Narrative:

There was a communications breakdown between ATC (tower) and the flight crew prior to takeoff. ATC issued takeoff clearance of 270 degree heading, 5000 ft off runway 27L. The same clearance was read back and we departed. Upon climb out, tower switched us to departure frequency without further instructions. Departure control did not respond to us (they were very busy) and we continued after takeoff procedures. After a few mins of no response, we checked the frequency and switched to the appropriate one for our direction of flight. ATC told us to discontinue climb at 4100 ft and to look for traffic at our 1 O'clock position. We had the traffic in sight (VMC WX), ATC continued our climb and turned us sbound. We received no conflict resolution from TCASII -- there was adequate separation. ATC informed us that tower had expected us to fly a different departure than what was read back and performed. There are 2 factors that contributed to this situation: 1) during high volume, high workload environments, there is an increased chance for communication breakdown and a need for increased vigilance in ATC readback on both ends of the communication. 2) both pilots are capts at the airline. The airline utilizes capts for both position -- this can lead to confusion on roles and duties (eg, who sets the departure frequency prior to departure), typically first officer's set the departure frequencys during taxi. There are other negative safety aspects of using capts for both seats -- it should not be allowed. Another contributing factor was the 8 hour flight time, and 14 hour duty day that was scheduled for the crew. These are regular schedules -- they always push flight crews to the maximum and lead to a degradation of safety. Flight and duty time regulations are not realistic, and often don't take into consideration early morning or late night flying effect on flight crew's physiology. Supplemental information from acn 601698: departure advised that tower assigned 240 degree heading.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DO328 EXPERIENCED POTENTIAL CONFLICTION DEPARTING PHL BECAUSE OF MISUNDERSTOOD HEADING CLRNC.

Narrative: THERE WAS A COMS BREAKDOWN BTWN ATC (TWR) AND THE FLT CREW PRIOR TO TKOF. ATC ISSUED TKOF CLRNC OF 270 DEG HDG, 5000 FT OFF RWY 27L. THE SAME CLRNC WAS READ BACK AND WE DEPARTED. UPON CLBOUT, TWR SWITCHED US TO DEP FREQ WITHOUT FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS. DEP CTL DID NOT RESPOND TO US (THEY WERE VERY BUSY) AND WE CONTINUED AFTER TKOF PROCS. AFTER A FEW MINS OF NO RESPONSE, WE CHKED THE FREQ AND SWITCHED TO THE APPROPRIATE ONE FOR OUR DIRECTION OF FLT. ATC TOLD US TO DISCONTINUE CLB AT 4100 FT AND TO LOOK FOR TFC AT OUR 1 O'CLOCK POS. WE HAD THE TFC IN SIGHT (VMC WX), ATC CONTINUED OUR CLB AND TURNED US SBOUND. WE RECEIVED NO CONFLICT RESOLUTION FROM TCASII -- THERE WAS ADEQUATE SEPARATION. ATC INFORMED US THAT TWR HAD EXPECTED US TO FLY A DIFFERENT DEP THAN WHAT WAS READ BACK AND PERFORMED. THERE ARE 2 FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT: 1) DURING HIGH VOLUME, HIGH WORKLOAD ENVIRONMENTS, THERE IS AN INCREASED CHANCE FOR COM BREAKDOWN AND A NEED FOR INCREASED VIGILANCE IN ATC READBACK ON BOTH ENDS OF THE COM. 2) BOTH PLTS ARE CAPTS AT THE AIRLINE. THE AIRLINE UTILIZES CAPTS FOR BOTH POS -- THIS CAN LEAD TO CONFUSION ON ROLES AND DUTIES (EG, WHO SETS THE DEP FREQ PRIOR TO DEP), TYPICALLY FO'S SET THE DEP FREQS DURING TAXI. THERE ARE OTHER NEGATIVE SAFETY ASPECTS OF USING CAPTS FOR BOTH SEATS -- IT SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED. ANOTHER CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE 8 HR FLT TIME, AND 14 HR DUTY DAY THAT WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE CREW. THESE ARE REGULAR SCHEDULES -- THEY ALWAYS PUSH FLT CREWS TO THE MAX AND LEAD TO A DEGRADATION OF SAFETY. FLT AND DUTY TIME REGS ARE NOT REALISTIC, AND OFTEN DON'T TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION EARLY MORNING OR LATE NIGHT FLYING EFFECT ON FLT CREW'S PHYSIOLOGY. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 601698: DEP ADVISED THAT TWR ASSIGNED 240 DEG HDG.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.