Narrative:

The first officer, was the PF. ATC asked us to state our present rate of climb. I responded that it was nearly 2000 FPM. The controller instructed us to maintain 2000 FPM until reaching FL330. At the time the instruction was issued we were climbing through approximately FL230 at a normal climb speed of approximately 330 KIAS. We were able to comply for most of the climb, but approaching FL290 our airspeed started to decay. At approximately FL310, it was necessary to decrease our rate of climb to approximately 500 FPM due to the airspeed loss. At approximately FL320 I informed the ATC controller that we would be unable to maintain our climb due to the loss of airspeed. We were instructed to turn 45 degrees to the right to avoid traffic. We began a turn but at less than standard rate because of the high altitude and low airspeed. I informed the ATC controller that a turn would be difficult and asked if the approaching aircraft could make a larger turn to compensate. We were able to see the approaching aircraft from about 5 mi in front of the aircraft. The vertical separation was never less than 1000 ft and the horizontal separation appeared sufficient to me from the time I first saw the approaching aircraft until we passed. We did not receive an RA from the TCASII computer. When I accepted the restr, the first officer made a comment something like, 'oh, thanks.' I don't think either of us expected the restr to remain through FL330 or that we wouldn't have to amend our climb at some point. We were almost able to comply but I waited until we were out of options before informing the controller. Supplemental information from acn 589777: to maintain safe airspeed we had to reduce the rate of climb until we had to leveloff due to airspeed bleed off. We were advised that due to not attaining FL330, leveloff was around FL315 -- that an altitude deviation had occurred. Continuation of acn 590291: we also had a deadhead captain in the jumpseat. None of us commented on the likelihood of us complying with the restr during the climb. I was waiting for the first officer to tell me what he wanted relayed to the controller and I think he was also waiting for me to step in and change our restr. As the captain, I certainly should have been more proactive. Oddly enough, I think having the jumpseat rider affected the dynamics of the situation. As the captain, I let the situation degrade further than I ever have in the past. It might have been because I viewed the first officer's background with a great deal of respect and felt sure he would speak up when he felt it was prudent to do so. It was my responsibility and the lesson I learned was not to ever assume so much without some type of verbal communication. I let myself be passive and in doing so did not fulfill my duties as the captain.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF MD80 ACCEPTED CLB CLRNC BEYOND CAPABILITIES OF THEIR ACFT. ZTL RADAR CTLR ADVISED OF ALTDEV WHEN TFC CONFLICT OCCURRED AT FL330 AND RPTR ACFT SLOWED UNTIL UNABLE TO CLB FURTHER AT FL315.

Narrative: THE FO, WAS THE PF. ATC ASKED US TO STATE OUR PRESENT RATE OF CLB. I RESPONDED THAT IT WAS NEARLY 2000 FPM. THE CTLR INSTRUCTED US TO MAINTAIN 2000 FPM UNTIL REACHING FL330. AT THE TIME THE INSTRUCTION WAS ISSUED WE WERE CLBING THROUGH APPROX FL230 AT A NORMAL CLB SPD OF APPROX 330 KIAS. WE WERE ABLE TO COMPLY FOR MOST OF THE CLB, BUT APCHING FL290 OUR AIRSPD STARTED TO DECAY. AT APPROX FL310, IT WAS NECESSARY TO DECREASE OUR RATE OF CLB TO APPROX 500 FPM DUE TO THE AIRSPD LOSS. AT APPROX FL320 I INFORMED THE ATC CTLR THAT WE WOULD BE UNABLE TO MAINTAIN OUR CLB DUE TO THE LOSS OF AIRSPD. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO TURN 45 DEGS TO THE R TO AVOID TFC. WE BEGAN A TURN BUT AT LESS THAN STANDARD RATE BECAUSE OF THE HIGH ALT AND LOW AIRSPD. I INFORMED THE ATC CTLR THAT A TURN WOULD BE DIFFICULT AND ASKED IF THE APCHING ACFT COULD MAKE A LARGER TURN TO COMPENSATE. WE WERE ABLE TO SEE THE APCHING ACFT FROM ABOUT 5 MI IN FRONT OF THE ACFT. THE VERT SEPARATION WAS NEVER LESS THAN 1000 FT AND THE HORIZ SEPARATION APPEARED SUFFICIENT TO ME FROM THE TIME I FIRST SAW THE APCHING ACFT UNTIL WE PASSED. WE DID NOT RECEIVE AN RA FROM THE TCASII COMPUTER. WHEN I ACCEPTED THE RESTR, THE FO MADE A COMMENT SOMETHING LIKE, 'OH, THANKS.' I DON'T THINK EITHER OF US EXPECTED THE RESTR TO REMAIN THROUGH FL330 OR THAT WE WOULDN'T HAVE TO AMEND OUR CLB AT SOME POINT. WE WERE ALMOST ABLE TO COMPLY BUT I WAITED UNTIL WE WERE OUT OF OPTIONS BEFORE INFORMING THE CTLR. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 589777: TO MAINTAIN SAFE AIRSPD WE HAD TO REDUCE THE RATE OF CLB UNTIL WE HAD TO LEVELOFF DUE TO AIRSPD BLEED OFF. WE WERE ADVISED THAT DUE TO NOT ATTAINING FL330, LEVELOFF WAS AROUND FL315 -- THAT AN ALTDEV HAD OCCURRED. CONTINUATION OF ACN 590291: WE ALSO HAD A DEADHEAD CAPT IN THE JUMPSEAT. NONE OF US COMMENTED ON THE LIKELIHOOD OF US COMPLYING WITH THE RESTR DURING THE CLB. I WAS WAITING FOR THE FO TO TELL ME WHAT HE WANTED RELAYED TO THE CTLR AND I THINK HE WAS ALSO WAITING FOR ME TO STEP IN AND CHANGE OUR RESTR. AS THE CAPT, I CERTAINLY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE PROACTIVE. ODDLY ENOUGH, I THINK HAVING THE JUMPSEAT RIDER AFFECTED THE DYNAMICS OF THE SIT. AS THE CAPT, I LET THE SIT DEGRADE FURTHER THAN I EVER HAVE IN THE PAST. IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BECAUSE I VIEWED THE FO'S BACKGROUND WITH A GREAT DEAL OF RESPECT AND FELT SURE HE WOULD SPEAK UP WHEN HE FELT IT WAS PRUDENT TO DO SO. IT WAS MY RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LESSON I LEARNED WAS NOT TO EVER ASSUME SO MUCH WITHOUT SOME TYPE OF VERBAL COM. I LET MYSELF BE PASSIVE AND IN DOING SO DID NOT FULFILL MY DUTIES AS THE CAPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.