B737-200 crew found the aircraft would not pressurize.

Attributes
ACN	633347
Time
Date	200410
Day	Tue
Local Time Of Day	0601 To 1200
Place
Locale Reference	airport : sea.airport
State Reference	WA
Altitude	msl single value : 9000
Environment
Flight Conditions	VMC
Aircraft 1
Controlling Facilities	tracon : s46.tracon
Operator	common carrier : air carrier
Make Model Name	B737-200
Operating Under FAR Part	Part 121
Flight Plan	IFR
Aircraft 2
Flight Phase	climbout : initial climbout : takeoff
Person 1
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : captain oversight : pic
ASRS Report	633518
Person 2
Affiliation	company : air carrier
Function	flight crew : first officer
ASRS Report	633518
Events
Anomaly	aircraft equipment problem : critical inflight encounter : weather maintenance problem : improper maintenance maintenance problem : improper documentation non adherence : published procedure non adherence : far non adherence : company policies
Independent Detector	aircraft equipment other aircraft equipment : cabin differential pressurzation. cabin rate of climb other flight crewa other flight crewb
Resolutory Action	controller : issued new clearance flight crew : landed as precaution flight crew : diverted to another airport
Consequence	other other
Factors
Maintenance	performance deficiency : non compliance with legal requirements performance deficiency : logbook entry performance deficiency : inspection
Supplementary
Problem Areas	Maintenance Human Performance Chart Or Publication Aircraft
Primary Problem	Maintenance Human Performance

Narrative:

The aircraft failed to pressurize after takeoff from sea. Found pressurization circuit breakers pulled and collared. Fog layer in sea prevented a return to sea due low visibility so diverted to pdx in accordance with company request. The aircraft had been down for maintenance for about 1 week, with a pressure bulkhead crack that required repair. The aircraft had been ferried unpressurized from sea to ZZZ repaired, then flown back to sea. We were the first scheduled flight after this maintenance. This event was particularly frustrating for myself and my first officer for a couple of reasons. We had specifically discussed the fact that the plane had been down for maintenance for several days, and that we should be on the lookout for anything unusual during our preflight inspection. We allowed extra time for the preflight by splitting the duties, with the first officer completing the interior and exterior preflight inspections, and myself doing the cockpit and maintenance logbook inspections. It is frustrating to me that even though we took these precautions, and 'did all the right things' from a CRM aspect, I still missed the fact that the breakers were improperly collared during the cockpit inspection. Upon initial climb out, it was obvious that the pressurization wasn't working. Once we found the problem, the subsequent divert and overweight landing at pdx were uneventful. The lesson learned here was to be suspicious of an verify and collared circuit breakers that do not have the tie wraps, and also of any collared circuit breakers that are in a location on the circuit breaker panels where we don't normally see collared breakers. I believe that if a logbook entry had been made recording the pressurization system deactivation, this never would have happened. Maintenance would have to reset the system to clear the log page, and if they didn't I would have seen in the logbook that the system had been deactivated which would have helped draw my attention to the circuit breakers for the system. Supplemental information from acn 633347: attempted to control with standby mode, manual AC and manual dc modes of operation. Aircraft would not pressurize.

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-200 CREW FOUND THE ACFT WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE.

Narrative: THE ACFT FAILED TO PRESSURIZE AFTER TKOF FROM SEA. FOUND PRESSURIZATION CIRCUIT BREAKERS PULLED AND COLLARED. FOG LAYER IN SEA PREVENTED A RETURN TO SEA DUE LOW VISIBILITY SO DIVERTED TO PDX IN ACCORDANCE WITH COMPANY REQUEST. THE ACFT HAD BEEN DOWN FOR MAINT FOR ABOUT 1 WK, WITH A PRESSURE BULKHEAD CRACK THAT REQUIRED REPAIR. THE ACFT HAD BEEN FERRIED UNPRESSURIZED FROM SEA TO ZZZ REPAIRED, THEN FLOWN BACK TO SEA. WE WERE THE FIRST SCHEDULED FLT AFTER THIS MAINT. THIS EVENT WAS PARTICULARLY FRUSTRATING FOR MYSELF AND MY FO FOR A COUPLE OF REASONS. WE HAD SPECIFICALLY DISCUSSED THE FACT THAT THE PLANE HAD BEEN DOWN FOR MAINT FOR SEVERAL DAYS, AND THAT WE SHOULD BE ON THE LOOKOUT FOR ANYTHING UNUSUAL DURING OUR PREFLT INSPECTION. WE ALLOWED EXTRA TIME FOR THE PREFLT BY SPLITTING THE DUTIES, WITH THE FO COMPLETING THE INTERIOR AND EXTERIOR PREFLT INSPECTIONS, AND MYSELF DOING THE COCKPIT AND MAINT LOGBOOK INSPECTIONS. IT IS FRUSTRATING TO ME THAT EVEN THOUGH WE TOOK THESE PRECAUTIONS, AND 'DID ALL THE RIGHT THINGS' FROM A CRM ASPECT, I STILL MISSED THE FACT THAT THE BREAKERS WERE IMPROPERLY COLLARED DURING THE COCKPIT INSPECTION. UPON INITIAL CLBOUT, IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE PRESSURIZATION WASN'T WORKING. ONCE WE FOUND THE PROB, THE SUBSEQUENT DIVERT AND OVERWT LNDG AT PDX WERE UNEVENTFUL. THE LESSON LEARNED HERE WAS TO BE SUSPICIOUS OF AN VERIFY AND COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT DO NOT HAVE THE TIE WRAPS, AND ALSO OF ANY COLLARED CIRCUIT BREAKERS THAT ARE IN A LOCATION ON THE CIRCUIT BREAKER PANELS WHERE WE DON'T NORMALLY SEE COLLARED BREAKERS. I BELIEVE THAT IF A LOGBOOK ENTRY HAD BEEN MADE RECORDING THE PRESSURIZATION SYS DEACTIVATION, THIS NEVER WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. MAINT WOULD HAVE TO RESET THE SYS TO CLR THE LOG PAGE, AND IF THEY DIDN'T I WOULD HAVE SEEN IN THE LOGBOOK THAT THE SYS HAD BEEN DEACTIVATED WHICH WOULD HAVE HELPED DRAW MY ATTN TO THE CIRCUIT BREAKERS FOR THE SYS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 633347: ATTEMPTED TO CTL WITH STANDBY MODE, MANUAL AC AND MANUAL DC MODES OF OP. ACFT WOULD NOT PRESSURIZE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.