37000 Feet | Browse and search NASA's Aviation Safety Reporting System |
|
Attributes | |
ACN | 616800 |
Time | |
Date | 200405 |
Day | Thu |
Local Time Of Day | 0601 To 1200 |
Place | |
Locale Reference | airport : cre.airport |
State Reference | SC |
Altitude | agl single value : 0 |
Environment | |
Flight Conditions | VMC |
Light | Daylight |
Aircraft 1 | |
Operator | general aviation : corporate |
Make Model Name | Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172 |
Operating Under FAR Part | Part 91 |
Navigation In Use | other |
Flight Phase | ground : taxi ground : preflight |
Flight Plan | VFR |
Person 1 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | flight crew : single pilot |
Qualification | pilot : private |
Experience | flight time last 90 days : 40 flight time total : 370 flight time type : 250 |
ASRS Report | 616800 |
Person 2 | |
Affiliation | other |
Function | controller : local |
Events | |
Anomaly | incursion : runway non adherence : far non adherence : published procedure |
Independent Detector | other controllera |
Resolutory Action | none taken : detected after the fact |
Consequence | faa : reviewed incident with flight crew |
Supplementary | |
Problem Areas | Airport Flight Crew Human Performance ATC Human Performance |
Primary Problem | Flight Crew Human Performance |
Air Traffic Incident | Pilot Deviation |
Narrative:
During taxi, I reported my position and intentions on the unicom frequency and heard other communications from time to time unrelated to my operation or position. After a run-up near the end of the taxiway for runway 5, I announced my intention to take the active runway (which was nearly aligned with the wind direction) and requested any aircraft in the pattern to advise of position. After a pause of several seconds, and in the absence of any response to that radio call, I announced that I was taking the active runway for takeoff and began to rotate the plane slightly (while on the taxiway near the hold short line) to get a clear view of the final approach path to the runway to make a final visual check for traffic. As the plane rotated, someone on the unicom frequency advised me to change my radio frequency to the tower frequency. I immediately became aware of my mistaken belief, tuned to the tower frequency, and called the tower. As I prepared for the flight, in accordance with a preparation procedure I learned in (and religiously used since) 1965 when learning to fly, I wrote down all frequencys I would need the next morning up to (and including) the frequency for myrtle beach approach/departure to request flight following after takeoff. Because I remembered the field as having a non-operational tower, when I checked the airport facility directory for frequencys, I ran my finger down the page for cre looking for a unicom and WX frequency. Immediately upon finding these, I wrote them down on a sheet being prepared for my kneeboard and looked no further. The tower and ground frequencys are listed lower on the page. I did not proceed further in the mistaken belief that I had already extracted the information I needed. Upon arrival at the airport, I used my notes to set the radios before taxiing. Had I used primary source material (I had a current sectional, a current airport facility directory, and up-to-date database with frequencys in an IFR certified GPS, an up-to-date database with frequencys in an MX20 mfd, and 3 other VFR onboard references) to set the radios, this event would not have occurred. After several hours of analyzing this situation, I have determined that I must change my preflight procedures. I have determined that this event would have been avoided if I referred in the cockpit to 'original information' for radio frequencys when setting his radios for departure. Accordingly, I now believe that any benefit derived from the advance planning of radio frequencys is more than offset by the risk of errors in writing out the information in advance.
Original NASA ASRS Text
Title: PLT OF C172 TAXIES WITHOUT CLRNC AT CRE WHEN HE FAILED TO NOTE THE EXISTENCE OF AN OPERATING CTL TWR FREQ DURING PREFLT PREPARATION.
Narrative: DURING TAXI, I RPTED MY POS AND INTENTIONS ON THE UNICOM FREQ AND HEARD OTHER COMS FROM TIME TO TIME UNRELATED TO MY OP OR POS. AFTER A RUN-UP NEAR THE END OF THE TXWY FOR RWY 5, I ANNOUNCED MY INTENTION TO TAKE THE ACTIVE RWY (WHICH WAS NEARLY ALIGNED WITH THE WIND DIRECTION) AND REQUESTED ANY ACFT IN THE PATTERN TO ADVISE OF POS. AFTER A PAUSE OF SEVERAL SECONDS, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY RESPONSE TO THAT RADIO CALL, I ANNOUNCED THAT I WAS TAKING THE ACTIVE RWY FOR TKOF AND BEGAN TO ROTATE THE PLANE SLIGHTLY (WHILE ON THE TXWY NEAR THE HOLD SHORT LINE) TO GET A CLR VIEW OF THE FINAL APCH PATH TO THE RWY TO MAKE A FINAL VISUAL CHK FOR TFC. AS THE PLANE ROTATED, SOMEONE ON THE UNICOM FREQ ADVISED ME TO CHANGE MY RADIO FREQ TO THE TWR FREQ. I IMMEDIATELY BECAME AWARE OF MY MISTAKEN BELIEF, TUNED TO THE TWR FREQ, AND CALLED THE TWR. AS I PREPARED FOR THE FLT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PREPARATION PROC I LEARNED IN (AND RELIGIOUSLY USED SINCE) 1965 WHEN LEARNING TO FLY, I WROTE DOWN ALL FREQS I WOULD NEED THE NEXT MORNING UP TO (AND INCLUDING) THE FREQ FOR MYRTLE BEACH APCH/DEP TO REQUEST FLT FOLLOWING AFTER TKOF. BECAUSE I REMEMBERED THE FIELD AS HAVING A NON-OPERATIONAL TWR, WHEN I CHKED THE ARPT FACILITY DIRECTORY FOR FREQS, I RAN MY FINGER DOWN THE PAGE FOR CRE LOOKING FOR A UNICOM AND WX FREQ. IMMEDIATELY UPON FINDING THESE, I WROTE THEM DOWN ON A SHEET BEING PREPARED FOR MY KNEEBOARD AND LOOKED NO FURTHER. THE TWR AND GND FREQS ARE LISTED LOWER ON THE PAGE. I DID NOT PROCEED FURTHER IN THE MISTAKEN BELIEF THAT I HAD ALREADY EXTRACTED THE INFO I NEEDED. UPON ARR AT THE ARPT, I USED MY NOTES TO SET THE RADIOS BEFORE TAXIING. HAD I USED PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL (I HAD A CURRENT SECTIONAL, A CURRENT ARPT FACILITY DIRECTORY, AND UP-TO-DATE DATABASE WITH FREQS IN AN IFR CERTIFIED GPS, AN UP-TO-DATE DATABASE WITH FREQS IN AN MX20 MFD, AND 3 OTHER VFR ONBOARD REFS) TO SET THE RADIOS, THIS EVENT WOULD NOT HAVE OCCURRED. AFTER SEVERAL HRS OF ANALYZING THIS SIT, I HAVE DETERMINED THAT I MUST CHANGE MY PREFLT PROCS. I HAVE DETERMINED THAT THIS EVENT WOULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF I REFERRED IN THE COCKPIT TO 'ORIGINAL INFO' FOR RADIO FREQS WHEN SETTING HIS RADIOS FOR DEP. ACCORDINGLY, I NOW BELIEVE THAT ANY BENEFIT DERIVED FROM THE ADVANCE PLANNING OF RADIO FREQS IS MORE THAN OFFSET BY THE RISK OF ERRORS IN WRITING OUT THE INFO IN ADVANCE.
Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.