Narrative:

Near miss event -- flight required the use of runway 31 for takeoff because the aircraft was at maximum ATOG. Bna tower cleared flight for takeoff. At approximately 140 KTS, I observed an aircraft at our 1 O'clock position with a flight path that I perceived would cross just in front of us at approximately 50 ft AGL. As soon as I called out the traffic to the first officer, he called rotate. We delayed rotation momentarily as the aircraft passed above and slightly in front of us. The remainder of the flight was continued uneventfully. After speaking with a bna tower contact, this is what I perceive to be the chain of events. A single engine cherokee (PA28) was having electrical problems and could not get its landing gear down. Bna tower cleared the aircraft to land at xa:18. Our flight was cleared into position and hold at approximately xa:20. A dc-9 that landed on runway 20C was cleared to cross runway 31 and taxi to the gate. A single engine cessna was then given clearance for takeoff on runway 20C with a left turn on course. Our flight was then given clearance for takeoff at xa:23 unaware of the problem aircraft in the traffic pattern. The near miss occurred with the PA28 on short final for a gear up landing on runway 20C while our flight was taking off on runway 31. Our flight was never aware of or given any notice of an emergency aircraft in the traffic pattern or that an aircraft was going to cross our flight path on takeoff roll. Pilot perceptions -- bna tower controller was busy, lost situational awareness on the position of the emergency aircraft, and created a situation for a catastrophic accident/incident to occur midfield at bna when the tower controller cleared our flight for takeoff on runway 31. Supplemental information from acn 595988: a PA28 was cleared to land on runway 20C at or around xa:20L. A B737 was cleared for takeoff from runway 31 at or around xa:22L. When the B737 was cleared for takeoff PA28 was still north of runway 31, and in sight. At this time I did not know PA28 had a complete loss of power and communications. Because of this loss of power, PA28 was moving slower than I expected, and the B737 started his takeoff roll. I never believed the two aircraft lost separation nor was it an unsafe situation. Supplemental information from acn 595752: I was working ground control/clearance delivery. A PA28 had been cleared to land on runway 20C and was north of taxiway lima. Local control had cleared a B737 for takeoff on runway 31. I began observing when B737 was passing T6. The PA28 passed in front of B737 and was south of runway 31 when B737 passed behind him, continuing his takeoff roll. Callback conversation with reporter acn 595147 revealed the following information: the captain indicated that neither he or the first officer was notified of the PA28 traffic, or given any emergency information regarding the aircraft. He revealed that after changing to the tower frequency from ground control, the aircraft was in position for approximately 2 to 3 mins. The reporter said that he contacted the tower via phone later and received the following information. The tower contact allegedly said the PA28 experienced an electrical failure. The tower contact also reportedly stated that the controller and the supervisor on duty forgot about the PA28, because the aircraft was a primary target only with no associated data block. The captain stated that as he was about to rotate he observed the PA28 in question and delayed the liftoff to avoid the PA28. The reporter stated that the aircraft filled the windscreen, 100 ft in front and 50 ft above them.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737 EXPERIENCED NMAC WITH LNDG TFC ON INTERSECTING RWY.

Narrative: NEAR MISS EVENT -- FLT REQUIRED THE USE OF RWY 31 FOR TKOF BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS AT MAX ATOG. BNA TWR CLRED FLT FOR TKOF. AT APPROX 140 KTS, I OBSERVED AN ACFT AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POSITION WITH A FLT PATH THAT I PERCEIVED WOULD CROSS JUST IN FRONT OF US AT APPROX 50 FT AGL. AS SOON AS I CALLED OUT THE TFC TO THE FO, HE CALLED ROTATE. WE DELAYED ROTATION MOMENTARILY AS THE ACFT PASSED ABOVE AND SLIGHTLY IN FRONT OF US. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS CONTINUED UNEVENTFULLY. AFTER SPEAKING WITH A BNA TWR CONTACT, THIS IS WHAT I PERCEIVE TO BE THE CHAIN OF EVENTS. A SINGLE ENG CHEROKEE (PA28) WAS HAVING ELECTRICAL PROBS AND COULD NOT GET ITS LNDG GEAR DOWN. BNA TWR CLRED THE ACFT TO LAND AT XA:18. OUR FLT WAS CLRED INTO POSITION AND HOLD AT APPROX XA:20. A DC-9 THAT LANDED ON RWY 20C WAS CLEARED TO CROSS RWY 31 AND TAXI TO THE GATE. A SINGLE ENG CESSNA WAS THEN GIVEN CLRNC FOR TKOF ON RWY 20C WITH A L TURN ON COURSE. OUR FLT WAS THEN GIVEN CLRNC FOR TKOF AT XA:23 UNAWARE OF THE PROB ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN. THE NEAR MISS OCCURRED WITH THE PA28 ON SHORT FINAL FOR A GEAR UP LNDG ON RWY 20C WHILE OUR FLT WAS TAKING OFF ON RWY 31. OUR FLT WAS NEVER AWARE OF OR GIVEN ANY NOTICE OF AN EMER ACFT IN THE TFC PATTERN OR THAT AN ACFT WAS GOING TO CROSS OUR FLT PATH ON TKOF ROLL. PLT PERCEPTIONS -- BNA TWR CTLR WAS BUSY, LOST SITUATIONAL AWARENESS ON THE POSITION OF THE EMER ACFT, AND CREATED A SIT FOR A CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENT/INCIDENT TO OCCUR MIDFIELD AT BNA WHEN THE TWR CTLR CLRED OUR FLT FOR TKOF ON RWY 31. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 595988: A PA28 WAS CLEARED TO LAND ON RWY 20C AT OR AROUND XA:20L. A B737 WAS CLRED FOR TKOF FROM RWY 31 AT OR AROUND XA:22L. WHEN THE B737 WAS CLRED FOR TKOF PA28 WAS STILL N OF RWY 31, AND IN SIGHT. AT THIS TIME I DID NOT KNOW PA28 HAD A COMPLETE LOSS OF POWER AND COMS. BECAUSE OF THIS LOSS OF POWER, PA28 WAS MOVING SLOWER THAN I EXPECTED, AND THE B737 STARTED HIS TKOF ROLL. I NEVER BELIEVED THE TWO ACFT LOST SEPARATION NOR WAS IT AN UNSAFE SIT. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 595752: I WAS WORKING GC/CD. A PA28 HAD BEEN CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 20C AND WAS N OF TXWY LIMA. LC HAD CLRED A B737 FOR TKOF ON RWY 31. I BEGAN OBSERVING WHEN B737 WAS PASSING T6. THE PA28 PASSED IN FRONT OF B737 AND WAS S OF RWY 31 WHEN B737 PASSED BEHIND HIM, CONTINUING HIS TKOF ROLL. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 595147 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE CAPT INDICATED THAT NEITHER HE OR THE FO WAS NOTIFIED OF THE PA28 TFC, OR GIVEN ANY EMER INFO REGARDING THE ACFT. HE REVEALED THAT AFTER CHANGING TO THE TWR FREQ FROM GC, THE ACFT WAS IN POSITION FOR APPROX 2 TO 3 MINS. THE RPTR SAID THAT HE CONTACTED THE TWR VIA PHONE LATER AND RECEIVED THE FOLLOWING INFO. THE TWR CONTACT ALLEGEDLY SAID THE PA28 EXPERIENCED AN ELECTRICAL FAILURE. THE TWR CONTACT ALSO REPORTEDLY STATED THAT THE CTLR AND THE SUPVR ON DUTY FORGOT ABOUT THE PA28, BECAUSE THE ACFT WAS A PRIMARY TARGET ONLY WITH NO ASSOCIATED DATA BLOCK. THE CAPT STATED THAT AS HE WAS ABOUT TO ROTATE HE OBSERVED THE PA28 IN QUESTION AND DELAYED THE LIFTOFF TO AVOID THE PA28. THE RPTR STATED THAT THE ACFT FILLED THE WINDSCREEN, 100 FT IN FRONT AND 50 FT ABOVE THEM.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.