Narrative:

I was acting in the capacity of sic on this particular flight, although I am the more senior pilot and manager of the pilot operations. First officer was acting as PIC. Upon successful completion of a preflight inspection, the aircraft was determined to be airworthy. After normal checklist procedures, utilizing strict crew discipline, we departed runway 17 at grr at approximately XA35. Shortly after takeoff, the tower reported seeing fuel exiting the aircraft from the right wingtip area. We agreed that the aircraft was in fact losing fuel from the right wing, and decided to return for landing. We requested runway 26L, as the winds were light, received clearance to land. The airport crash fire rescue equipment (crash, fire, and rescue) was dispatched and upon our safe landing, returned to their 'barn.' at approximately XA50, 2 inspectors from the local grr FSDO arrived at our base FBO to ask us some questions about the flight. They asked general questions about the aircraft's fuel system and whether any recent maintenance had been performed. I explained that none had been performed recently on the right side fuel system. The inspector asked what, specifically, had been the last item addressed on the aircraft. I explained that components of the left side's fuel system had been worked on the day prior. The 2 system are independent. It seems that the inspectors from the local FSDO have expressed concern that there may have been some question as to whether the aircraft was airworthy prior to the flight. I make this assumption because they have mentioned to the technician who made subsequent repairs, and to my attorney, that they have questions with regard to our MEL and its associated procedures. We do not even have an MEL letter of authority/authorized, yet. Therefore, we have not had the option of flying the aircraft with open discrepancies, period. In fact, we canceled the previous day's flight, for a problem that we may have been able to 'MEL,' simply if we had a letter of authority/authorized for one. More specifically, on the day of this occurrence, the problem that we had encountered on the left side the day prior, not only didn't exist, but the system operated as per the flight manual, and the problem could not be reproduced. The aircraft was determined to be in an airworthy condition for the flight that took place.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DURING INITIAL CLB A DEP FA20 IS NOTED BY THE LCL CTLR TO BE VENTING FUEL FROM ITS R WINGTIP AFTER TKOF FROM GRR.

Narrative: I WAS ACTING IN THE CAPACITY OF SIC ON THIS PARTICULAR FLT, ALTHOUGH I AM THE MORE SENIOR PLT AND MGR OF THE PLT OPS. FO WAS ACTING AS PIC. UPON SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF A PREFLT INSPECTION, THE ACFT WAS DETERMINED TO BE AIRWORTHY. AFTER NORMAL CHKLIST PROCS, UTILIZING STRICT CREW DISCIPLINE, WE DEPARTED RWY 17 AT GRR AT APPROX XA35. SHORTLY AFTER TKOF, THE TWR RPTED SEEING FUEL EXITING THE ACFT FROM THE R WINGTIP AREA. WE AGREED THAT THE ACFT WAS IN FACT LOSING FUEL FROM THE R WING, AND DECIDED TO RETURN FOR LNDG. WE REQUESTED RWY 26L, AS THE WINDS WERE LIGHT, RECEIVED CLRNC TO LAND. THE ARPT CFR (CRASH, FIRE, AND RESCUE) WAS DISPATCHED AND UPON OUR SAFE LNDG, RETURNED TO THEIR 'BARN.' AT APPROX XA50, 2 INSPECTORS FROM THE LCL GRR FSDO ARRIVED AT OUR BASE FBO TO ASK US SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE FLT. THEY ASKED GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACFT'S FUEL SYS AND WHETHER ANY RECENT MAINT HAD BEEN PERFORMED. I EXPLAINED THAT NONE HAD BEEN PERFORMED RECENTLY ON THE R SIDE FUEL SYS. THE INSPECTOR ASKED WHAT, SPECIFICALLY, HAD BEEN THE LAST ITEM ADDRESSED ON THE ACFT. I EXPLAINED THAT COMPONENTS OF THE L SIDE'S FUEL SYS HAD BEEN WORKED ON THE DAY PRIOR. THE 2 SYS ARE INDEPENDENT. IT SEEMS THAT THE INSPECTORS FROM THE LCL FSDO HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THERE MAY HAVE BEEN SOME QUESTION AS TO WHETHER THE ACFT WAS AIRWORTHY PRIOR TO THE FLT. I MAKE THIS ASSUMPTION BECAUSE THEY HAVE MENTIONED TO THE TECHNICIAN WHO MADE SUBSEQUENT REPAIRS, AND TO MY ATTORNEY, THAT THEY HAVE QUESTIONS WITH REGARD TO OUR MEL AND ITS ASSOCIATED PROCS. WE DO NOT EVEN HAVE AN MEL LETTER OF AUTH, YET. THEREFORE, WE HAVE NOT HAD THE OPTION OF FLYING THE ACFT WITH OPEN DISCREPANCIES, PERIOD. IN FACT, WE CANCELED THE PREVIOUS DAY'S FLT, FOR A PROB THAT WE MAY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO 'MEL,' SIMPLY IF WE HAD A LETTER OF AUTH FOR ONE. MORE SPECIFICALLY, ON THE DAY OF THIS OCCURRENCE, THE PROB THAT WE HAD ENCOUNTERED ON THE L SIDE THE DAY PRIOR, NOT ONLY DIDN'T EXIST, BUT THE SYS OPERATED AS PER THE FLT MANUAL, AND THE PROB COULD NOT BE REPRODUCED. THE ACFT WAS DETERMINED TO BE IN AN AIRWORTHY CONDITION FOR THE FLT THAT TOOK PLACE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.