Narrative:

We were on descent into iad, given crossing altitude of 11000 ft 50 NM west of aml. At the time, autoplt was on and we were on a 'speed descent.' ATC issued instructions as we were passing through approximately FL340, 'air carrier X, turn left 20 degrees, maintain current rate of descent.' at the time we were at 800 FPM and going to heading select, the aircraft reverted to a vertical descent of 800 FPM instead of the speed descent. The captain accidentally activated the approach mode and became concerned with this. He had selected speed so the aircraft did not slow to green DOT speed. There were no problems at this point. He became fixated with putting aircraft back into the descent phase and unknown to me, violated SOP and put FL330 back in altitude window. The aircraft began to level at FL330, as I noticed our descent had shallowed. I told the captain we must continued 800-1000 FPM as instructed. He was very concerned about getting back to descent mode. I went into FMGC to fix it (even though it didn't matter). ATC asked our rate of descent and I noticed we were leveling. I told the captain we must descend and saw him pull for open descent. The aircraft did not descend and only then did I notice FL330 was still in the window. I reset 11000 ft and we continued open descent. ATC said she saw 5 radar sweeps with us level at FL330. I asked her if our current rate was enough. She said it was ok but wondered if we had a transponder problem. There seemed to be no conflict with the traffic as it was greater than 10 NM and 1000 ft, but we cannot know if we created a problem or not. Nothing else was mentioned by ATC. Human factors were: 1) failure to follow SOP. Had the captain followed SOP, this would never had occurred. 2) failure to communicate with PNF. 3) fatigue resulting on fixation of an aircraft mode of flight that was irrelevant. This same captain also made PA announcements while flying and without saying anything to me. I would notice he was talking and then realized he was addressing passenger. Why? He would turn on system such as anti-ice without my knowledge. This is just professional courtesy to verbalize things you are doing, and this type of thing should not be normally done by the PF. Our procedures are fine -- I am sick of pilots telling me they follow SOP, and then failing to comply with the basics.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A320 CREW DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE DSCNT RATE ASSIGNED BY RADAR CTLR. THE CAPT WAS IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH SOP'S WHEN HE WAS CHANGING VERT NAV MODES, AND ALT ALERTER SETTINGS, WITHOUT THE FO'S KNOWLEDGE.

Narrative: WE WERE ON DSCNT INTO IAD, GIVEN XING ALT OF 11000 FT 50 NM W OF AML. AT THE TIME, AUTOPLT WAS ON AND WE WERE ON A 'SPD DSCNT.' ATC ISSUED INSTRUCTIONS AS WE WERE PASSING THROUGH APPROX FL340, 'ACR X, TURN L 20 DEGS, MAINTAIN CURRENT RATE OF DSCNT.' AT THE TIME WE WERE AT 800 FPM AND GOING TO HEADING SELECT, THE ACFT REVERTED TO A VERT DSCNT OF 800 FPM INSTEAD OF THE SPD DSCNT. THE CAPT ACCIDENTALLY ACTIVATED THE APCH MODE AND BECAME CONCERNED WITH THIS. HE HAD SELECTED SPD SO THE ACFT DID NOT SLOW TO GREEN DOT SPD. THERE WERE NO PROBS AT THIS POINT. HE BECAME FIXATED WITH PUTTING ACFT BACK INTO THE DSCNT PHASE AND UNKNOWN TO ME, VIOLATED SOP AND PUT FL330 BACK IN ALT WINDOW. THE ACFT BEGAN TO LEVEL AT FL330, AS I NOTICED OUR DSCNT HAD SHALLOWED. I TOLD THE CAPT WE MUST CONTINUED 800-1000 FPM AS INSTRUCTED. HE WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT GETTING BACK TO DSCNT MODE. I WENT INTO FMGC TO FIX IT (EVEN THOUGH IT DIDN'T MATTER). ATC ASKED OUR RATE OF DSCNT AND I NOTICED WE WERE LEVELING. I TOLD THE CAPT WE MUST DSND AND SAW HIM PULL FOR OPEN DSCNT. THE ACFT DID NOT DSND AND ONLY THEN DID I NOTICE FL330 WAS STILL IN THE WINDOW. I RESET 11000 FT AND WE CONTINUED OPEN DSCNT. ATC SAID SHE SAW 5 RADAR SWEEPS WITH US LEVEL AT FL330. I ASKED HER IF OUR CURRENT RATE WAS ENOUGH. SHE SAID IT WAS OK BUT WONDERED IF WE HAD A XPONDER PROB. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO CONFLICT WITH THE TFC AS IT WAS GREATER THAN 10 NM AND 1000 FT, BUT WE CANNOT KNOW IF WE CREATED A PROB OR NOT. NOTHING ELSE WAS MENTIONED BY ATC. HUMAN FACTORS WERE: 1) FAILURE TO FOLLOW SOP. HAD THE CAPT FOLLOWED SOP, THIS WOULD NEVER HAD OCCURRED. 2) FAILURE TO COMMUNICATE WITH PNF. 3) FATIGUE RESULTING ON FIXATION OF AN ACFT MODE OF FLT THAT WAS IRRELEVANT. THIS SAME CAPT ALSO MADE PA ANNOUNCEMENTS WHILE FLYING AND WITHOUT SAYING ANYTHING TO ME. I WOULD NOTICE HE WAS TALKING AND THEN REALIZED HE WAS ADDRESSING PAX. WHY? HE WOULD TURN ON SYS SUCH AS ANTI-ICE WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE. THIS IS JUST PROFESSIONAL COURTESY TO VERBALIZE THINGS YOU ARE DOING, AND THIS TYPE OF THING SHOULD NOT BE NORMALLY DONE BY THE PF. OUR PROCS ARE FINE -- I AM SICK OF PLTS TELLING ME THEY FOLLOW SOP, AND THEN FAILING TO COMPLY WITH THE BASICS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.