Narrative:

I served as captain on flight from ind-atl and atl-ind. Same aircraft both flts. Dispatched with #1 generator inoperative. APU operated to power left bus. WX was snow at ind. No problems to ind, except a passenger thought he saw oil leaking from #2 engine. We noted no change in oil (engine) quantity/pressure. Gave emphasis to #2 engine on visual preflight at ind. Departing ind, ground operations all normal, including deice. During takeoff roll prior to V1, master caution and electric lights illuminated. First officer leg and I told him to continue. After cleanup, I told first officer to handle the airplane and ATC communication while I handled the checklist. Noted right bus off and #2 CSD low oil pressure lights on and load shed had occurred. I then tried to fit the checklist to the situation: loss of both engine driven generators with APU already running to power left bus, and bus xfer switch still in 'automatic.' then went to bus off and CSD low oil pressure checklist: #2 generator volts/frequencys both zero. I was about to announce activating generator drive disconnect switch when right bus off and low oil pressure lights extinguished. Noted volts/frequencys ok, but frequencys fluctuating 390-400. By now, we were south of cvg (2 mi overcast 1 SM) en route to bwg for rmb arrival. Told first officer we would continue toward atl and began coordination with maintenance and flight control. Flight control reminded us not to fly into icing conditions (in case left bus failed resulting in standby power operation with no anti-ice capability). Got WX for bna and cha. Atl still best with 6500 ft broken and 65 degrees. At some point prior to leveloff, right bus off and low oil pressure lights came back on. Volts good/frequencys 390. Could not decide what right generator situation was for sure. Now 220 NM from atl. We reviewed our options and system should we end up on standby power. Meantime, we had gotten a descent below FL300 to ensure fuel would gravity feed. Told cabin crew galley power would be inoperative and initial descent signal would be early. By now we were less than 30 mins from landing at atl and could see that we would be able to descend in VMC. We again reviewed our options should left bus/APU fault. Flight control sent an ACARS message that he had put in a word on our behalf to atl approach. Fortunately, traffic volume was not heavy. First officer flew visual approach to runway 26R, made a very nice touchdown, and we taxied to the gate. Supplemental information from acn 611555: at cruise altitude (FL310), aircraft lost left generator (the right generator was already MEL'ed). The captain advised the maintenance controller coordination of event rather than dispatcher. The maintenance coordinator called me to discuss the event and I asked the captain to call me on the radio. While I was waiting for the captain to call, I ensured the flight would not enter icing conditions. When the captain called, he wanted to talk to maintenance, I told him I wanted to talk to him about the event. I understood the second generator went off line due to a low oil pressure light and that he was on APU power. I advised him that no icing conditions would be encountered and began to give him the WX for bna. The captain told me he was continuing on to atl. I patched maintenance in on our radio and maintenance confirmed event. The language in our QRH says, 'plan to land at nearest suitable airport.' I asked my supervisor the intent of the language, and he was unsure. I had ny supervisor go with me to talk with the maintenance coordinator to talk about the radio conversation. I asked if the generator could be brought on line if needed and what was affected. I was advised the generator cold not be brought on line and the only power the captain had was APU, then battery. I could not understand why the captain did not want to land at nearest suitable airport. I had given the captain bna information prior to talking to maintenance. I told the captain I would ask ATC not to delay him. Although I advised the captain of my desire to go to bna and the language in the operational procedures was not clear, I feel that I should have advised the captain that if he elected to continue to atlanta, he would use his emergency authority/authorized. Although my intent was clear, I did not use that wording. The flight did not declare an emergency and there were no further issues.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-200 CREW WAS MEL'ED WITH #1 GENERATOR INOP. THE #2 GENERATOR CSD HAD A LOW PRESSURE WARNING PRIOR TO V1. THE CAPT DID NOT ABORT THE TKOF AND CONTINUED TO THE DEST IN NON COMPLIANCE WITH THE FOM THAT REQUIRED A LNDG AT THE NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.

Narrative: I SERVED AS CAPT ON FLT FROM IND-ATL AND ATL-IND. SAME ACFT BOTH FLTS. DISPATCHED WITH #1 GENERATOR INOP. APU OPERATED TO PWR L BUS. WX WAS SNOW AT IND. NO PROBS TO IND, EXCEPT A PAX THOUGHT HE SAW OIL LEAKING FROM #2 ENG. WE NOTED NO CHANGE IN OIL (ENG) QUANTITY/PRESSURE. GAVE EMPHASIS TO #2 ENG ON VISUAL PREFLT AT IND. DEPARTING IND, GND OPS ALL NORMAL, INCLUDING DEICE. DURING TKOF ROLL PRIOR TO V1, MASTER CAUTION AND ELECTRIC LIGHTS ILLUMINATED. FO LEG AND I TOLD HIM TO CONTINUE. AFTER CLEANUP, I TOLD FO TO HANDLE THE AIRPLANE AND ATC COM WHILE I HANDLED THE CHKLIST. NOTED R BUS OFF AND #2 CSD LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHTS ON AND LOAD SHED HAD OCCURRED. I THEN TRIED TO FIT THE CHKLIST TO THE SIT: LOSS OF BOTH ENG DRIVEN GENERATORS WITH APU ALREADY RUNNING TO PWR L BUS, AND BUS XFER SWITCH STILL IN 'AUTO.' THEN WENT TO BUS OFF AND CSD LOW OIL PRESSURE CHKLIST: #2 GENERATOR VOLTS/FREQS BOTH ZERO. I WAS ABOUT TO ANNOUNCE ACTIVATING GENERATOR DRIVE DISCONNECT SWITCH WHEN R BUS OFF AND LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHTS EXTINGUISHED. NOTED VOLTS/FREQS OK, BUT FREQS FLUCTUATING 390-400. BY NOW, WE WERE S OF CVG (2 MI OVCST 1 SM) ENRTE TO BWG FOR RMB ARR. TOLD FO WE WOULD CONTINUE TOWARD ATL AND BEGAN COORD WITH MAINT AND FLT CTL. FLT CTL REMINDED US NOT TO FLY INTO ICING CONDITIONS (IN CASE L BUS FAILED RESULTING IN STANDBY PWR OP WITH NO ANTI-ICE CAPABILITY). GOT WX FOR BNA AND CHA. ATL STILL BEST WITH 6500 FT BROKEN AND 65 DEGS. AT SOME POINT PRIOR TO LEVELOFF, R BUS OFF AND LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHTS CAME BACK ON. VOLTS GOOD/FREQS 390. COULD NOT DECIDE WHAT R GENERATOR SIT WAS FOR SURE. NOW 220 NM FROM ATL. WE REVIEWED OUR OPTIONS AND SYS SHOULD WE END UP ON STANDBY PWR. MEANTIME, WE HAD GOTTEN A DSCNT BELOW FL300 TO ENSURE FUEL WOULD GRAVITY FEED. TOLD CABIN CREW GALLEY PWR WOULD BE INOP AND INITIAL DSCNT SIGNAL WOULD BE EARLY. BY NOW WE WERE LESS THAN 30 MINS FROM LNDG AT ATL AND COULD SEE THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO DSND IN VMC. WE AGAIN REVIEWED OUR OPTIONS SHOULD L BUS/APU FAULT. FLT CTL SENT AN ACARS MESSAGE THAT HE HAD PUT IN A WORD ON OUR BEHALF TO ATL APCH. FORTUNATELY, TFC VOLUME WAS NOT HVY. FO FLEW VISUAL APCH TO RWY 26R, MADE A VERY NICE TOUCHDOWN, AND WE TAXIED TO THE GATE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 611555: AT CRUISE ALT (FL310), ACFT LOST L GENERATOR (THE R GENERATOR WAS ALREADY MEL'ED). THE CAPT ADVISED THE MAINT CTLR COORD OF EVENT RATHER THAN DISPATCHER. THE MAINT COORDINATOR CALLED ME TO DISCUSS THE EVENT AND I ASKED THE CAPT TO CALL ME ON THE RADIO. WHILE I WAS WAITING FOR THE CAPT TO CALL, I ENSURED THE FLT WOULD NOT ENTER ICING CONDITIONS. WHEN THE CAPT CALLED, HE WANTED TO TALK TO MAINT, I TOLD HIM I WANTED TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT THE EVENT. I UNDERSTOOD THE SECOND GENERATOR WENT OFF LINE DUE TO A LOW OIL PRESSURE LIGHT AND THAT HE WAS ON APU PWR. I ADVISED HIM THAT NO ICING CONDITIONS WOULD BE ENCOUNTERED AND BEGAN TO GIVE HIM THE WX FOR BNA. THE CAPT TOLD ME HE WAS CONTINUING ON TO ATL. I PATCHED MAINT IN ON OUR RADIO AND MAINT CONFIRMED EVENT. THE LANGUAGE IN OUR QRH SAYS, 'PLAN TO LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT.' I ASKED MY SUPVR THE INTENT OF THE LANGUAGE, AND HE WAS UNSURE. I HAD NY SUPVR GO WITH ME TO TALK WITH THE MAINT COORDINATOR TO TALK ABOUT THE RADIO CONVERSATION. I ASKED IF THE GENERATOR COULD BE BROUGHT ON LINE IF NEEDED AND WHAT WAS AFFECTED. I WAS ADVISED THE GENERATOR COLD NOT BE BROUGHT ON LINE AND THE ONLY PWR THE CAPT HAD WAS APU, THEN BATTERY. I COULD NOT UNDERSTAND WHY THE CAPT DID NOT WANT TO LAND AT NEAREST SUITABLE ARPT. I HAD GIVEN THE CAPT BNA INFO PRIOR TO TALKING TO MAINT. I TOLD THE CAPT I WOULD ASK ATC NOT TO DELAY HIM. ALTHOUGH I ADVISED THE CAPT OF MY DESIRE TO GO TO BNA AND THE LANGUAGE IN THE OPERATIONAL PROCS WAS NOT CLR, I FEEL THAT I SHOULD HAVE ADVISED THE CAPT THAT IF HE ELECTED TO CONTINUE TO ATLANTA, HE WOULD USE HIS EMER AUTH. ALTHOUGH MY INTENT WAS CLR, I DID NOT USE THAT WORDING. THE FLT DID NOT DECLARE AN EMER AND THERE WERE NO FURTHER ISSUES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.