Narrative:

I was instructed to temporarily install #5 main wheel assembly to transport airplane to hangar xx for further inspection of the axle and brake. A new wheel assembly was installed to facilitate the move from the terminal gate to hangar X. Upon completing the temporary installation I was given information the aircraft was OTS. I was told the #5 main wheel assembly would be removed again. I was later asked to sign off the logbook entry which I felt was incorrect. After trying to locate the airplane on gate, which it was not, I returned to my ready room and was requested to fill out a technician's non-routine write-up, which I did upon learning of the new location of the aircraft. There I saw the #5 wheel assembly was removed. With this information I contacted a hangar supervisor and technical crew chief to ask if they needed me to do anything else. They seemed satisfied that the aircraft was being worked and did not ask me for any additional assistance concerning the temporary wheel installation or paperwork. They did not ask for the technician's non-routine write-up, I had filled out. I was told by a technician crew chief that an OTS work pack was completed. The aircraft was removed from gate at the terminal to hangar X bay X and the wheel assembly was removed. Therefore I didn't feel it necessary to generate a technician's non-routine write-up. Additionally after speaking with a supervisor and technical crew chief at hangar X they didn't want the technician's non-routine write-up. If the paperwork was incomplete the airplane should not have been moved and the inspection procedure shouldn't have started. The lack of communication between supervision, the crew chiefs and myself is the largest contributing factor to this incident. I was led to believe an OTS work pack was completed. Then I was asked to fill out a technician's non-routine write-up to continue with the inspection. Upon learning the inspection had begun (aircraft being moved and wheel removed) and also communicating with a hangar supervisor and technical crew chief I assumed that my part of the job was complete. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: the reporter stated the non routine write-up stated the condition of the interim tire and wheel assembly installed for movement of the aircraft to the hangar for more brake work. The reporter said by the hangar crew discarding the write-up they may not have known the actual condition of the tire and wheel assembly installation and may have returned the airplane to service with the unserviceable repair.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A300-600 HAD AN INTERIM TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY INSTALLED IN #5 POS TO ALLOW TOWING TO THE HANGAR FOR REPAIR. TECHNICIAN WROTE UP NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP DESCRIBING INTERIM WHEEL CHANGE.

Narrative: I WAS INSTRUCTED TO TEMPORARILY INSTALL #5 MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLY TO TRANSPORT AIRPLANE TO HANGAR XX FOR FURTHER INSPECTION OF THE AXLE AND BRAKE. A NEW WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS INSTALLED TO FACILITATE THE MOVE FROM THE TERMINAL GATE TO HANGAR X. UPON COMPLETING THE TEMPORARY INSTALLATION I WAS GIVEN INFO THE ACFT WAS OTS. I WAS TOLD THE #5 MAIN WHEEL ASSEMBLY WOULD BE REMOVED AGAIN. I WAS LATER ASKED TO SIGN OFF THE LOGBOOK ENTRY WHICH I FELT WAS INCORRECT. AFTER TRYING TO LOCATE THE AIRPLANE ON GATE, WHICH IT WAS NOT, I RETURNED TO MY READY ROOM AND WAS REQUESTED TO FILL OUT A TECHNICIAN'S NON-ROUTINE WRITE-UP, WHICH I DID UPON LEARNING OF THE NEW LOCATION OF THE ACFT. THERE I SAW THE #5 WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED. WITH THIS INFO I CONTACTED A HANGAR SUPVR AND TECHNICAL CREW CHIEF TO ASK IF THEY NEEDED ME TO DO ANYTHING ELSE. THEY SEEMED SATISFIED THAT THE ACFT WAS BEING WORKED AND DID NOT ASK ME FOR ANY ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE CONCERNING THE TEMPORARY WHEEL INSTALLATION OR PAPERWORK. THEY DID NOT ASK FOR THE TECHNICIAN'S NON-ROUTINE WRITE-UP, I HAD FILLED OUT. I WAS TOLD BY A TECHNICIAN CREW CHIEF THAT AN OTS WORK PACK WAS COMPLETED. THE ACFT WAS REMOVED FROM GATE AT THE TERMINAL TO HANGAR X BAY X AND THE WHEEL ASSEMBLY WAS REMOVED. THEREFORE I DIDN'T FEEL IT NECESSARY TO GENERATE A TECHNICIAN'S NON-ROUTINE WRITE-UP. ADDITIONALLY AFTER SPEAKING WITH A SUPVR AND TECHNICAL CREW CHIEF AT HANGAR X THEY DIDN'T WANT THE TECHNICIAN'S NON-ROUTINE WRITE-UP. IF THE PAPERWORK WAS INCOMPLETE THE AIRPLANE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN MOVED AND THE INSPECTION PROC SHOULDN'T HAVE STARTED. THE LACK OF COM BTWN SUPERVISION, THE CREW CHIEFS AND MYSELF IS THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTING FACTOR TO THIS INCIDENT. I WAS LED TO BELIEVE AN OTS WORK PACK WAS COMPLETED. THEN I WAS ASKED TO FILL OUT A TECHNICIAN'S NON-ROUTINE WRITE-UP TO CONTINUE WITH THE INSPECTION. UPON LEARNING THE INSPECTION HAD BEGUN (ACFT BEING MOVED AND WHEEL REMOVED) AND ALSO COMMUNICATING WITH A HANGAR SUPVR AND TECHNICAL CREW CHIEF I ASSUMED THAT MY PART OF THE JOB WAS COMPLETE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE RPTR STATED THE NON ROUTINE WRITE-UP STATED THE CONDITION OF THE INTERIM TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY INSTALLED FOR MOVEMENT OF THE ACFT TO THE HANGAR FOR MORE BRAKE WORK. THE RPTR SAID BY THE HANGAR CREW DISCARDING THE WRITE-UP THEY MAY NOT HAVE KNOWN THE ACTUAL CONDITION OF THE TIRE AND WHEEL ASSEMBLY INSTALLATION AND MAY HAVE RETURNED THE AIRPLANE TO SVC WITH THE UNSERVICEABLE REPAIR.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.