Narrative:

Oakland ground control instructed us to taxi from our hangar to runway 27R (this was an unusual taxi instruction for us). Approaching the hold short for runway 27R oakland ground instructed us to cross runway 27R and hold short of runway 27L. It was at this point that we discovered in conversation with oakland ground that taxiway B from B1 to taxiway south was closed and we would have to depart from runway 27L and not from runway 29 as we expected and were normally assigned. Both of us were surprised by this unusual runway assignment and while we were discussing the runway change and the performance impact the captain (PF) taxied the aircraft across the approach end of runway 27R to hold short of runway 27L. At some time during our cockpit discussion we evidently missed the change in our taxi clearance that was, 'now hold short of runway 27R' from oakland ground control. The sequence of events (the unexpected runway change) could have been less confusing to us had the NOTAMS revealed the taxiway closure. The ATIS clearly described the taxiway closure but after many months of the same taxiway closure information at oakland airport I did not listen to all of the ATIS information carefully enough and missed the information concerning taxiway B. As part of our preflight brief, our crews normally review the flight plan, WX and NOTAMS together. Due to bay area traffic the captain was late getting to the airport and we did not do this as described in our SOP. As we were approaching the hold short for runway 27R ground control explained the taxiway closure situation to us and we were concerned that we might be too heavy to depart from runway 27L and, of course, would have to explain our lack of attention to detail to the chief pilot. This caused us some serious angst. Needless to say we were distraction. While taxiing the aircraft the captain (PF) simultaneously taxied the airplane and attempted to enter new runway information into the FMS' CDU. Concerned about a potential taxi accident I suggested that I (PNF) input the data while he taxied the aircraft. He continued to do both tasks and I observed another jet on about a 3 mi final to runway 27R. After observing another jet on final I informed the captain and suggested we hold short of runway 27R. The captain replied that he thought the jet was landing on runway 29, the south complex and ignored my suggestion and taxied across runway 27R to hold short of runway 27L. This is when ground control explained to us that we had crossed runway 27R without a clearance. What could we have done better? Listened carefully to all of ATIS. Not let changes in our 'plan' cause our cockpit discipline to erode. Clearly adhere to cockpit SOP and crew duties so that no crew member is overwhelmed by events. Stop the airplane when one crew member detects a problem. Slow down! There was no need for us to feel any urgency on this flight, it was a deadhead. It appears to me that most cpr operators are always in a hurry. Lastly, I should have been more assertive and insisted that the captain (PF) stop the aircraft at the hold short for runway 27R for the landing traffic. Supplemental information from acn 635030: we requested taxi instructions and were cleared to runway 27L. We informed the tower that we needed runway 29. In the future we will stop taxiing and accomplish FMS performance for any changes prior to continuing to taxi, to assure both pilots will be alert to any ATC changes, and not cross an active runway without a backup call to verify the crossing clearance.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: G4 CREW HAD A RWY INCURSION ON RWY 27R AT OAK.

Narrative: OAKLAND GND CTL INSTRUCTED US TO TAXI FROM OUR HANGAR TO RWY 27R (THIS WAS AN UNUSUAL TAXI INSTRUCTION FOR US). APCHING THE HOLD SHORT FOR RWY 27R OAKLAND GND INSTRUCTED US TO CROSS RWY 27R AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. IT WAS AT THIS POINT THAT WE DISCOVERED IN CONVERSATION WITH OAKLAND GND THAT TXWY B FROM B1 TO TXWY S WAS CLOSED AND WE WOULD HAVE TO DEPART FROM RWY 27L AND NOT FROM RWY 29 AS WE EXPECTED AND WERE NORMALLY ASSIGNED. BOTH OF US WERE SURPRISED BY THIS UNUSUAL RWY ASSIGNMENT AND WHILE WE WERE DISCUSSING THE RWY CHANGE AND THE PERFORMANCE IMPACT THE CAPT (PF) TAXIED THE ACFT ACROSS THE APCH END OF RWY 27R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. AT SOME TIME DURING OUR COCKPIT DISCUSSION WE EVIDENTLY MISSED THE CHANGE IN OUR TAXI CLRNC THAT WAS, 'NOW HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R' FROM OAKLAND GND CTL. THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS (THE UNEXPECTED RWY CHANGE) COULD HAVE BEEN LESS CONFUSING TO US HAD THE NOTAMS REVEALED THE TXWY CLOSURE. THE ATIS CLRLY DESCRIBED THE TXWY CLOSURE BUT AFTER MANY MONTHS OF THE SAME TXWY CLOSURE INFO AT OAKLAND ARPT I DID NOT LISTEN TO ALL OF THE ATIS INFO CAREFULLY ENOUGH AND MISSED THE INFO CONCERNING TXWY B. AS PART OF OUR PREFLT BRIEF, OUR CREWS NORMALLY REVIEW THE FLT PLAN, WX AND NOTAMS TOGETHER. DUE TO BAY AREA TFC THE CAPT WAS LATE GETTING TO THE ARPT AND WE DID NOT DO THIS AS DESCRIBED IN OUR SOP. AS WE WERE APCHING THE HOLD SHORT FOR RWY 27R GND CTL EXPLAINED THE TXWY CLOSURE SIT TO US AND WE WERE CONCERNED THAT WE MIGHT BE TOO HVY TO DEPART FROM RWY 27L AND, OF COURSE, WOULD HAVE TO EXPLAIN OUR LACK OF ATTN TO DETAIL TO THE CHIEF PLT. THIS CAUSED US SOME SERIOUS ANGST. NEEDLESS TO SAY WE WERE DISTR. WHILE TAXIING THE ACFT THE CAPT (PF) SIMULTANEOUSLY TAXIED THE AIRPLANE AND ATTEMPTED TO ENTER NEW RWY INFO INTO THE FMS' CDU. CONCERNED ABOUT A POTENTIAL TAXI ACCIDENT I SUGGESTED THAT I (PNF) INPUT THE DATA WHILE HE TAXIED THE ACFT. HE CONTINUED TO DO BOTH TASKS AND I OBSERVED ANOTHER JET ON ABOUT A 3 MI FINAL TO RWY 27R. AFTER OBSERVING ANOTHER JET ON FINAL I INFORMED THE CAPT AND SUGGESTED WE HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27R. THE CAPT REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT THE JET WAS LNDG ON RWY 29, THE S COMPLEX AND IGNORED MY SUGGESTION AND TAXIED ACROSS RWY 27R TO HOLD SHORT OF RWY 27L. THIS IS WHEN GND CTL EXPLAINED TO US THAT WE HAD CROSSED RWY 27R WITHOUT A CLRNC. WHAT COULD WE HAVE DONE BETTER? LISTENED CAREFULLY TO ALL OF ATIS. NOT LET CHANGES IN OUR 'PLAN' CAUSE OUR COCKPIT DISCIPLINE TO ERODE. CLRLY ADHERE TO COCKPIT SOP AND CREW DUTIES SO THAT NO CREW MEMBER IS OVERWHELMED BY EVENTS. STOP THE AIRPLANE WHEN ONE CREW MEMBER DETECTS A PROB. SLOW DOWN! THERE WAS NO NEED FOR US TO FEEL ANY URGENCY ON THIS FLT, IT WAS A DEADHEAD. IT APPEARS TO ME THAT MOST CPR OPERATORS ARE ALWAYS IN A HURRY. LASTLY, I SHOULD HAVE BEEN MORE ASSERTIVE AND INSISTED THAT THE CAPT (PF) STOP THE ACFT AT THE HOLD SHORT FOR RWY 27R FOR THE LNDG TFC. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 635030: WE REQUESTED TAXI INSTRUCTIONS AND WERE CLRED TO RWY 27L. WE INFORMED THE TWR THAT WE NEEDED RWY 29. IN THE FUTURE WE WILL STOP TAXIING AND ACCOMPLISH FMS PERFORMANCE FOR ANY CHANGES PRIOR TO CONTINUING TO TAXI, TO ASSURE BOTH PLTS WILL BE ALERT TO ANY ATC CHANGES, AND NOT CROSS AN ACTIVE RWY WITHOUT A BACKUP CALL TO VERIFY THE XING CLRNC.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.