO NOT RECALL HIM MAKING ANY 'GAR' CALLOUT TO ME). UPON CONFIRMATION WITH THE CAPT THAT HE WANTED A GAR, I INITIATED THE GAR AT APPROX 3 MI AND 1000 FT AGL, AND INQUIRED TO THE CAPT ABOUT THE WINDSHEAR. WE WERE JUST ROLLING OUT ON FINAL, SO I PUSHED THE THROTTLES UP SOME (I DID NOT PUSH TOGA OR SET GAR PWR) AND STARTED A CLB TO 1500 FT AGL (PATTERN ALT), AND MOTIONED FOR FLAPS 15 DEGS. I USED A HAND SIGNAL BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS ON THE RADIO. AS I REQUESTED CONFIGN CHANGES, THE CAPT RECEIVED THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS AND DIRECTED ME TO 'CLB' (NO SPECIFIC ALT) AND HE ALSO MADE REF TO THE WINDSHEAR ALERT (IN RESPONSE TO MY INQUIRY). I DO NOT RECALL HIS SPECIFIC TERMINOLOGY IN REF TO THE WINDSHEAR, BUT HEARD CERTAIN 'BUZZ' WORDS SUCH AS 'CLB' AND 'WINDSHEAR WARNING.' HIS INSTRUCTIONS WERE NON SPECIFIC AND I DID NOT COPY THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS. IN SOME RESPECTS ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY 'WINDSHEAR, RECOVER,' HIS TONE OF VOICE HAD A LITTLE URGENCY IN IT SO I THOUGHT HE MIGHT BE IMPLYING THAT WE WERE ENCOUNTERING WINDSHEAR. WE WERE NOW AT APPROX 1200 FT TO 1300 FT MSL WITH MY INTENTIONS TO LEVEL OFF AT 1500 FT MSL (WE HAD ABOUT A 200 FPM RATE OF CLB). DUE TO WORKLOAD, I KNEW THAT WE HAD RECEIVED MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS (HEADING AND ALT) BUT DID NOT GET THE SPECIFICS, AND THE CAPT DID NOT HAVE TIME TO SET THEM IN THE MCP PANEL. THEREFORE I WAS UNSURE IF HIS INSTRUCTIONS (NON SPECIFIC) TO 'CLB' WERE FOR MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS OR FOR WINDSHEAR. AT THAT TIME MY FOCUS OF ATTN WAS IMMEDIATELY REDIRECTED FROM COMPLETING GAR PROCS TO EVALUATING IF WE WERE ENCOUNTERING WINDSHEAR. I EVALUATED THE INFO GIVEN FROM THE TWR AND THE CAPT, WHAT I SAW OUTSIDE, THE LACK OF ANY ACFT WINDSHEAR WARNING ALERTS, AND XCHKED MY AIRSPD, PITCH, VVI, WIND VECTOR, ALT AND PWR SETTINGS. ALL COCKPIT INDICATIONS APPEARED STABLE, WITH THE EXCEPTION THAT OUR AIRSPD WAS IN THE ZIPPER. I REMEMBER THINKING THAT THE INCREASED AIRSPD (INCREASING PERFORMANCE) MIGHT BE THE FIRST PART OF THE WINDSHEAR AND SO I DID NOT PULL THE PWR OFF. SIMULTANEOUSLY THE CAPT REALIZED HE DID NOT RAISE THE FLAPS. HE IMMEDIATELY SAID 'THE FLAPS ARE STILL AT 30 DEGS.' I DETERMINED THAT ACTUAL WINDSHEAR CONDITIONS WERE NOT BEING ENCOUNTERED AND THAT THE AIRSPD IN THE ZIPPER WAS DUE TO A FLAP OVERSPD, THEREFORE WINDSHEAR RECOVERY TECHNIQUES WERE NOT INITIATED. WE CLEANED UP THE AIRPLANE, I CONFIRMED THE MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS WITH THE CAPT AND A NORMAL GAR AND MISSED APCH WERE COMPLETED. DURING THE ABOVE TIME FRAME, FLAP SPD LIMITS WERE INADVERTENTLY EXCEEDED BY APPROX 20 KTS. WX -- TSTM AT 6 MI, APCH END OF RWY, LLWS ADVISORIES IN EFFECT, VMC, WINDS 130 DEGS/10 KTS. DUE TO WX IN THE AREA AT FLL, I PROCEEDED TO HOLD E OF FLL UNTIL THE WX AT THE FIELD WAS RPTED GOOD BY TWR. I THEN FLEW AN ILS TO RWY 27R AT FLL. AT MINIMUMS THE RWY ENVIRONMENT WAS NOT IN SIGHT DUE TO A CLOUD LAYER AND A RAIN SHOWER. I INITIATED AND EXECUTED A NORMAL MISSED APCH WITH RADAR VECTORS TO THE S. DUE TO OUR FUEL STATE AT THIS TIME, I ACCOMPLISHED A DIVERT TO MIA. I FLEW AN UNEVENTFUL VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12 IN MIA. ATTHE GATE IN MIA, A LOGBOOK ENTRY REFING THE FLAP OVERSPD WAS MADE. THE DISPATCHER AND MAINT WERE NOTIFIED. MY RADAR ALTIMETER OFF FLAG WAS NOT WRITTEN UP BECAUSE THE OFF FLAG ONLY ILLUMINATED A FEW TIMES DURING THE FIRST APCH IN FLL AND DID NOT ILLUMINATE THEREAFTER. WHAT I THOUGHT REALLY CAUSED THE OVERSPD! CRM -- POOR COMS BY THE CAPT. CAPT FOCUSING ON COMMUNICATING ON THE RADIO BUT NOT WITH THE FO, BY NEVER ASSERTIVELY CALLING 'GAR' TO THE PF. CAPT ANSWERED QUESTIONS WITH POOR TERMINOLOGY SUCH AS 'WINDSHEAR WARNING, CLB,' WHICH WAS MISLEADING IN THAT WE WERE MAYBE ENCOUNTERING WINDSHEAR WHICH WAS NOT THE CASE. PROCS -- CAPT DID NOT DO HIS 'PNF DUTIES.' CAPT DID NOT RAISE THE FLAPS WHEN CALLED FOR. CAPT DID NOT CALL 'POSITIVE RATE.' CAPT DID NOT INSURE THAT PF HEARD MISSED APCH INSTRUCTIONS, NOR DID HE SET THEM IN THE MCP WINDOW, NOR DID HE USE THE 'FINGER POINT PROC.' PROCS -- MANEUVERS-- WE ALWAYS PRACTICE OUR GAR MANEUVER FROM AN INST APCH, AT MINIMUMS, WITH A PUBLISHED MISSED PROC. THIS WAS MORE OF A FLYAWAY FROM GND/BREAKOUT (AT 1000 FT AGL TO ONLY CLB TO PATTERN ALT UNTIL NEW INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN). UP UNTIL LAST WK THERE IS NO PUBLISHED MANEUVER IN OUR MANUALS FOR THIS. HITTING THE TOGA SWITCH LIKE ON A NORMAL GAR WOULD GIVE YOU TOO MUCH PWR AND FLT DIRECTOR PITCH GUIDANCE TO ONLY CLB 500 FT. FLT DIRECTOR MUST BE CYCLED OFF AND ON TO GET USEFUL GUIDANCE (AS IN OUR NEW PRM BREAKOUT MANEUVER).

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.