Narrative:

On the arrival into moscow, the first officer was the PF. He was high on the descent. The captain, PNF, told the first officer a couple times to get down. I did not say how high he was because the captain was already commenting. The first officer did not increase rate of descent much. Just after intercepting final, approach offered us a l-hand circuit to make the descent. The captain accepted this. At this time we were passing through transition level descending to 2000 ft. The first officer had set in 997 for QFE and the captain was so focused on the first officer being high and overloaded with handling the radio calls and dealing with meters, he still had 1013 standard set in. I had written down 977 for QFE from the ATIS. I saw the discrepancy and asked the captain to request the altimeter setting. The captain did not recognize the importance of having QFE set in. I thought there was plenty of time to correct the conflicting altimeter settings from approach. Approach did not understand our request and it took 3 radio calls before they gave us QFE of 978. At this time we were passing through 3000 ft when the first officer set in 978 from 997. This caused us to level off about 400 ft low. The part that made it worse is the first officer did not climb back up to 2000 ft. The captain told him to climb, but the first officer did not climb aggressively if at all. Once again, I did not say 'climb' because the captain was already saying it. One reason we did not climb as easily was that the speed brake was still out much earlier. I told the captain that he should put the speed brake in for the first officer. He only moved it half way because he was overloaded with what he had to do. We eventually climbed to about 100 ft low about the time it was glide path intercept. I believe that the captain got very focused and worried when the copilot was high on the descent, so focused that his other duties got dropped. When the first officer was high, it made everything else harder to deal with QFE and metric altitudes. I should have been more aggressive and also told the first officer he was high. Also, when I saw a discrepancy in altimeter settings I should have told the first officer to 'level off now! Until we get the correct one.' I also should have trusted the one I wrote down from ATIS. I thought that I might have made a mistake, but the lower one is safer and makes more sense for QFE. It was a mess and all 3 pilots contributed to the poor performance and any one of us could have straightened it out, especially me as relief pilot who watched it happen!

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B767-300 CREW HAD AN ALTDEV, UNSTABILIZED APCH, CFTT, MISSET QFE ON AN APCH TO UUEE.

Narrative: ON THE ARR INTO MOSCOW, THE FO WAS THE PF. HE WAS HIGH ON THE DSCNT. THE CAPT, PNF, TOLD THE FO A COUPLE TIMES TO GET DOWN. I DID NOT SAY HOW HIGH HE WAS BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS ALREADY COMMENTING. THE FO DID NOT INCREASE RATE OF DSCNT MUCH. JUST AFTER INTERCEPTING FINAL, APCH OFFERED US A L-HAND CIRCUIT TO MAKE THE DSCNT. THE CAPT ACCEPTED THIS. AT THIS TIME WE WERE PASSING THROUGH TRANSITION LEVEL DSNDING TO 2000 FT. THE FO HAD SET IN 997 FOR QFE AND THE CAPT WAS SO FOCUSED ON THE FO BEING HIGH AND OVERLOADED WITH HANDLING THE RADIO CALLS AND DEALING WITH METERS, HE STILL HAD 1013 STANDARD SET IN. I HAD WRITTEN DOWN 977 FOR QFE FROM THE ATIS. I SAW THE DISCREPANCY AND ASKED THE CAPT TO REQUEST THE ALTIMETER SETTING. THE CAPT DID NOT RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANCE OF HAVING QFE SET IN. I THOUGHT THERE WAS PLENTY OF TIME TO CORRECT THE CONFLICTING ALTIMETER SETTINGS FROM APCH. APCH DID NOT UNDERSTAND OUR REQUEST AND IT TOOK 3 RADIO CALLS BEFORE THEY GAVE US QFE OF 978. AT THIS TIME WE WERE PASSING THROUGH 3000 FT WHEN THE FO SET IN 978 FROM 997. THIS CAUSED US TO LEVEL OFF ABOUT 400 FT LOW. THE PART THAT MADE IT WORSE IS THE FO DID NOT CLB BACK UP TO 2000 FT. THE CAPT TOLD HIM TO CLB, BUT THE FO DID NOT CLB AGGRESSIVELY IF AT ALL. ONCE AGAIN, I DID NOT SAY 'CLB' BECAUSE THE CAPT WAS ALREADY SAYING IT. ONE REASON WE DID NOT CLB AS EASILY WAS THAT THE SPD BRAKE WAS STILL OUT MUCH EARLIER. I TOLD THE CAPT THAT HE SHOULD PUT THE SPD BRAKE IN FOR THE FO. HE ONLY MOVED IT HALF WAY BECAUSE HE WAS OVERLOADED WITH WHAT HE HAD TO DO. WE EVENTUALLY CLBED TO ABOUT 100 FT LOW ABOUT THE TIME IT WAS GLIDE PATH INTERCEPT. I BELIEVE THAT THE CAPT GOT VERY FOCUSED AND WORRIED WHEN THE COPLT WAS HIGH ON THE DSCNT, SO FOCUSED THAT HIS OTHER DUTIES GOT DROPPED. WHEN THE FO WAS HIGH, IT MADE EVERYTHING ELSE HARDER TO DEAL WITH QFE AND METRIC ALTS. I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE AGGRESSIVE AND ALSO TOLD THE FO HE WAS HIGH. ALSO, WHEN I SAW A DISCREPANCY IN ALTIMETER SETTINGS I SHOULD HAVE TOLD THE FO TO 'LEVEL OFF NOW! UNTIL WE GET THE CORRECT ONE.' I ALSO SHOULD HAVE TRUSTED THE ONE I WROTE DOWN FROM ATIS. I THOUGHT THAT I MIGHT HAVE MADE A MISTAKE, BUT THE LOWER ONE IS SAFER AND MAKES MORE SENSE FOR QFE. IT WAS A MESS AND ALL 3 PLTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE POOR PERFORMANCE AND ANY ONE OF US COULD HAVE STRAIGHTENED IT OUT, ESPECIALLY ME AS RELIEF PLT WHO WATCHED IT HAPPEN!

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.