A fairchild metropolitan 111 on approach at 1500 ft shut down the left engine due to loss of oil pre...

Attributes
ACN	603617
Time
Date	200312
Day	Wed
Local Time Of Day	0001 To 0600
Place
Locale Reference	airport : zzz.airport
State Reference	US
Altitude	msl single value : 1500
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Light	Night
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : zzz.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air taxi
Make Model Name	SA-227 AC Metro III
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 135
Flight Phase	descent : approach
Route In Use	approach : visual
Flight Plan	IFR
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air taxi
Function	flight crew : first officer
Qualification	pilot : cfi pilot : multi engine pilot : instrument pilot : commercial
Experience	flight time last 90 days : 300 flight time total : 1020 flight time type : 500
ASRS Report	603617
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air taxi
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical other anomaly other
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : l eng press. indication other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	flight crew : overcame equipment problem
Consequence	other
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Aircraft Chart Or Publication Flight Crew Human Performance
Primary Problem	Aircraft

Narrative:

We were on a straight in visual approach to the runway at 1500 ft when the left engine oil pressure warning light illuminated and was verified by zero oil pressure indication on the respective gauge. We decided to level off and requested a l-hand traffic pattern to allow for adequate time to address our situation. We completed the appropriate checklists, shut down the engine and had a positive exchange of controls switching me to the PNF. I declared an emergency with the tower and informed them of our situation. The captain immediately keyed the microphone canceling our emergency status and said we simply had to do a precautionary shutdown. I questioned his statement and he reiterated his desire not to declare an emergency. Due to our critical situation and close proximity to the airport, I chose not to argue with him and we proceeded with a safe and uneventful landing. Once we were on the ground and had shut down the aircraft, we discussed the entire situation including our need to declare an emergency. Factors that contributed to this situation include fatigue, hazardous attitudes, and a breakdown in CRM. Fatigue played a role because we were returning home from a long duty day which greatly influenced our judgement and decision making skills. Fatigue also led to the development of hazardous attitudes such as impulsivity and machoism. The captain made an impulsive decision without stopping to think of the best course of action. He also may have felt macho because he had experienced a similar emergency the day before and felt that he could safely handle the situation without declaring an emergency. Finally, there was a breakdown in CRM which led to the captain's desire to not declare an emergency while I knew it was required. I could have further stressed the importance of declaring the emergency by stating the many different ways that it benefits us such as bringing ATC and ground personnel into the loop of our situation. If time permitted, I also could have shown him the regulation in our operations manual which I had with me.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A FAIRCHILD METRO 111 ON APCH AT 1500 FT SHUT DOWN THE L ENG DUE TO LOSS OF OIL PRESSURE. FO CONCERNED CAPT DID NOT DECLARE EMER.

Narrative: WE WERE ON A STRAIGHT IN VISUAL APCH TO THE RWY AT 1500 FT WHEN THE L ENG OIL PRESSURE WARNING LIGHT ILLUMINATED AND WAS VERIFIED BY ZERO OIL PRESSURE INDICATION ON THE RESPECTIVE GAUGE. WE DECIDED TO LEVEL OFF AND REQUESTED A L-HAND TFC PATTERN TO ALLOW FOR ADEQUATE TIME TO ADDRESS OUR SIT. WE COMPLETED THE APPROPRIATE CHKLISTS, SHUT DOWN THE ENG AND HAD A POSITIVE EXCHANGE OF CTLS SWITCHING ME TO THE PNF. I DECLARED AN EMER WITH THE TWR AND INFORMED THEM OF OUR SIT. THE CAPT IMMEDIATELY KEYED THE MIKE CANCELING OUR EMER STATUS AND SAID WE SIMPLY HAD TO DO A PRECAUTIONARY SHUTDOWN. I QUESTIONED HIS STATEMENT AND HE REITERATED HIS DESIRE NOT TO DECLARE AN EMER. DUE TO OUR CRITICAL SIT AND CLOSE PROX TO THE ARPT, I CHOSE NOT TO ARGUE WITH HIM AND WE PROCEEDED WITH A SAFE AND UNEVENTFUL LNDG. ONCE WE WERE ON THE GND AND HAD SHUT DOWN THE ACFT, WE DISCUSSED THE ENTIRE SIT INCLUDING OUR NEED TO DECLARE AN EMER. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS SIT INCLUDE FATIGUE, HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES, AND A BREAKDOWN IN CRM. FATIGUE PLAYED A ROLE BECAUSE WE WERE RETURNING HOME FROM A LONG DUTY DAY WHICH GREATLY INFLUENCED OUR JUDGEMENT AND DECISION MAKING SKILLS. FATIGUE ALSO LED TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF HAZARDOUS ATTITUDES SUCH AS IMPULSIVITY AND MACHOISM. THE CAPT MADE AN IMPULSIVE DECISION WITHOUT STOPPING TO THINK OF THE BEST COURSE OF ACTION. HE ALSO MAY HAVE FELT MACHO BECAUSE HE HAD EXPERIENCED A SIMILAR EMER THE DAY BEFORE AND FELT THAT HE COULD SAFELY HANDLE THE SIT WITHOUT DECLARING AN EMER. FINALLY, THERE WAS A BREAKDOWN IN CRM WHICH LED TO THE CAPT'S DESIRE TO NOT DECLARE AN EMER WHILE I KNEW IT WAS REQUIRED. I COULD HAVE FURTHER STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF DECLARING THE EMER BY STATING THE MANY DIFFERENT WAYS THAT IT BENEFITS US SUCH AS BRINGING ATC AND GND PERSONNEL INTO THE LOOP OF OUR SIT. IF TIME PERMITTED, I ALSO COULD HAVE SHOWN HIM THE REG IN OUR OPS MANUAL WHICH I HAD WITH ME.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.

A fairchild metropolitan 111 on approach at 1500 ft shut down the left engine due to loss of oil pressure. First officer concerned captain did not declare emergency.