Narrative:

I was beginning my flight from anchorage to the big susitna river at my aircraft tiedown at the anchorage international airport. I contacted anchorage ground control (121.9) and received permission to taxi down taxiway V to lake hood strip. After my preflight, I called the lake hood tower and advised that I was ready to take off 'west' with the required ATIS information. The ATIS information advised 'west route' in use and landing and take off on runway 31. I was told to hold for landing aircraft. There was, in fact, an airplane landing at the time, which was 'short final' for runway 31. After a few mins the landing aircraft had cleared the runway. The tower did not contact me so I advised the tower that I was ready to go 'west' (as the west route was in use). I was directed to proceed 'west.' at approximately the end of the runway I observed another aircraft in my path descending to land on runway 13. The anchorage tower contacted me and asked for my position and I responded that I was approximately at the end of the runway. The other aircraft was advised to proceed to runway 31. Relevant points and problem areas: 1) lake hood and the lake hood landing strip share common ATIS information. The landing strip and the lake utilize the same tower frequency and land and water traffic is mixed. This results in the tower frequently asking pilots if they 'are for the strip or the water.' there was obvious confusion about my location, which in my opinion was the primary factor in this matter. Advising that I was holding short of runway 31 could have helped. I believe a separate tower frequency for the strip would solve this problem. 2) one of the departures from lake hood (land and water) is commonly known as the 'west departure.' this is the term utilized by pilots and is the reference in the FAA pubs for this departure and refers to both land and water rtes. I have a copy attached. Separate required departure communication would solve this problem (the strip could call for a north departure, as an example). 3) I contend that most pilots believe that when they contact the tower, the tower has a visual reference to the pilot's location. If the tower is unsure of that position they should contact the pilot and confirm his location. The holding position for runway 31 is clearly visible from the tower. In this matter I was told to 'hold for landing traffic' which led me to believe that the tower had visual reference to my position. 4) a contributing factor was the fact that there were apparently 2 aircraft landing at the same time and presumably 2 aircraft holding as well (one on the land and one on the lake). This resulted in my holding my position on the strip while the other aircraft landed and then asking for permission to take off when the strip was clear. I don't know if there were other aircraft waiting for takeoff in the lake or if one of them was a cessna. 5) a contributing factor is that most aircraft on the lake don't necessarily identify themselves as being on the lake. The tower seems to make an assumption that if you are for the 'west' that you are on the lake. This is the assumption the tower made which resulted in this matter. 6) a contributing factor is the fact that the other aircraft in this matter was landing downwind and against the flow of ATIS traffic as directed by tower. 7) a final contributing factor is the taxi clearance from anchorage ground control. This clearance apparently does not 'put the pilot in the system' for future reference at lake hood strip.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: PLT DEP FROM LAKE HOOD ON ANC ARPT ENCOUNTERS CONFLICTING TFC AFTER TKOF.

Narrative: I WAS BEGINNING MY FLT FROM ANCHORAGE TO THE BIG SUSITNA RIVER AT MY ACFT TIEDOWN AT THE ANCHORAGE INTL ARPT. I CONTACTED ANCHORAGE GND CTL (121.9) AND RECEIVED PERMISSION TO TAXI DOWN TXWY V TO LAKE HOOD STRIP. AFTER MY PREFLT, I CALLED THE LAKE HOOD TWR AND ADVISED THAT I WAS READY TO TAKE OFF 'W' WITH THE REQUIRED ATIS INFO. THE ATIS INFO ADVISED 'W RTE' IN USE AND LNDG AND TAKE OFF ON RWY 31. I WAS TOLD TO HOLD FOR LNDG ACFT. THERE WAS, IN FACT, AN AIRPLANE LNDG AT THE TIME, WHICH WAS 'SHORT FINAL' FOR RWY 31. AFTER A FEW MINS THE LNDG ACFT HAD CLRED THE RWY. THE TWR DID NOT CONTACT ME SO I ADVISED THE TWR THAT I WAS READY TO GO 'W' (AS THE W RTE WAS IN USE). I WAS DIRECTED TO PROCEED 'W.' AT APPROX THE END OF THE RWY I OBSERVED ANOTHER ACFT IN MY PATH DSNDING TO LAND ON RWY 13. THE ANCHORAGE TWR CONTACTED ME AND ASKED FOR MY POS AND I RESPONDED THAT I WAS APPROX AT THE END OF THE RWY. THE OTHER ACFT WAS ADVISED TO PROCEED TO RWY 31. RELEVANT POINTS AND PROB AREAS: 1) LAKE HOOD AND THE LAKE HOOD LNDG STRIP SHARE COMMON ATIS INFO. THE LNDG STRIP AND THE LAKE UTILIZE THE SAME TWR FREQ AND LAND AND WATER TFC IS MIXED. THIS RESULTS IN THE TWR FREQUENTLY ASKING PLTS IF THEY 'ARE FOR THE STRIP OR THE WATER.' THERE WAS OBVIOUS CONFUSION ABOUT MY LOCATION, WHICH IN MY OPINION WAS THE PRIMARY FACTOR IN THIS MATTER. ADVISING THAT I WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 31 COULD HAVE HELPED. I BELIEVE A SEPARATE TWR FREQ FOR THE STRIP WOULD SOLVE THIS PROB. 2) ONE OF THE DEPS FROM LAKE HOOD (LAND AND WATER) IS COMMONLY KNOWN AS THE 'W DEP.' THIS IS THE TERM UTILIZED BY PLTS AND IS THE REF IN THE FAA PUBS FOR THIS DEP AND REFERS TO BOTH LAND AND WATER RTES. I HAVE A COPY ATTACHED. SEPARATE REQUIRED DEP COM WOULD SOLVE THIS PROB (THE STRIP COULD CALL FOR A N DEP, AS AN EXAMPLE). 3) I CONTEND THAT MOST PLTS BELIEVE THAT WHEN THEY CONTACT THE TWR, THE TWR HAS A VISUAL REF TO THE PLT'S LOCATION. IF THE TWR IS UNSURE OF THAT POS THEY SHOULD CONTACT THE PLT AND CONFIRM HIS LOCATION. THE HOLDING POS FOR RWY 31 IS CLRLY VISIBLE FROM THE TWR. IN THIS MATTER I WAS TOLD TO 'HOLD FOR LNDG TFC' WHICH LED ME TO BELIEVE THAT THE TWR HAD VISUAL REF TO MY POS. 4) A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR WAS THE FACT THAT THERE WERE APPARENTLY 2 ACFT LNDG AT THE SAME TIME AND PRESUMABLY 2 ACFT HOLDING AS WELL (ONE ON THE LAND AND ONE ON THE LAKE). THIS RESULTED IN MY HOLDING MY POS ON THE STRIP WHILE THE OTHER ACFT LANDED AND THEN ASKING FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE OFF WHEN THE STRIP WAS CLR. I DON'T KNOW IF THERE WERE OTHER ACFT WAITING FOR TKOF IN THE LAKE OR IF ONE OF THEM WAS A CESSNA. 5) A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THAT MOST ACFT ON THE LAKE DON'T NECESSARILY IDENT THEMSELVES AS BEING ON THE LAKE. THE TWR SEEMS TO MAKE AN ASSUMPTION THAT IF YOU ARE FOR THE 'W' THAT YOU ARE ON THE LAKE. THIS IS THE ASSUMPTION THE TWR MADE WHICH RESULTED IN THIS MATTER. 6) A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THE FACT THAT THE OTHER ACFT IN THIS MATTER WAS LNDG DOWNWIND AND AGAINST THE FLOW OF ATIS TFC AS DIRECTED BY TWR. 7) A FINAL CONTRIBUTING FACTOR IS THE TAXI CLRNC FROM ANCHORAGE GND CTL. THIS CLRNC APPARENTLY DOES NOT 'PUT THE PLT IN THE SYS' FOR FUTURE REF AT LAKE HOOD STRIP.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.