Narrative:

Inbound to hef, the ATIS information reported the winds to be 240 degrees at 4 KTS. I was also informed inbound by potomac approach to expect runway 16R since hef was in process of changing from northerly to southerly operation due to wind shift. After checking in with hef local controller, I heard a wind check report on frequency to be 220 degrees at 8 KTS. Flying a tail wheel airplane, I knew the landing (with a 60 degree crosswind) would be challenging. Hef local controller cleared me to land on runway 16R. During my landing attempt, the aircraft became difficult to control directionally due to crosswind. I determined that continuing to land would have been unsafe. I initiated a go around and informed the local controller that aircraft X was 'on the go.' the local controller immediately asked what my intentions were and informed me that I was only cleared to land. The local controller also asked the reason for my go around, to which I replied that I deemed the landing attempt to be unsafe. The local controller then asked the reason why I deemed the landing unsafe, to which I replied that, in my judgement, the landing attempt was unsafe. The local controller informed me that 'if you can take off, you can land,' and again asked the reason for my believing the landing to be unsafe, to which I replied 'due to the crosswind.' following that exchange, the local controller again asked me what my intentions were, to which I asked for a closed pattern go around and requested a squawk code (since class D airspace is inside washington ADIZ). Finally, after occupying the frequency with such argument, the local controller instructed me to join left downwind for runway 16R and report midfield. After obtaining another landing clearance for runway 16R on left downwind, and a wind check of 180 degrees at 4 KTS on left base, the subsequent landing attempt was uneventful. The events described above happened at a very critical phase of flight -- a tailwheel airplane experiencing a crosswind in a full nose-up trim, at low altitude and near stall while in a go around situation. The local controller's unprecedented on-frequency argument with me at best showed a complete disregard for the difficulties during that phase of flight and at worst could have jeopardized the flight's continued safe conduct. Every pilot knows that each landing attempt must include plan to go around. Every controller likewise should know that each landing clearance must necessarily include a go around plan. It is ultimately the PIC's responsibility to determine what constitutes a safe landing attempt, and not the controller's. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter indicated that in his judgement this was an isolated incident and the controller was only trying to determine the cause of the go around. The reporter did question the timing the controller utilized in securing the reason for the go around. The reporter corresponded with the ATC manager reference this incident and was satisfied with the manager's response and actions. The reporter idented his aircraft as a PA12.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT LNDG HEF ENCOUNTERS XWINDS, EXECUTES GAR AND EXPERIENCED EXCHANGE WITH ATC WITH REGARD TO THE CAUSE OF THE GAR.

Narrative: INBOUND TO HEF, THE ATIS INFO RPTED THE WINDS TO BE 240 DEGS AT 4 KTS. I WAS ALSO INFORMED INBOUND BY POTOMAC APCH TO EXPECT RWY 16R SINCE HEF WAS IN PROCESS OF CHANGING FROM NORTHERLY TO SOUTHERLY OP DUE TO WIND SHIFT. AFTER CHKING IN WITH HEF LCL CTLR, I HEARD A WIND CHK RPT ON FREQ TO BE 220 DEGS AT 8 KTS. FLYING A TAIL WHEEL AIRPLANE, I KNEW THE LNDG (WITH A 60 DEG XWIND) WOULD BE CHALLENGING. HEF LCL CTLR CLRED ME TO LAND ON RWY 16R. DURING MY LNDG ATTEMPT, THE ACFT BECAME DIFFICULT TO CTL DIRECTIONALLY DUE TO XWIND. I DETERMINED THAT CONTINUING TO LAND WOULD HAVE BEEN UNSAFE. I INITIATED A GAR AND INFORMED THE LCL CTLR THAT ACFT X WAS 'ON THE GO.' THE LCL CTLR IMMEDIATELY ASKED WHAT MY INTENTIONS WERE AND INFORMED ME THAT I WAS ONLY CLRED TO LAND. THE LCL CTLR ALSO ASKED THE REASON FOR MY GAR, TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT I DEEMED THE LNDG ATTEMPT TO BE UNSAFE. THE LCL CTLR THEN ASKED THE REASON WHY I DEEMED THE LNDG UNSAFE, TO WHICH I REPLIED THAT, IN MY JUDGEMENT, THE LNDG ATTEMPT WAS UNSAFE. THE LCL CTLR INFORMED ME THAT 'IF YOU CAN TAKE OFF, YOU CAN LAND,' AND AGAIN ASKED THE REASON FOR MY BELIEVING THE LNDG TO BE UNSAFE, TO WHICH I REPLIED 'DUE TO THE XWIND.' FOLLOWING THAT EXCHANGE, THE LCL CTLR AGAIN ASKED ME WHAT MY INTENTIONS WERE, TO WHICH I ASKED FOR A CLOSED PATTERN GAR AND REQUESTED A SQUAWK CODE (SINCE CLASS D AIRSPACE IS INSIDE WASHINGTON ADIZ). FINALLY, AFTER OCCUPYING THE FREQ WITH SUCH ARGUMENT, THE LCL CTLR INSTRUCTED ME TO JOIN L DOWNWIND FOR RWY 16R AND RPT MIDFIELD. AFTER OBTAINING ANOTHER LNDG CLRNC FOR RWY 16R ON L DOWNWIND, AND A WIND CHK OF 180 DEGS AT 4 KTS ON L BASE, THE SUBSEQUENT LNDG ATTEMPT WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE EVENTS DESCRIBED ABOVE HAPPENED AT A VERY CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT -- A TAILWHEEL AIRPLANE EXPERIENCING A XWIND IN A FULL NOSE-UP TRIM, AT LOW ALT AND NEAR STALL WHILE IN A GAR SIT. THE LCL CTLR'S UNPRECEDENTED ON-FREQ ARGUMENT WITH ME AT BEST SHOWED A COMPLETE DISREGARD FOR THE DIFFICULTIES DURING THAT PHASE OF FLT AND AT WORST COULD HAVE JEOPARDIZED THE FLT'S CONTINUED SAFE CONDUCT. EVERY PLT KNOWS THAT EACH LNDG ATTEMPT MUST INCLUDE PLAN TO GAR. EVERY CTLR LIKEWISE SHOULD KNOW THAT EACH LNDG CLRNC MUST NECESSARILY INCLUDE A GAR PLAN. IT IS ULTIMATELY THE PIC'S RESPONSIBILITY TO DETERMINE WHAT CONSTITUTES A SAFE LNDG ATTEMPT, AND NOT THE CTLR'S. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR INDICATED THAT IN HIS JUDGEMENT THIS WAS AN ISOLATED INCIDENT AND THE CTLR WAS ONLY TRYING TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE OF THE GAR. THE RPTR DID QUESTION THE TIMING THE CTLR UTILIZED IN SECURING THE REASON FOR THE GAR. THE RPTR CORRESPONDED WITH THE ATC MGR REFERENCE THIS INCIDENT AND WAS SATISFIED WITH THE MGR'S RESPONSE AND ACTIONS. THE RPTR IDENTED HIS ACFT AS A PA12.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.