Narrative:

Arriving from the northwest, we were being vectored for a visual approach for runway 9L mia. PF was the captain. End result was that I lined up on the new runway under construction runway 8L. On short final, the tower asked us if we were lined up on the correct runway. At the same time, the tower was asking that, the first officer and I also realized we were lined up for the wrong runway. A missed approach was executed, and we returned and landed on runway 9L with no further problems. After a brainstorming session, these are the items that the first officer and I thought might have contributed to the event. These are not intended as excuses, but rather as an honest evaluation of what our thought process might have been. Approach was into the sun on a slightly hazy morning. When we were on a long final, approximately 9-10 mi, I saw something on the runway 8L that looked like a small commuter airplane starting a takeoff roll, and I made that comment verbally. On final, I was a little fixated on determining what that spot was at the approach end of the runway. As we got closer to the runway, I finally determined in my mind, that it was just rubber deposits on the touchdown zone. In fact, we were looking at the vehicle holding the 'X' indicating the closed runway. I was never able to identify it as a runway closing 'X' until I taxied out 1 hour later for our takeoff from runway 9L when I wanted to take a good look at how it was presented. Also, on short final, the tower advised us to be aware of the jet blast of a heavy taking off of runway 12. I did divert my attention to the aircraft to determine what level of power application he might have. Both the first officer and I were tuned to the correct ILS for runway 9L. I believe my navigation display was still in the map mode. Why? I don't know. I always normally make it a habit to display ILS data. I flew the majority of the approach visually looking outside the aircraft. For some reason, I really had tunnel vision on the runway I was lined up on. I do know that the runway closing indicators are inadequate. Even on a short final, I did not see anything that would trigger a thought of a closed runway. I talked to the tower chief, and had a short brainstorming session with him to try to determine the problems, and how it might be avoided in the future. I flew the same trip the sat before, and was aware of the new runway construction, so that fact caused me even more consternation on how I could have screwed up on this approach. Supplemental information from acn 590929: we noticed the mis-alignment about the same time tower did, and were given instructions for go around. I had tuned and idented ILS runway 9L frequency. And, also, verified runway and airport in sight along with the captain. My mistake was not to cross reference my ILS with the position of our aircraft. The closed runway looked identical to runway 9L, and both the captain and I did not notice the 'X' in the runway, which was not lighted and poorly visible. We did review the approach prior to commencing the visual approach. The lesson to be learned is to cross reference all navaids and visual aids during the entire approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MIA TWR LCL CTLR ISSUES MD80 FLT CREW A GAR DUE TO NEW CONSTRUCTION, CLOSED RWY APCH. CAPT REVIEWS EVENT WITH FO AND TWR SUPVR.

Narrative: ARRIVING FROM THE NW, WE WERE BEING VECTORED FOR A VISUAL APCH FOR RWY 9L MIA. PF WAS THE CAPT. END RESULT WAS THAT I LINED UP ON THE NEW RWY UNDER CONSTRUCTION RWY 8L. ON SHORT FINAL, THE TWR ASKED US IF WE WERE LINED UP ON THE CORRECT RWY. AT THE SAME TIME, THE TWR WAS ASKING THAT, THE FO AND I ALSO REALIZED WE WERE LINED UP FOR THE WRONG RWY. A MISSED APCH WAS EXECUTED, AND WE RETURNED AND LANDED ON RWY 9L WITH NO FURTHER PROBS. AFTER A BRAINSTORMING SESSION, THESE ARE THE ITEMS THAT THE FO AND I THOUGHT MIGHT HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE EVENT. THESE ARE NOT INTENDED AS EXCUSES, BUT RATHER AS AN HONEST EVALUATION OF WHAT OUR THOUGHT PROCESS MIGHT HAVE BEEN. APCH WAS INTO THE SUN ON A SLIGHTLY HAZY MORNING. WHEN WE WERE ON A LONG FINAL, APPROX 9-10 MI, I SAW SOMETHING ON THE RWY 8L THAT LOOKED LIKE A SMALL COMMUTER AIRPLANE STARTING A TKOF ROLL, AND I MADE THAT COMMENT VERBALLY. ON FINAL, I WAS A LITTLE FIXATED ON DETERMINING WHAT THAT SPOT WAS AT THE APCH END OF THE RWY. AS WE GOT CLOSER TO THE RWY, I FINALLY DETERMINED IN MY MIND, THAT IT WAS JUST RUBBER DEPOSITS ON THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. IN FACT, WE WERE LOOKING AT THE VEHICLE HOLDING THE 'X' INDICATING THE CLOSED RWY. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO IDENT IT AS A RWY CLOSING 'X' UNTIL I TAXIED OUT 1 HR LATER FOR OUR TKOF FROM RWY 9L WHEN I WANTED TO TAKE A GOOD LOOK AT HOW IT WAS PRESENTED. ALSO, ON SHORT FINAL, THE TWR ADVISED US TO BE AWARE OF THE JET BLAST OF A HEAVY TAKING OFF OF RWY 12. I DID DIVERT MY ATTN TO THE ACFT TO DETERMINE WHAT LEVEL OF PWR APPLICATION HE MIGHT HAVE. BOTH THE FO AND I WERE TUNED TO THE CORRECT ILS FOR RWY 9L. I BELIEVE MY NAV DISPLAY WAS STILL IN THE MAP MODE. WHY? I DON'T KNOW. I ALWAYS NORMALLY MAKE IT A HABIT TO DISPLAY ILS DATA. I FLEW THE MAJORITY OF THE APCH VISUALLY LOOKING OUTSIDE THE ACFT. FOR SOME REASON, I REALLY HAD TUNNEL VISION ON THE RWY I WAS LINED UP ON. I DO KNOW THAT THE RWY CLOSING INDICATORS ARE INADEQUATE. EVEN ON A SHORT FINAL, I DID NOT SEE ANYTHING THAT WOULD TRIGGER A THOUGHT OF A CLOSED RWY. I TALKED TO THE TWR CHIEF, AND HAD A SHORT BRAINSTORMING SESSION WITH HIM TO TRY TO DETERMINE THE PROBS, AND HOW IT MIGHT BE AVOIDED IN THE FUTURE. I FLEW THE SAME TRIP THE SAT BEFORE, AND WAS AWARE OF THE NEW RWY CONSTRUCTION, SO THAT FACT CAUSED ME EVEN MORE CONSTERNATION ON HOW I COULD HAVE SCREWED UP ON THIS APCH. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 590929: WE NOTICED THE MIS-ALIGNMENT ABOUT THE SAME TIME TWR DID, AND WERE GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS FOR GAR. I HAD TUNED AND IDENTED ILS RWY 9L FREQ. AND, ALSO, VERIFIED RWY AND ARPT IN SIGHT ALONG WITH THE CAPT. MY MISTAKE WAS NOT TO CROSS REF MY ILS WITH THE POS OF OUR ACFT. THE CLOSED RWY LOOKED IDENTICAL TO RWY 9L, AND BOTH THE CAPT AND I DID NOT NOTICE THE 'X' IN THE RWY, WHICH WAS NOT LIGHTED AND POORLY VISIBLE. WE DID REVIEW THE APCH PRIOR TO COMMENCING THE VISUAL APCH. THE LESSON TO BE LEARNED IS TO CROSS REF ALL NAVAIDS AND VISUAL AIDS DURING THE ENTIRE APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.