Narrative:

I was acting as the PNF. We were on the arlin arrival to phx with ATC instructions to expect runway 25L. The WX was clear with good visibility. Due to the gusting wind conditions, the captain (acting as PF) determined that a flaps 3 degree landing would be made, as per our procedures. The arrival proceeded normally, with the expected altitude step-downs and assigned speed reductions. Once we were passed to the second approach controller, we started to receive vectors off the arrival for an expected visual approach to runway 25L. While monitoring that frequency, we could hear the controller having some difficulty with an aircraft being vectored to runway 25L. The pilot was questioned if he could see the traffic he was following. When we were vectored to our base leg, we were given a TA for an rj being vectored from the north for runway 26. Once we reported him in sight, we were cleared for a visual arrival to runway 25L. I recall being told to slow to our final approach speed when we were cleared for the approach. I was also instructed to switch to tower frequency. Once we had finished our turn onto final, I reported to tower that we were on an 8 mi final for runway 25L, at which time we were cleared to land. I could see the aircraft we were following, as well. As we went through our final configns, the captain and I discussed how slow the aircraft ahead appeared, due to the gusty wind conditions. The captain elected to turn off the autothrust and use manual thrust with managed speed. At some point I asked tower what type of aircraft we were following. We were advised it was an S2. Around 1000 ft AGL, the discussion of a possible go around began. This continued as we watched the S2 ahead touch down. I remember checking the radar altimeter and seeing 400 ft AGL. It was about this time tower prompted the S2 to hurry off the runway, but while the tower was doing this we could see the S2 was going past the turnoff and a go around was inevitable now. Tower realized this as well and instructed us to go around. We were around 250 ft AGL at this time. The captain initiated the go around procedure, while tower advised us to go around to the left (south) of the runway. I remember hearing tower say something about a helicopter in the area of our runway. During this time, I was heads down in the cockpit reconfiguring the aircraft for the go around. Very soon I felt the aircraft pitch down and looked out of the aircraft. I could see that we were climbing directly at helicopter traffic. It was readily apparent that we did not have sufficient time nor energy to maneuver around or to out-climb the traffic, therefore, the captain was trying to descend below him. It was only a matter of moments before we passed under the helicopter, missing him by around 50-100 ft. The descent during the go around caused us to gain speed rapidly and we were given the aural alert that we needed to retract the flaps. The rest of the go around was completed and we were passed to approach for vectors back to runway 26 and set up for that, and were vectored behind a B737 for runway 26. We were a little close and high, a combination of not the best vector onto final, as well as our own distraction with what had just happened. We required an s-turn for separation with the B737. Once that was complete, we landed on runway 26. After we turned off the runway, tower advised us that we would need to contact them. I copied the number and we were told that the tapes were being pulled, and that the helicopter was supposed to have remained north of runway 25L. In retrospect, I don't think there was anything that I, as a crew member, would do differently. There was never one thing that I saw or did that I would not do again. It is easy to second-guess your performance after the fact, but I feel we operated the aircraft as well as anyone could in that situation. We were told that the helicopter was supposed to remain north of the runway, and he was most certainly south of it, but not having heard his clearance, I don't want to speculate on his actions. I do feel, however, that the captain did an outstanding job in avoiding the helicopter. There was certainly no time for debate or discussion on his course of action, and his decision to fly under the traffic most certainly was the right one. Supplemental information from acn 616040: iinitiated the go around procedure, selecting toga thrust and calling for go around flaps, gear up. As we began to pitch up to go around altitude and began a slight left turn to offset to the left of the runway, an A350 astar helicopter appeared directly in front of and slightly above our flight path. We were climbing rapidly directly into that aircraft. I immediately reduced power to near or at flight idle and began to dive the aircraft toward the runway edge (parallel to) to attempt to pass beneath the helicopter. At that instant, I was certain we would collide. Passenger and crew were briefed on the previous events on taxiway C with the aircraft stopped. Reported to chief pilot immediately after leaving the aircraft.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF A320 EXPERIENCE NMAC WITH HELI OVER PHX RWY 25L WHEN GOING AROUND DUE TO PRECEDING ACFT NOT CLRING RWY.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING AS THE PNF. WE WERE ON THE ARLIN ARR TO PHX WITH ATC INSTRUCTIONS TO EXPECT RWY 25L. THE WX WAS CLR WITH GOOD VISIBILITY. DUE TO THE GUSTING WIND CONDITIONS, THE CAPT (ACTING AS PF) DETERMINED THAT A FLAPS 3 DEG LNDG WOULD BE MADE, AS PER OUR PROCS. THE ARR PROCEEDED NORMALLY, WITH THE EXPECTED ALT STEP-DOWNS AND ASSIGNED SPD REDUCTIONS. ONCE WE WERE PASSED TO THE SECOND APCH CTLR, WE STARTED TO RECEIVE VECTORS OFF THE ARR FOR AN EXPECTED VISUAL APCH TO RWY 25L. WHILE MONITORING THAT FREQ, WE COULD HEAR THE CTLR HAVING SOME DIFFICULTY WITH AN ACFT BEING VECTORED TO RWY 25L. THE PLT WAS QUESTIONED IF HE COULD SEE THE TFC HE WAS FOLLOWING. WHEN WE WERE VECTORED TO OUR BASE LEG, WE WERE GIVEN A TA FOR AN RJ BEING VECTORED FROM THE N FOR RWY 26. ONCE WE RPTED HIM IN SIGHT, WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL ARR TO RWY 25L. I RECALL BEING TOLD TO SLOW TO OUR FINAL APCH SPD WHEN WE WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. I WAS ALSO INSTRUCTED TO SWITCH TO TWR FREQ. ONCE WE HAD FINISHED OUR TURN ONTO FINAL, I RPTED TO TWR THAT WE WERE ON AN 8 MI FINAL FOR RWY 25L, AT WHICH TIME WE WERE CLRED TO LAND. I COULD SEE THE ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING, AS WELL. AS WE WENT THROUGH OUR FINAL CONFIGNS, THE CAPT AND I DISCUSSED HOW SLOW THE ACFT AHEAD APPEARED, DUE TO THE GUSTY WIND CONDITIONS. THE CAPT ELECTED TO TURN OFF THE AUTOTHRUST AND USE MANUAL THRUST WITH MANAGED SPD. AT SOME POINT I ASKED TWR WHAT TYPE OF ACFT WE WERE FOLLOWING. WE WERE ADVISED IT WAS AN S2. AROUND 1000 FT AGL, THE DISCUSSION OF A POSSIBLE GAR BEGAN. THIS CONTINUED AS WE WATCHED THE S2 AHEAD TOUCH DOWN. I REMEMBER CHKING THE RADAR ALTIMETER AND SEEING 400 FT AGL. IT WAS ABOUT THIS TIME TWR PROMPTED THE S2 TO HURRY OFF THE RWY, BUT WHILE THE TWR WAS DOING THIS WE COULD SEE THE S2 WAS GOING PAST THE TURNOFF AND A GAR WAS INEVITABLE NOW. TWR REALIZED THIS AS WELL AND INSTRUCTED US TO GO AROUND. WE WERE AROUND 250 FT AGL AT THIS TIME. THE CAPT INITIATED THE GAR PROC, WHILE TWR ADVISED US TO GO AROUND TO THE L (S) OF THE RWY. I REMEMBER HEARING TWR SAY SOMETHING ABOUT A HELI IN THE AREA OF OUR RWY. DURING THIS TIME, I WAS HEADS DOWN IN THE COCKPIT RECONFIGURING THE ACFT FOR THE GAR. VERY SOON I FELT THE ACFT PITCH DOWN AND LOOKED OUT OF THE ACFT. I COULD SEE THAT WE WERE CLBING DIRECTLY AT HELI TFC. IT WAS READILY APPARENT THAT WE DID NOT HAVE SUFFICIENT TIME NOR ENERGY TO MANEUVER AROUND OR TO OUT-CLB THE TFC, THEREFORE, THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO DSND BELOW HIM. IT WAS ONLY A MATTER OF MOMENTS BEFORE WE PASSED UNDER THE HELI, MISSING HIM BY AROUND 50-100 FT. THE DSCNT DURING THE GAR CAUSED US TO GAIN SPD RAPIDLY AND WE WERE GIVEN THE AURAL ALERT THAT WE NEEDED TO RETRACT THE FLAPS. THE REST OF THE GAR WAS COMPLETED AND WE WERE PASSED TO APCH FOR VECTORS BACK TO RWY 26 AND SET UP FOR THAT, AND WERE VECTORED BEHIND A B737 FOR RWY 26. WE WERE A LITTLE CLOSE AND HIGH, A COMBINATION OF NOT THE BEST VECTOR ONTO FINAL, AS WELL AS OUR OWN DISTR WITH WHAT HAD JUST HAPPENED. WE REQUIRED AN S-TURN FOR SEPARATION WITH THE B737. ONCE THAT WAS COMPLETE, WE LANDED ON RWY 26. AFTER WE TURNED OFF THE RWY, TWR ADVISED US THAT WE WOULD NEED TO CONTACT THEM. I COPIED THE NUMBER AND WE WERE TOLD THAT THE TAPES WERE BEING PULLED, AND THAT THE HELI WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE REMAINED N OF RWY 25L. IN RETROSPECT, I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANYTHING THAT I, AS A CREW MEMBER, WOULD DO DIFFERENTLY. THERE WAS NEVER ONE THING THAT I SAW OR DID THAT I WOULD NOT DO AGAIN. IT IS EASY TO SECOND-GUESS YOUR PERFORMANCE AFTER THE FACT, BUT I FEEL WE OPERATED THE ACFT AS WELL AS ANYONE COULD IN THAT SIT. WE WERE TOLD THAT THE HELI WAS SUPPOSED TO REMAIN N OF THE RWY, AND HE WAS MOST CERTAINLY S OF IT, BUT NOT HAVING HEARD HIS CLRNC, I DON'T WANT TO SPECULATE ON HIS ACTIONS. I DO FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT THE CAPT DID AN OUTSTANDING JOB IN AVOIDING THE HELI. THERE WAS CERTAINLY NO TIME FOR DEBATE OR DISCUSSION ON HIS COURSE OF ACTION, AND HIS DECISION TO FLY UNDER THE TFC MOST CERTAINLY WAS THE RIGHT ONE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 616040: IINITIATED THE GAR PROC, SELECTING TOGA THRUST AND CALLING FOR GAR FLAPS, GEAR UP. AS WE BEGAN TO PITCH UP TO GAR ALT AND BEGAN A SLIGHT L TURN TO OFFSET TO THE L OF THE RWY, AN A350 ASTAR HELI APPEARED DIRECTLY IN FRONT OF AND SLIGHTLY ABOVE OUR FLT PATH. WE WERE CLBING RAPIDLY DIRECTLY INTO THAT ACFT. I IMMEDIATELY REDUCED PWR TO NEAR OR AT FLT IDLE AND BEGAN TO DIVE THE ACFT TOWARD THE RWY EDGE (PARALLEL TO) TO ATTEMPT TO PASS BENEATH THE HELI. AT THAT INSTANT, I WAS CERTAIN WE WOULD COLLIDE. PAX AND CREW WERE BRIEFED ON THE PREVIOUS EVENTS ON TXWY C WITH THE ACFT STOPPED. RPTED TO CHIEF PLT IMMEDIATELY AFTER LEAVING THE ACFT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.