Narrative:

I was working the baxley (79) sector (FL110-FL230) with thunderstorms and sua airspace (G8 tfr) negatively impacting the normal flows and operations of the sector. Additionally the flow control restr for aircraft landing jax to enter my sector at FL230 or below from ZTL had been lifted so that said aircraft were now able to enter my airspace from above, within the lateral confines of the sector, rather than from the side, outside the lateral confines of the sector. Upon initial contact with aircraft #1 (climbing 15000 ft) I cleared the aircraft to FL230. The aircraft #1 later asked to deviate left (west) of course. I approved, shortly thereafter he then requested a right (east) deviation. I approved his request and switched communication to the amg (50) sector (up to FL240) as said sector had already accepted the radar handoff on the aircraft #1. Upon switching communication I instructed the aircraft #1 to inform the amg (50) controller of his deviation. The aircraft #2 had already checked onto my frequency descending FL240 and deviating left (east) of course, I had cleared the aircraft to FL190 at initial check on. The aircraft #2 rate of descent was significantly less than standard rate (he was floating it down). I failed to recognize this as I was trying to figure out how to get a VFR aircraft through the tfr into an airport within the confines of the tfr as well as how to keep him in VMC conditions. Additionally, because of the WX, I was concentrating on other sits occurring within the sector. The amg (50) controller engaged my override and asked if I was talking to the aircraft #2 (this brought the potential loss of separation situation to my attention). I responded that I would turn the aircraft #2 to the west (he was west of the aircraft #1 at the time). I asked the aircraft #2 if he could fly a 270 degree heading. He said no. I asked what the furthest right he could turn would be. He said 230 degrees. I assigned that heading. I then engaged the override to the amg (50) sector intending to determine what (if anything) the amg (50) controller had done or intended to do with the aircraft #1 to alleviate the potential loss of separation situation. I heard the amg (50) controller say (not to me) something to the effect 'him at FL240,' he then acknowledged my override call. I stated that I would climb the aircraft #2 back up to FL250 and immediately did so as the potential loss of separation was imminent. The amg (50) controller did not hear what I had said as he had not disengaged the receive and transmit button to prevent aircraft on his frequency from interfering with our conversation as one did when I told him my plan to climb the aircraft #2 back up. Turns out his statement about FL240 was not his plan to get the aircraft #1 back down as I had assumed, which I thought was a terrible plan but since I thought that is what he was doing I made the complimentary action to his by climbing the aircraft #2 therefore a loss of standard separation occurred.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: ZJX CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL250 DURING WX DEVS.

Narrative: I WAS WORKING THE BAXLEY (79) SECTOR (FL110-FL230) WITH TSTMS AND SUA AIRSPACE (G8 TFR) NEGATIVELY IMPACTING THE NORMAL FLOWS AND OPS OF THE SECTOR. ADDITIONALLY THE FLOW CTL RESTR FOR ACFT LNDG JAX TO ENTER MY SECTOR AT FL230 OR BELOW FROM ZTL HAD BEEN LIFTED SO THAT SAID ACFT WERE NOW ABLE TO ENTER MY AIRSPACE FROM ABOVE, WITHIN THE LATERAL CONFINES OF THE SECTOR, RATHER THAN FROM THE SIDE, OUTSIDE THE LATERAL CONFINES OF THE SECTOR. UPON INITIAL CONTACT WITH ACFT #1 (CLBING 15000 FT) I CLRED THE ACFT TO FL230. THE ACFT #1 LATER ASKED TO DEVIATE L (W) OF COURSE. I APPROVED, SHORTLY THEREAFTER HE THEN REQUESTED A R (E) DEV. I APPROVED HIS REQUEST AND SWITCHED COM TO THE AMG (50) SECTOR (UP TO FL240) AS SAID SECTOR HAD ALREADY ACCEPTED THE RADAR HDOF ON THE ACFT #1. UPON SWITCHING COM I INSTRUCTED THE ACFT #1 TO INFORM THE AMG (50) CTLR OF HIS DEV. THE ACFT #2 HAD ALREADY CHKED ONTO MY FREQ DSNDING FL240 AND DEVIATING L (E) OF COURSE, I HAD CLRED THE ACFT TO FL190 AT INITIAL CHK ON. THE ACFT #2 RATE OF DSCNT WAS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN STANDARD RATE (HE WAS FLOATING IT DOWN). I FAILED TO RECOGNIZE THIS AS I WAS TRYING TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO GET A VFR ACFT THROUGH THE TFR INTO AN ARPT WITHIN THE CONFINES OF THE TFR AS WELL AS HOW TO KEEP HIM IN VMC CONDITIONS. ADDITIONALLY, BECAUSE OF THE WX, I WAS CONCENTRATING ON OTHER SITS OCCURRING WITHIN THE SECTOR. THE AMG (50) CTLR ENGAGED MY OVERRIDE AND ASKED IF I WAS TALKING TO THE ACFT #2 (THIS BROUGHT THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEPARATION SIT TO MY ATTN). I RESPONDED THAT I WOULD TURN THE ACFT #2 TO THE W (HE WAS W OF THE ACFT #1 AT THE TIME). I ASKED THE ACFT #2 IF HE COULD FLY A 270 DEG HDG. HE SAID NO. I ASKED WHAT THE FURTHEST R HE COULD TURN WOULD BE. HE SAID 230 DEGS. I ASSIGNED THAT HDG. I THEN ENGAGED THE OVERRIDE TO THE AMG (50) SECTOR INTENDING TO DETERMINE WHAT (IF ANYTHING) THE AMG (50) CTLR HAD DONE OR INTENDED TO DO WITH THE ACFT #1 TO ALLEVIATE THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEPARATION SIT. I HEARD THE AMG (50) CTLR SAY (NOT TO ME) SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT 'HIM AT FL240,' HE THEN ACKNOWLEDGED MY OVERRIDE CALL. I STATED THAT I WOULD CLB THE ACFT #2 BACK UP TO FL250 AND IMMEDIATELY DID SO AS THE POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEPARATION WAS IMMINENT. THE AMG (50) CTLR DID NOT HEAR WHAT I HAD SAID AS HE HAD NOT DISENGAGED THE RECEIVE AND XMIT BUTTON TO PREVENT ACFT ON HIS FREQ FROM INTERFERING WITH OUR CONVERSATION AS ONE DID WHEN I TOLD HIM MY PLAN TO CLB THE ACFT #2 BACK UP. TURNS OUT HIS STATEMENT ABOUT FL240 WAS NOT HIS PLAN TO GET THE ACFT #1 BACK DOWN AS I HAD ASSUMED, WHICH I THOUGHT WAS A TERRIBLE PLAN BUT SINCE I THOUGHT THAT IS WHAT HE WAS DOING I MADE THE COMPLIMENTARY ACTION TO HIS BY CLBING THE ACFT #2 THEREFORE A LOSS OF STANDARD SEPARATION OCCURRED.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.