Narrative:

Descending into spokane international airport we were set up to fly a night visual approach to runway 21. ATIS and NOTAMS indicated that the first 1000 ft of runway 21 closed, ILS GS OTS, approach lights and touchdown zone lights OTS, and PAPI OTS. The only visual reference/guidance available for runway 21 was runway edge lights. Our aircraft was at a relatively high landing weight and the first officer had 7 months experience on the A320 and as a first officer with our airline. While on the hilie 1 arrival, we contacted approach control as we neared ropes intersection approximately 25 NM from the airport (currently at 13000 ft and 250 KTS). We were given a heading of approximately 270 degrees and a descent to 7000 ft. This heading aimed us just outside the ILS marker, phort 4 NM from the end of the runway. From our altitude and distance from the airport I could see a high, unstable approach developing. I asked approach control 'are we #1 for the airport and going straight in?' approach control's only response was 'affirmative, you are being vectored for a straight-in visual approach runway 21.' I stated to the first officer 'you better use speed brakes and get down' the first officer (PF) selected 180 KTS, speed brakes, and called for gear down. He commented that this was earlier than normal, but he wanted the extra drag to descend aggressively and get back on a stable path. It was a good call and I agreed completely. We were then cleared to 5000 ft. Approximately 15 NM from the runway we were at 180 KTS and gear down, flaps 2 degrees, still descending toward 5000 ft. Approach control then states aircraft X, I need you to accelerate to 230 KTS.' this caught me completely by surprise and I responded that we were already configured with gear and flaps, what was the problem?' in a very sarcastic and in my opinion unprofessional manner, he then stated that in order to give us priority as #1 for the airport we needed to be at 230 KTS because he had additional aircraft following us and that this would not work properly. I was flustered and responded something to the effect 'no it won't.' approach control then issued us a 10 degree heading change further toward runway 21 and stated 'report the field in sight.' I did and he cleared us a visual approach runway 21, 'keep your speed up as much as possible, switch to tower.' in my final transmission to approach control, I stated 'you needed to give us more warning.' we flew a stable approach to an uneventful landing. In my opinion, the controller attempted to rush us into what could have been an unsafe night visual approach into a degraded runway environment with a relatively high landing weight and a first officer that was relatively inexperienced. I have never before had approach control issue me a speed that fast, that close to the landing runway. Given our altitude and the runway conditions, I feel this was completely out of line. The controller's attitude (which came through very clearly over the radio) could have been intimidating had we allowed it to be. Accelerating to comply with this 230 KTS request would have required us to completely clean up the aircraft and would have certainly made our approach unstable. As an experienced A320 captain I feel confident this was unusual and could have become unsafe quickly. At the very least the controller should have advised us early on that he needed us to keep our speed up due to traffic. Especially since I initiated a 'sequence' question to him. Had the controller communicated this earlier or issued us 230 KTS at the beginning of vectors, I would have assessed the situation then and advised him right away that we could not comply, giving him more time to adjust everything. I too could have advised the controller that we were slowing to 180 KTS to configure early to descend aggressively. Had either one of us communicated more sooner, this uncomfortable exchange could have been avoided.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AFTER BEING HIGH ON FINAL AND CONFIGURING FOR A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT, AN A-320 CREW IS INSTRUCTED BY GEG APCH TO INCREASE SPD.

Narrative: DSNDING INTO SPOKANE INTL ARPT WE WERE SET UP TO FLY A NIGHT VISUAL APCH TO RWY 21. ATIS AND NOTAMS INDICATED THAT THE FIRST 1000 FT OF RWY 21 CLOSED, ILS GS OTS, APCH LIGHTS AND TOUCHDOWN ZONE LIGHTS OTS, AND PAPI OTS. THE ONLY VISUAL REF/GUIDANCE AVAILABLE FOR RWY 21 WAS RWY EDGE LIGHTS. OUR ACFT WAS AT A RELATIVELY HIGH LNDG WT AND THE FO HAD 7 MONTHS EXPERIENCE ON THE A320 AND AS A FO WITH OUR AIRLINE. WHILE ON THE HILIE 1 ARR, WE CONTACTED APCH CTL AS WE NEARED ROPES INTXN APPROX 25 NM FROM THE ARPT (CURRENTLY AT 13000 FT AND 250 KTS). WE WERE GIVEN A HDG OF APPROX 270 DEGS AND A DSCNT TO 7000 FT. THIS HDG AIMED US JUST OUTSIDE THE ILS MARKER, PHORT 4 NM FROM THE END OF THE RWY. FROM OUR ALT AND DISTANCE FROM THE ARPT I COULD SEE A HIGH, UNSTABLE APCH DEVELOPING. I ASKED APCH CTL 'ARE WE #1 FOR THE ARPT AND GOING STRAIGHT IN?' APCH CTL'S ONLY RESPONSE WAS 'AFFIRMATIVE, YOU ARE BEING VECTORED FOR A STRAIGHT-IN VISUAL APCH RWY 21.' I STATED TO THE FO 'YOU BETTER USE SPD BRAKES AND GET DOWN' THE FO (PF) SELECTED 180 KTS, SPD BRAKES, AND CALLED FOR GEAR DOWN. HE COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS EARLIER THAN NORMAL, BUT HE WANTED THE EXTRA DRAG TO DSND AGGRESSIVELY AND GET BACK ON A STABLE PATH. IT WAS A GOOD CALL AND I AGREED COMPLETELY. WE WERE THEN CLRED TO 5000 FT. APPROX 15 NM FROM THE RWY WE WERE AT 180 KTS AND GEAR DOWN, FLAPS 2 DEGS, STILL DSNDING TOWARD 5000 FT. APCH CTL THEN STATES ACFT X, I NEED YOU TO ACCELERATE TO 230 KTS.' THIS CAUGHT ME COMPLETELY BY SURPRISE AND I RESPONDED THAT WE WERE ALREADY CONFIGURED WITH GEAR AND FLAPS, WHAT WAS THE PROB?' IN A VERY SARCASTIC AND IN MY OPINION UNPROFESSIONAL MANNER, HE THEN STATED THAT IN ORDER TO GIVE US PRIORITY AS #1 FOR THE ARPT WE NEEDED TO BE AT 230 KTS BECAUSE HE HAD ADDITIONAL ACFT FOLLOWING US AND THAT THIS WOULD NOT WORK PROPERLY. I WAS FLUSTERED AND RESPONDED SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT 'NO IT WON'T.' APCH CTL THEN ISSUED US A 10 DEG HDG CHANGE FURTHER TOWARD RWY 21 AND STATED 'RPT THE FIELD IN SIGHT.' I DID AND HE CLRED US A VISUAL APCH RWY 21, 'KEEP YOUR SPD UP AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE, SWITCH TO TWR.' IN MY FINAL XMISSION TO APCH CTL, I STATED 'YOU NEEDED TO GIVE US MORE WARNING.' WE FLEW A STABLE APCH TO AN UNEVENTFUL LNDG. IN MY OPINION, THE CTLR ATTEMPTED TO RUSH US INTO WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN AN UNSAFE NIGHT VISUAL APCH INTO A DEGRADED RWY ENVIRONMENT WITH A RELATIVELY HIGH LNDG WT AND A FO THAT WAS RELATIVELY INEXPERIENCED. I HAVE NEVER BEFORE HAD APCH CTL ISSUE ME A SPD THAT FAST, THAT CLOSE TO THE LNDG RWY. GIVEN OUR ALT AND THE RWY CONDITIONS, I FEEL THIS WAS COMPLETELY OUT OF LINE. THE CTLR'S ATTITUDE (WHICH CAME THROUGH VERY CLEARLY OVER THE RADIO) COULD HAVE BEEN INTIMIDATING HAD WE ALLOWED IT TO BE. ACCELERATING TO COMPLY WITH THIS 230 KTS REQUEST WOULD HAVE REQUIRED US TO COMPLETELY CLEAN UP THE ACFT AND WOULD HAVE CERTAINLY MADE OUR APCH UNSTABLE. AS AN EXPERIENCED A320 CAPT I FEEL CONFIDENT THIS WAS UNUSUAL AND COULD HAVE BECOME UNSAFE QUICKLY. AT THE VERY LEAST THE CTLR SHOULD HAVE ADVISED US EARLY ON THAT HE NEEDED US TO KEEP OUR SPD UP DUE TO TFC. ESPECIALLY SINCE I INITIATED A 'SEQUENCE' QUESTION TO HIM. HAD THE CTLR COMMUNICATED THIS EARLIER OR ISSUED US 230 KTS AT THE BEGINNING OF VECTORS, I WOULD HAVE ASSESSED THE SIT THEN AND ADVISED HIM RIGHT AWAY THAT WE COULD NOT COMPLY, GIVING HIM MORE TIME TO ADJUST EVERYTHING. I TOO COULD HAVE ADVISED THE CTLR THAT WE WERE SLOWING TO 180 KTS TO CONFIGURE EARLY TO DSND AGGRESSIVELY. HAD EITHER ONE OF US COMMUNICATED MORE SOONER, THIS UNCOMFORTABLE EXCHANGE COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.