Narrative:

We departed smf for sea on jun/sun/03, flight ab, aircraft X. When the gear was retracted, the 'anti-skid inoperative' light came on. The light went out passing FL280 and stayed out for the remainder of the flight. We entered this information in the maintenance log. In sea, maintenance folks told us that the airplane had a history of anti-skid problems and that they would MEL the anti-skid system (MEL 32-2A, I believe). Since we were headed to southeast alaska, I was concerned and talked to the dispatcher. We addressed several issues including takeoff and landing weights, takeoff restrs, WX, fuel and MEL restrs. We agreed the flight could safely operate from sea-ktn-jnu. Before pushback at sea, my first officer and I methodically reviewed the MEL and suggested section of the flight handbook. We also went through the anti-skid inoperative worksheet to make sure we wouldn't have a vmcg problem departing ktn. The flight from sea-ktn was uneventful. We flew the RNAV approach runway 11 at ktn. The airplane weighed about 105000 pounds. I flew a flaps 40 degree approach and landing. WX was about a 4000 ft ceiling, good visibility and winds about 140 degrees/7 KTS. Due to some light turbulence over the runway, I touched down left mains first. The touchdown was about 2000 ft down the runway at target speed plus about 3 KTS and on centerline. Since the speed brakes needed to be deployed manually, the airplane took a mild bounce on touchdown and landed smoothly on both mains. I applied the brakes at about 100 KTS several thousand ft down the runway. Until this point, the landing felt normal. The airplane decelerated normally to taxi speed. As we slowed to taxi speed, we could tell we had a flat or square tire. After landing, we discovered that the left main tires had been badly worn through about 13 ply. They were still inflated, but somewhat deformed. Driving out to the runway, the first officer saw skid marks from about 2000-3000 ft down the runway just left of centerline. I called maintenance control to see if anyone could explain the left brake locking up on touchdown. Subsequent discussion with the flight operations duty officer led to the decision to not continue the flight to juneau, where it was now raining. We rechked that the anti-skid switch was in the 'off' position as per the MEL. We also confirmed that the approach and landing was flown with my heels on the floor, not on the brake. The ktn maintenance person said the safety wire on a sensor was broken. According to the corrective action in the logbook the next morning, a bolt in the brake system had sheared.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-400 CREW GROUND THROUGH 13 TIRE PLIES ON A LNDG AT KTN WITH THE ANTI-SKID MEL'ED INOP.

Narrative: WE DEPARTED SMF FOR SEA ON JUN/SUN/03, FLT AB, ACFT X. WHEN THE GEAR WAS RETRACTED, THE 'ANTI-SKID INOP' LIGHT CAME ON. THE LIGHT WENT OUT PASSING FL280 AND STAYED OUT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT. WE ENTERED THIS INFO IN THE MAINT LOG. IN SEA, MAINT FOLKS TOLD US THAT THE AIRPLANE HAD A HISTORY OF ANTI-SKID PROBS AND THAT THEY WOULD MEL THE ANTI-SKID SYS (MEL 32-2A, I BELIEVE). SINCE WE WERE HEADED TO SE ALASKA, I WAS CONCERNED AND TALKED TO THE DISPATCHER. WE ADDRESSED SEVERAL ISSUES INCLUDING TKOF AND LNDG WTS, TKOF RESTRS, WX, FUEL AND MEL RESTRS. WE AGREED THE FLT COULD SAFELY OPERATE FROM SEA-KTN-JNU. BEFORE PUSHBACK AT SEA, MY FO AND I METHODICALLY REVIEWED THE MEL AND SUGGESTED SECTION OF THE FLT HANDBOOK. WE ALSO WENT THROUGH THE ANTI-SKID INOP WORKSHEET TO MAKE SURE WE WOULDN'T HAVE A VMCG PROB DEPARTING KTN. THE FLT FROM SEA-KTN WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE FLEW THE RNAV APCH RWY 11 AT KTN. THE AIRPLANE WEIGHED ABOUT 105000 LBS. I FLEW A FLAPS 40 DEG APCH AND LNDG. WX WAS ABOUT A 4000 FT CEILING, GOOD VISIBILITY AND WINDS ABOUT 140 DEGS/7 KTS. DUE TO SOME LIGHT TURB OVER THE RWY, I TOUCHED DOWN L MAINS FIRST. THE TOUCHDOWN WAS ABOUT 2000 FT DOWN THE RWY AT TARGET SPD PLUS ABOUT 3 KTS AND ON CTRLINE. SINCE THE SPD BRAKES NEEDED TO BE DEPLOYED MANUALLY, THE AIRPLANE TOOK A MILD BOUNCE ON TOUCHDOWN AND LANDED SMOOTHLY ON BOTH MAINS. I APPLIED THE BRAKES AT ABOUT 100 KTS SEVERAL THOUSAND FT DOWN THE RWY. UNTIL THIS POINT, THE LNDG FELT NORMAL. THE AIRPLANE DECELERATED NORMALLY TO TAXI SPD. AS WE SLOWED TO TAXI SPD, WE COULD TELL WE HAD A FLAT OR SQUARE TIRE. AFTER LNDG, WE DISCOVERED THAT THE L MAIN TIRES HAD BEEN BADLY WORN THROUGH ABOUT 13 PLY. THEY WERE STILL INFLATED, BUT SOMEWHAT DEFORMED. DRIVING OUT TO THE RWY, THE FO SAW SKID MARKS FROM ABOUT 2000-3000 FT DOWN THE RWY JUST L OF CTRLINE. I CALLED MAINT CTL TO SEE IF ANYONE COULD EXPLAIN THE L BRAKE LOCKING UP ON TOUCHDOWN. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE FLT OPS DUTY OFFICER LED TO THE DECISION TO NOT CONTINUE THE FLT TO JUNEAU, WHERE IT WAS NOW RAINING. WE RECHKED THAT THE ANTI-SKID SWITCH WAS IN THE 'OFF' POS AS PER THE MEL. WE ALSO CONFIRMED THAT THE APCH AND LNDG WAS FLOWN WITH MY HEELS ON THE FLOOR, NOT ON THE BRAKE. THE KTN MAINT PERSON SAID THE SAFETY WIRE ON A SENSOR WAS BROKEN. ACCORDING TO THE CORRECTIVE ACTION IN THE LOGBOOK THE NEXT MORNING, A BOLT IN THE BRAKE SYS HAD SHEARED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.