Narrative:

Climbing out of richmond, va, we were leveled at 9000 ft by richmond departure control. Following a brasilia jet, we were held at 9000 ft for an extended period of time. We were then passed to ZDC who cleared us to 13000 ft and held us there for a while. They asked if we had traffic in sight ahead at 14000 ft, same direction. We said we did. ZDC cleared us for a visual climb to FL200. We assumed the traffic was the brasilia jet, which would be a comparable speed with our aircraft. We were mistaken. In reality we had a large overtake on the visual traffic and as we passed through its altitude, we turned away to avoid. An RA TCASII resulted and we continued our climb with the traffic in sight, then turned back on course. Point #1: the ZDC controller set us up with a conflict situation knowing we had overtake on the visual traffic, but not divulging that information. Point #2: at night, having a visual sighting of the lights of an aircraft does not give enough visual clues as to the orientation of that aircraft or the rate of closure between the 2 aircraft. Point #3: night visual avoidance maneuvers are dangerous, should be illegal, and I will never accept another clearance to perform one. Supplemental information from acn 636451: level at 13000 ft, ZDC asked if we had traffic 11:30 O'clock position, same direction. We stated 'traffic in sight.' center then cleared us for a visual climb to FL200. We accepted climb believing traffic was an EMB135 which we had been behind since ric. That traffic would be comparable speed-wise. That, however, was not the case. As we climbed through 14000 ft, we turned right to insure proper spacing. A TCASII RA then alerted at approximately 14500 ft. We continued the climb with traffic never out of our sight during entire climb. Controllers issuing visual climb/dscnts should give more information on closure rate, headings, and distance to ensure this clearance is advisable using normal aircraft maneuvers. Visual clues at night were limited and made it difficult to readily determine exact distance/position/track. Lesson learned: do not accept visual climb/descent during limited visibility or night operations. Callback conversation with reporter acn 636459 revealed the following information: reporter stated he regrets accepting the clearance to maintain visual separation from the aircraft at 14000 ft. He said it was difficult to judge the distance from the other aircraft and believed they were traveling at about the same speed but later estimated the closure rate was about 100 KTS. He said while they were responding to the TCASII RA, the other aircraft was asking the controller to advise what was going on.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A ZDC ARTCC RADAR CTLR INCORRECTLY APPLIES VISUAL SEPARATION TO AN MD88 CREW RESULTING IN A TCASII RA AND CAUSING THE CREW TO TAKE EVASIVE ACTION.

Narrative: CLBING OUT OF RICHMOND, VA, WE WERE LEVELED AT 9000 FT BY RICHMOND DEP CTL. FOLLOWING A BRASILIA JET, WE WERE HELD AT 9000 FT FOR AN EXTENDED PERIOD OF TIME. WE WERE THEN PASSED TO ZDC WHO CLRED US TO 13000 FT AND HELD US THERE FOR A WHILE. THEY ASKED IF WE HAD TFC IN SIGHT AHEAD AT 14000 FT, SAME DIRECTION. WE SAID WE DID. ZDC CLRED US FOR A VISUAL CLB TO FL200. WE ASSUMED THE TFC WAS THE BRASILIA JET, WHICH WOULD BE A COMPARABLE SPD WITH OUR ACFT. WE WERE MISTAKEN. IN REALITY WE HAD A LARGE OVERTAKE ON THE VISUAL TFC AND AS WE PASSED THROUGH ITS ALT, WE TURNED AWAY TO AVOID. AN RA TCASII RESULTED AND WE CONTINUED OUR CLB WITH THE TFC IN SIGHT, THEN TURNED BACK ON COURSE. POINT #1: THE ZDC CTLR SET US UP WITH A CONFLICT SIT KNOWING WE HAD OVERTAKE ON THE VISUAL TFC, BUT NOT DIVULGING THAT INFO. POINT #2: AT NIGHT, HAVING A VISUAL SIGHTING OF THE LIGHTS OF AN ACFT DOES NOT GIVE ENOUGH VISUAL CLUES AS TO THE ORIENTATION OF THAT ACFT OR THE RATE OF CLOSURE BTWN THE 2 ACFT. POINT #3: NIGHT VISUAL AVOIDANCE MANEUVERS ARE DANGEROUS, SHOULD BE ILLEGAL, AND I WILL NEVER ACCEPT ANOTHER CLRNC TO PERFORM ONE. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 636451: LEVEL AT 13000 FT, ZDC ASKED IF WE HAD TFC 11:30 O'CLOCK POS, SAME DIRECTION. WE STATED 'TFC IN SIGHT.' CTR THEN CLRED US FOR A VISUAL CLB TO FL200. WE ACCEPTED CLB BELIEVING TFC WAS AN EMB135 WHICH WE HAD BEEN BEHIND SINCE RIC. THAT TFC WOULD BE COMPARABLE SPD-WISE. THAT, HOWEVER, WAS NOT THE CASE. AS WE CLBED THROUGH 14000 FT, WE TURNED R TO INSURE PROPER SPACING. A TCASII RA THEN ALERTED AT APPROX 14500 FT. WE CONTINUED THE CLB WITH TFC NEVER OUT OF OUR SIGHT DURING ENTIRE CLB. CTLRS ISSUING VISUAL CLB/DSCNTS SHOULD GIVE MORE INFO ON CLOSURE RATE, HDGS, AND DISTANCE TO ENSURE THIS CLRNC IS ADVISABLE USING NORMAL ACFT MANEUVERS. VISUAL CLUES AT NIGHT WERE LIMITED AND MADE IT DIFFICULT TO READILY DETERMINE EXACT DISTANCE/POS/TRACK. LESSON LEARNED: DO NOT ACCEPT VISUAL CLB/DSCNT DURING LIMITED VISIBILITY OR NIGHT OPS. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR ACN 636459 REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED HE REGRETS ACCEPTING THE CLRNC TO MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION FROM THE ACFT AT 14000 FT. HE SAID IT WAS DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE DISTANCE FROM THE OTHER ACFT AND BELIEVED THEY WERE TRAVELING AT ABOUT THE SAME SPD BUT LATER ESTIMATED THE CLOSURE RATE WAS ABOUT 100 KTS. HE SAID WHILE THEY WERE RESPONDING TO THE TCASII RA, THE OTHER ACFT WAS ASKING THE CTLR TO ADVISE WHAT WAS GOING ON.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.