Narrative:

Upon departure from las vegas international, I had programmed the FMS for the wild 2 departure for runway 7L. Knowing that our clearance was to join J86 off the departure, I looked up J86 and saw that it began from peach springs. Seeing peach springs (pgs) on the departure (wild 2), I programmed the ims to join J86 off of pgs. This was in error because our clearance was to proceed to winslow (inw), and then join J86. This error resulted in a turn of the aircraft off the intended departure corridor. ZLA noticed the turn and confirmed the routing with us, which caused us to realize the error. While it is the crew's ultimate responsibility to ensure proper routing in the FMS, contributing factors to this deviation were as follows: 1) the heat of the cockpit in las vegas reached 120 degrees which degraded human attention to detail. 2) the electronic chart that my company uses on its aircraft does not allow the pilot to see the entire chart clearly. To see the chart clearly, the pilot must point and drag the chart to see certain sections, while covering up other sections. Ironically, winslow was not visible on the electronic chart when I was programming the FMS. 3) no where on the company's hawker 800 checklist is there an item that asks for the crew to check the cockpit set up prior to departure (ie, routing, display setup, etc). While it is in company sops to brief the flight prior to departure, it is not on the checklist. It is not covered in training, nor do any check airmen, capts, first officer's cover it.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN HS125 FO ADMITTED TO A HDG DEV IN ZLA'S AIRSPACE.

Narrative: UPON DEP FROM LAS VEGAS INTL, I HAD PROGRAMMED THE FMS FOR THE WILD 2 DEP FOR RWY 7L. KNOWING THAT OUR CLRNC WAS TO JOIN J86 OFF THE DEP, I LOOKED UP J86 AND SAW THAT IT BEGAN FROM PEACH SPRINGS. SEEING PEACH SPRINGS (PGS) ON THE DEP (WILD 2), I PROGRAMMED THE IMS TO JOIN J86 OFF OF PGS. THIS WAS IN ERROR BECAUSE OUR CLRNC WAS TO PROCEED TO WINSLOW (INW), AND THEN JOIN J86. THIS ERROR RESULTED IN A TURN OF THE ACFT OFF THE INTENDED DEP CORRIDOR. ZLA NOTICED THE TURN AND CONFIRMED THE ROUTING WITH US, WHICH CAUSED US TO REALIZE THE ERROR. WHILE IT IS THE CREW'S ULTIMATE RESPONSIBILITY TO ENSURE PROPER ROUTING IN THE FMS, CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS DEV WERE AS FOLLOWS: 1) THE HEAT OF THE COCKPIT IN LAS VEGAS REACHED 120 DEGS WHICH DEGRADED HUMAN ATTN TO DETAIL. 2) THE ELECTRONIC CHART THAT MY COMPANY USES ON ITS ACFT DOES NOT ALLOW THE PLT TO SEE THE ENTIRE CHART CLEARLY. TO SEE THE CHART CLEARLY, THE PLT MUST POINT AND DRAG THE CHART TO SEE CERTAIN SECTIONS, WHILE COVERING UP OTHER SECTIONS. IRONICALLY, WINSLOW WAS NOT VISIBLE ON THE ELECTRONIC CHART WHEN I WAS PROGRAMMING THE FMS. 3) NO WHERE ON THE COMPANY'S HAWKER 800 CHKLIST IS THERE AN ITEM THAT ASKS FOR THE CREW TO CHK THE COCKPIT SET UP PRIOR TO DEP (IE, ROUTING, DISPLAY SETUP, ETC). WHILE IT IS IN COMPANY SOPS TO BRIEF THE FLT PRIOR TO DEP, IT IS NOT ON THE CHKLIST. IT IS NOT COVERED IN TRAINING, NOR DO ANY CHK AIRMEN, CAPTS, FO'S COVER IT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.