Narrative:

I was with my instructor on a local training flight in a piper arrow. I was flying and my instructor was talking on the radio. We had just departed bunnell-flagler (X47) and called dayton approach for a full stop landing at dab. We were at 1500 ft, approaching from the north and the controller gave me vectors of 180 degrees and then 160 degrees, which pointed us right at the approach end of runway 7L at dab. He instructed us to keep our speed up and plan for a short approach to runway 7L to get in before a helicopter on a 6 mi final. At that time, I estimate we were also about 6 mi out because he then handed us off to the tower. After establishing contact with the tower, we were instructed to continue on the base for the runway. At about 1/4 mi from the runway and at an altitude of about 300 ft, I turned final for runway 7L. The tower never said anything about the helicopter until I turned for a very short final. At about that time the tower inquired if we had the helicopter traffic in sight. I never saw the helicopter. My instructor looked out and saw it in extremely close proximity to us off our right side and slightly above us. He estimated the helicopter was 25 ft horizontally and 50 ft vertically away from us. When the tower realized there was a problem, he instructed the helicopter to go around and we continued the landing. I believe that the problem first arose when someone put a human in front of a radar screen and put a human at the controls of an aircraft and then gave them a means to communicate. I believe the contributing factors were: 1) we were sequenced for a hurried approach, 2) the inadequate visual lookout by the pilots of both aircraft (myself included), and 3) inadequate surveillance by the tower. The problem was discovered when the tower queried if we had the traffic in sight and the helicopter was spotted just off our right wing. As a corrective action, the helicopter was instructed to go around and he carried out that instruction. For human performance, I did not perceive any problem until my instructor spotted the helicopter in an extremely close proximity to us. I had no problem conducting a hurried and short approach. At the time, I was looking at the runway and did not devote any time to scanning for the helicopter traffic. For myself, I made a logical assumption that because we are talking to a controller, everything will be ok and, therefore, I was not more proactive in scanning for traffic. I believe that nothing can be done to correct this situation or prevent it from recurring. We, as humans, are not perfect and this type of problem can never be eliminated as long as humans are in control.

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: VFR PA28, ON ATC VECTORS PER TWR INSTRUCTIONS FOR A SHORT APCH TO DAB, EXPERIENCED NMAC WITH STRAIGHT-IN HELI TFC.

Narrative: I WAS WITH MY INSTRUCTOR ON A LCL TRAINING FLT IN A PIPER ARROW. I WAS FLYING AND MY INSTRUCTOR WAS TALKING ON THE RADIO. WE HAD JUST DEPARTED BUNNELL-FLAGLER (X47) AND CALLED DAYTON APCH FOR A FULL STOP LNDG AT DAB. WE WERE AT 1500 FT, APCHING FROM THE N AND THE CTLR GAVE ME VECTORS OF 180 DEGS AND THEN 160 DEGS, WHICH POINTED US RIGHT AT THE APCH END OF RWY 7L AT DAB. HE INSTRUCTED US TO KEEP OUR SPD UP AND PLAN FOR A SHORT APCH TO RWY 7L TO GET IN BEFORE A HELI ON A 6 MI FINAL. AT THAT TIME, I ESTIMATE WE WERE ALSO ABOUT 6 MI OUT BECAUSE HE THEN HANDED US OFF TO THE TWR. AFTER ESTABLISHING CONTACT WITH THE TWR, WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CONTINUE ON THE BASE FOR THE RWY. AT ABOUT 1/4 MI FROM THE RWY AND AT AN ALT OF ABOUT 300 FT, I TURNED FINAL FOR RWY 7L. THE TWR NEVER SAID ANYTHING ABOUT THE HELI UNTIL I TURNED FOR A VERY SHORT FINAL. AT ABOUT THAT TIME THE TWR INQUIRED IF WE HAD THE HELI TFC IN SIGHT. I NEVER SAW THE HELI. MY INSTRUCTOR LOOKED OUT AND SAW IT IN EXTREMELY CLOSE PROX TO US OFF OUR R SIDE AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE US. HE ESTIMATED THE HELI WAS 25 FT HORIZLY AND 50 FT VERTLY AWAY FROM US. WHEN THE TWR REALIZED THERE WAS A PROB, HE INSTRUCTED THE HELI TO GO AROUND AND WE CONTINUED THE LNDG. I BELIEVE THAT THE PROB FIRST AROSE WHEN SOMEONE PUT A HUMAN IN FRONT OF A RADAR SCREEN AND PUT A HUMAN AT THE CTLS OF AN ACFT AND THEN GAVE THEM A MEANS TO COMMUNICATE. I BELIEVE THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS WERE: 1) WE WERE SEQUENCED FOR A HURRIED APCH, 2) THE INADEQUATE VISUAL LOOKOUT BY THE PLTS OF BOTH ACFT (MYSELF INCLUDED), AND 3) INADEQUATE SURVEILLANCE BY THE TWR. THE PROB WAS DISCOVERED WHEN THE TWR QUERIED IF WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT AND THE HELI WAS SPOTTED JUST OFF OUR R WING. AS A CORRECTIVE ACTION, THE HELI WAS INSTRUCTED TO GO AROUND AND HE CARRIED OUT THAT INSTRUCTION. FOR HUMAN PERFORMANCE, I DID NOT PERCEIVE ANY PROB UNTIL MY INSTRUCTOR SPOTTED THE HELI IN AN EXTREMELY CLOSE PROX TO US. I HAD NO PROB CONDUCTING A HURRIED AND SHORT APCH. AT THE TIME, I WAS LOOKING AT THE RWY AND DID NOT DEVOTE ANY TIME TO SCANNING FOR THE HELI TFC. FOR MYSELF, I MADE A LOGICAL ASSUMPTION THAT BECAUSE WE ARE TALKING TO A CTLR, EVERYTHING WILL BE OK AND, THEREFORE, I WAS NOT MORE PROACTIVE IN SCANNING FOR TFC. I BELIEVE THAT NOTHING CAN BE DONE TO CORRECT THIS SIT OR PREVENT IT FROM RECURRING. WE, AS HUMANS, ARE NOT PERFECT AND THIS TYPE OF PROB CAN NEVER BE ELIMINATED AS LONG AS HUMANS ARE IN CTL.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.