Narrative:

Runway 30 operation in mmun. Somewhat extended hold for takeoff. Takeoff clearance was runway heading to 7000 ft. The tower controller asked if we could accept an immediate takeoff after preceding traffic then he subsequently issued takeoff clearance. During the takeoff roll, he stated that we should stay with tower controller contrary to our original instructions to switch to departure. The captain (PNF) acknowledged just prior to V1. Climbing through 4500 ft MSL on runway heading, tower told us to maintain 2500 ft. As I leveled, the captain asked for clarification and the controller responded with instructions for a right turn (no heading given). I started the right turn and the controller gave us the frequency change to departure. At this point we got a brief TA for traffic at our 10:30 O'clock position and high. This all happened in a matter of seconds. The captain contacted departure and asked if we should descend or continue the climb. The controller cleared us to FL250 and gave us a vector on course. Later, the asked us if tower had originally instructed us to level at 2000 ft on takeoff. We told him that tower had not. That ended the conversation. The tower controller's english was very poor. I believe that in his rush to get us out, he either 1) forgot to pass the 2000 ft hold down to us, 2) failed to coordination with departure, or 3) gave it to us during the takeoff roll but we missed it. The ensuing mess was the result of him getting overwhelmed. He should not be issuing changes to us during the takeoff roll (approaching V1). Poor adherence to standard terminology. 'Maintain 250' is an example of what we had to clarify as clearance to FL250. Another example is his incomplete instruction to 'turn right.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MMUN DEP CTLR QUESTIONS DEPARTING B767 FLT CREW REF AN EXPECTED DEP ALT RESTR. FLT CREW QUESTIONS MMUN ATCT LCL CTLR ATC SEPARATION AND COM TECHNIQUE AFTER QUESTIONABLE PHRASEOLOGY.

Narrative: RWY 30 OP IN MMUN. SOMEWHAT EXTENDED HOLD FOR TKOF. TKOF CLRNC WAS RWY HDG TO 7000 FT. THE TWR CTLR ASKED IF WE COULD ACCEPT AN IMMEDIATE TKOF AFTER PRECEDING TFC THEN HE SUBSEQUENTLY ISSUED TKOF CLRNC. DURING THE TKOF ROLL, HE STATED THAT WE SHOULD STAY WITH TWR CTLR CONTRARY TO OUR ORIGINAL INSTRUCTIONS TO SWITCH TO DEP. THE CAPT (PNF) ACKNOWLEDGED JUST PRIOR TO V1. CLBING THROUGH 4500 FT MSL ON RWY HDG, TWR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 2500 FT. AS I LEVELED, THE CAPT ASKED FOR CLARIFICATION AND THE CTLR RESPONDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS FOR A R TURN (NO HDG GIVEN). I STARTED THE R TURN AND THE CTLR GAVE US THE FREQ CHANGE TO DEP. AT THIS POINT WE GOT A BRIEF TA FOR TFC AT OUR 10:30 O'CLOCK POS AND HIGH. THIS ALL HAPPENED IN A MATTER OF SECONDS. THE CAPT CONTACTED DEP AND ASKED IF WE SHOULD DSND OR CONTINUE THE CLB. THE CTLR CLRED US TO FL250 AND GAVE US A VECTOR ON COURSE. LATER, THE ASKED US IF TWR HAD ORIGINALLY INSTRUCTED US TO LEVEL AT 2000 FT ON TKOF. WE TOLD HIM THAT TWR HAD NOT. THAT ENDED THE CONVERSATION. THE TWR CTLR'S ENGLISH WAS VERY POOR. I BELIEVE THAT IN HIS RUSH TO GET US OUT, HE EITHER 1) FORGOT TO PASS THE 2000 FT HOLD DOWN TO US, 2) FAILED TO COORD WITH DEP, OR 3) GAVE IT TO US DURING THE TKOF ROLL BUT WE MISSED IT. THE ENSUING MESS WAS THE RESULT OF HIM GETTING OVERWHELMED. HE SHOULD NOT BE ISSUING CHANGES TO US DURING THE TKOF ROLL (APCHING V1). POOR ADHERENCE TO STANDARD TERMINOLOGY. 'MAINTAIN 250' IS AN EXAMPLE OF WHAT WE HAD TO CLARIFY AS CLRNC TO FL250. ANOTHER EXAMPLE IS HIS INCOMPLETE INSTRUCTION TO 'TURN R.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.