Narrative:

We were taking off out of iah. Our aircraft had a placarded right CSD, requiring us to keep the APU on line for the duration of the flight. Climbing to FL230, we got an APU fault light. Considering the WX conditions and the overwater nature of our flight, we elected to return to iah for maintenance. We requested to return, stating that we were not declaring an emergency. We were given a northerly heading, a descent and told to expect the stros 4 arrival. There were 2 large thunderstorms in the area of the arrival path, one touching stros and extending to the south, the other being to the north of stros, leaving a small gap between the two. There were 3 attempts to vector us to stros and onto the arrival. The first attempt was from the northeast. We were given vectors that would have taken us through the northerly cell, then would have required a hard right turn to shoot the gap between the cells. The setup was such that we would have been driven into the southern cell. Approaching the northern cell, we requested a turn to the south to avoid the buildup. There was no response. We took up a southerly heading, telling approach of our actions. After a pause, we were then given vectors and set up for the second attempt. The second attempt was from the southeast. We were given direct stros. About 15 mi out of stros, we asked for a deviation north off course to avoid the WX over stros. After being asked how long the deviation would be, we were vectored out of the area to the northeast. The desired deviation would have been around 10 degrees right off course and no more than 5-7 mi. The third attempt was a direct vector to stros, a vector that would again have taken us through a buildup. When we explained this, we were given vectors to the south for a southern arrival. We were vectored to the south for the trinity arrival. We had a little confusion, being unable to locate that arrival. I think it's an arrival for hobby. The captain found trinity on a low chart and we dialed it in. We were given a north heading out of trinity and then vectored on to the final approach course for runway 27. We landed and taxied to the gate. What should have been a fairly simple return to iah turned out to be a confused muddle. Even though we were in constant contact with approach and had clearly indicated what we needed, they seemed to be confused in how to handle us or fit us back into the flow. The frequencys were extremely confused. At various points, we were asked, 1) if the cockpit was secure. This got our attention! 2) what were our souls on board and fuel remaining. (We reiterated that we were not declaring an emergency.) and 3) if we were wanting to return to intercontinental. (We had stated that at the outset.) crash crew, paramedics, and police were all waiting for us upon landing. Some had been told we had a hydraulic failure, then an APU fire. We were instructed to call ATC. What should have been a 20 min evolution took about 90 mins. We had simply requested a return to iah. We were in constant contact with ATC and responded to all instructions. On the initial attempt as stated above, we did request a turn to the south and took it because we got no response and needed to avoid the thunderstorm. Approach appeared to be overwhelmed with us needing to come back into iah and didn't seem to know what to do with us. Supplemental information from acn 617765: at ZHU, he informed me of the loss of separation and I informed him of my displeasure with the quality of handling from ZHU.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: MD80 FLT CREW ATTEMPTING TO RETURN TO IAH FOR MINOR MECHANICAL DIFFICULTY, BECOMES EMBROILED IN TSTM COURSE AND RTE DEVS THAT RESULT IN A LOSS OF SEPARATION AND COM MISCUES DURING TRANSITION FROM ZHU TO I90 APCH CTL.

Narrative: WE WERE TAKING OFF OUT OF IAH. OUR ACFT HAD A PLACARDED R CSD, REQUIRING US TO KEEP THE APU ON LINE FOR THE DURATION OF THE FLT. CLBING TO FL230, WE GOT AN APU FAULT LIGHT. CONSIDERING THE WX CONDITIONS AND THE OVERWATER NATURE OF OUR FLT, WE ELECTED TO RETURN TO IAH FOR MAINT. WE REQUESTED TO RETURN, STATING THAT WE WERE NOT DECLARING AN EMER. WE WERE GIVEN A NORTHERLY HDG, A DSCNT AND TOLD TO EXPECT THE STROS 4 ARR. THERE WERE 2 LARGE TSTMS IN THE AREA OF THE ARR PATH, ONE TOUCHING STROS AND EXTENDING TO THE S, THE OTHER BEING TO THE N OF STROS, LEAVING A SMALL GAP BTWN THE TWO. THERE WERE 3 ATTEMPTS TO VECTOR US TO STROS AND ONTO THE ARR. THE FIRST ATTEMPT WAS FROM THE NE. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS THAT WOULD HAVE TAKEN US THROUGH THE NORTHERLY CELL, THEN WOULD HAVE REQUIRED A HARD R TURN TO SHOOT THE GAP BTWN THE CELLS. THE SETUP WAS SUCH THAT WE WOULD HAVE BEEN DRIVEN INTO THE SOUTHERN CELL. APCHING THE NORTHERN CELL, WE REQUESTED A TURN TO THE S TO AVOID THE BUILDUP. THERE WAS NO RESPONSE. WE TOOK UP A SOUTHERLY HDG, TELLING APCH OF OUR ACTIONS. AFTER A PAUSE, WE WERE THEN GIVEN VECTORS AND SET UP FOR THE SECOND ATTEMPT. THE SECOND ATTEMPT WAS FROM THE SE. WE WERE GIVEN DIRECT STROS. ABOUT 15 MI OUT OF STROS, WE ASKED FOR A DEV N OFF COURSE TO AVOID THE WX OVER STROS. AFTER BEING ASKED HOW LONG THE DEV WOULD BE, WE WERE VECTORED OUT OF THE AREA TO THE NE. THE DESIRED DEV WOULD HAVE BEEN AROUND 10 DEGS R OFF COURSE AND NO MORE THAN 5-7 MI. THE THIRD ATTEMPT WAS A DIRECT VECTOR TO STROS, A VECTOR THAT WOULD AGAIN HAVE TAKEN US THROUGH A BUILDUP. WHEN WE EXPLAINED THIS, WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS TO THE S FOR A SOUTHERN ARR. WE WERE VECTORED TO THE S FOR THE TRINITY ARR. WE HAD A LITTLE CONFUSION, BEING UNABLE TO LOCATE THAT ARR. I THINK IT'S AN ARR FOR HOBBY. THE CAPT FOUND TRINITY ON A LOW CHART AND WE DIALED IT IN. WE WERE GIVEN A N HDG OUT OF TRINITY AND THEN VECTORED ON TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE FOR RWY 27. WE LANDED AND TAXIED TO THE GATE. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A FAIRLY SIMPLE RETURN TO IAH TURNED OUT TO BE A CONFUSED MUDDLE. EVEN THOUGH WE WERE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH APCH AND HAD CLRLY INDICATED WHAT WE NEEDED, THEY SEEMED TO BE CONFUSED IN HOW TO HANDLE US OR FIT US BACK INTO THE FLOW. THE FREQS WERE EXTREMELY CONFUSED. AT VARIOUS POINTS, WE WERE ASKED, 1) IF THE COCKPIT WAS SECURE. THIS GOT OUR ATTN! 2) WHAT WERE OUR SOULS ON BOARD AND FUEL REMAINING. (WE REITERATED THAT WE WERE NOT DECLARING AN EMER.) AND 3) IF WE WERE WANTING TO RETURN TO INTERCONTINENTAL. (WE HAD STATED THAT AT THE OUTSET.) CRASH CREW, PARAMEDICS, AND POLICE WERE ALL WAITING FOR US UPON LNDG. SOME HAD BEEN TOLD WE HAD A HYD FAILURE, THEN AN APU FIRE. WE WERE INSTRUCTED TO CALL ATC. WHAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN A 20 MIN EVOLUTION TOOK ABOUT 90 MINS. WE HAD SIMPLY REQUESTED A RETURN TO IAH. WE WERE IN CONSTANT CONTACT WITH ATC AND RESPONDED TO ALL INSTRUCTIONS. ON THE INITIAL ATTEMPT AS STATED ABOVE, WE DID REQUEST A TURN TO THE S AND TOOK IT BECAUSE WE GOT NO RESPONSE AND NEEDED TO AVOID THE TSTM. APCH APPEARED TO BE OVERWHELMED WITH US NEEDING TO COME BACK INTO IAH AND DIDN'T SEEM TO KNOW WHAT TO DO WITH US. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 617765: AT ZHU, HE INFORMED ME OF THE LOSS OF SEPARATION AND I INFORMED HIM OF MY DISPLEASURE WITH THE QUALITY OF HANDLING FROM ZHU.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.