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|
Attributes | |
ACN | 597783 |
Time | |
Date | 200310 |
Day | Sun |
Place | |
Locale Reference | navaid : cap.vortac |
State Reference | IL |
Altitude | msl bound lower : 29000 msl bound upper : 31000 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Night |
Aircraft 1 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zkc.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Navigation In Use | other vortac |
Flight Phase | descent : intermediate altitude |
Route In Use | arrival star : n/s |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Aircraft 2 | |
Controlling Facilities | artcc : zkc.artcc |
Operator | common carrier : air carrier |
Make Model Name | Commercial Fixed Wing |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 121 |
Flight Phase | cruise : level |
Flight Plan | IFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Qualification | controller : radar |
Experience | controller radar : 1.5 controller time certified in position1 : 1.5 |
ASRS Report | 597783 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | government : faa |
Function | controller : radar |
Events | |
Anomaly | altitude deviation : crossing restriction not met conflict : airborne less severe non adherence : required legal separation non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | atc equipment : conflict alert |
Resolutory Action | none taken : insufficient time |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Miss Distance | horizontal : 24000 vertical : 1600 |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | ATC Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Operational Error |
Narrative:
The B737 needed to descend for traffic, so I pointed out the aircraft to section 84 so to not level or increase any workload on the pilot. The controller at section 84 said, 'pointout approved descending to FL290.' the B737 pilot was given 90 mi to descend 8000 ft (FL370 down to FL290). When conflict alert went off with air carrier Y, I asked the B737 his descent rate and he replied 2000 FPM. In my calculation that descent rate was more than enough time to be level underneath the air carrier Y and make a crossing restr of FL290 by the ZAU boundary. No need to 'appreq' a descent believing the B737 would be level. The B737 was issued traffic and acknowledge. If B737 would not have slowed his descent rate and continued to 2000 FPM the oe would not have been a factor.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: A ZKC RADAR CTLR RECEIVED A POINTOUT APPROVED FROM AN ADJACENT SECTOR FOR A B737 TO DSND FROM FL370 TO FL290. A CONFLICT OCCURRED WITH TFC AT FL310.
Narrative: THE B737 NEEDED TO DSND FOR TFC, SO I POINTED OUT THE ACFT TO SECTION 84 SO TO NOT LEVEL OR INCREASE ANY WORKLOAD ON THE PLT. THE CTLR AT SECTION 84 SAID, 'POINTOUT APPROVED DSNDING TO FL290.' THE B737 PLT WAS GIVEN 90 MI TO DSND 8000 FT (FL370 DOWN TO FL290). WHEN CONFLICT ALERT WENT OFF WITH ACR Y, I ASKED THE B737 HIS DSCNT RATE AND HE REPLIED 2000 FPM. IN MY CALCULATION THAT DSCNT RATE WAS MORE THAN ENOUGH TIME TO BE LEVEL UNDERNEATH THE ACR Y AND MAKE A XING RESTR OF FL290 BY THE ZAU BOUNDARY. NO NEED TO 'APPREQ' A DSCNT BELIEVING THE B737 WOULD BE LEVEL. THE B737 WAS ISSUED TFC AND ACKNOWLEDGE. IF B737 WOULD NOT HAVE SLOWED HIS DSCNT RATE AND CONTINUED TO 2000 FPM THE OE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN A FACTOR.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.