Narrative:

The captain and I were operating flight from mdw to ewr. While descending via the fqm 1 STAR (williamsport 1 arrival) at approximately 10500 ft MSL with a crossing restr of sweet intersection at 7000 ft, a ZNY ARTCC controller on frequency 127.50 MHZ idented traffic to us. The traffic was called at our 2 O'clock position and climbing through what I thought I heard as 6900 ft MSL. Neither the captain nor I could spot the traffic visually, and when the controller made another report to us, he remarked that the traffic was a commander 690 and was on a nebound converging course with ours. We had the traffic on the TCASII and were uneasy, as the TCASII hits truly appeared to be on a course to converge with us during our descent. As we descended through 8500 ft, and approximately 1 mi west of penns intersection, the traffic was within 1 1/2 mi at our 2 O'clock position, and the TCASII reported it as a yellow TA with a data tag of -06 with an up arrow (600 ft below us and climbing at more than 500 FPM). I was scanning externally as we descended through 8300 ft when the controller stated that the traffic had us in sight. Almost concurrent with this, we received an RA with a 'climb, climb' instruction. The captain disconnected the autoplt, added power and pitched the aircraft up. I responded to the controller, saying 'it doesn't matter now, we're responding to an RA with the traffic.' I alternated between scanning outside and checking the TCASII display. The controller responded to my report of the RA, somewhat defensively, by saying 'how you react to an RA is your business, the traffic had you in sight, so it's out of my hands,' or something to that affect. I never saw the traffic, though as our indicated position met, I saw the data tag read -01 with an up arrow. At about this time, while the captain had the aircraft stabilized in approximately a 1000 FPM climb outside the TCASII pitch command indicators, the TCASII gave another, conflicting RA instructing 'descend, descend.' the captain reduced power, rolled the aircraft into approximately a 30 degree bank to the left to maintain positive G force on the aircraft and the flight attendants (who were still up in the cabin at this time), and let the nose of the aircraft fall through the horizon. The target on the TCASII display disappeared after our position met, but while in the commanded descent the traffic reappeared approximately 1/4 mi away from us at our 7 O'clock position as a white square (proximity traffic) with a data tag of '00' with an up arrow. Within 1 min of the RA, we leveled off at 7000 ft heading back direct to sweet intersection and the controller handed us off to new york approach control. In response to our check-in, the new york approach controller gave us a 080 degree heading for the approach, as we were about 1 mi from sweet intersection at the time. Contributing factors to this incident include the fact that the ZNY controller was not speaking to the commander on our frequency, so we had no idea what was being said and could not hear the responses of the other pilot. Second, the controller seemed fixated on our making the altitude restr of crossing sweet at 7000 ft to enable the handoff to new york approach. We could have leveled off at an intermediate altitude or taken a turn to avoid the conflict. Third, assuming the pilot of the commander actually had us in sight, the willful operation of his aircraft in such close proximity to a large transport category aircraft is grossly negligent. Even if the pilot was confident that he would pass behind us, our response to a TCASII RA could have easily caused us to contact each other. Fourth, it is irresponsible (whether legal or not) for a controller to allow 2 aircraft in contact with him to continue toward an imminent collision, even if one aircraft advises the other in sight. There was no way to know if the pilot had our aircraft, or some other one in actual visual contact. The second descending RA could have easily been caused by another aircraft above the TCASII display limit of 2700 ft overhead and this could have been the aircraft the commander called in sight, as it was just prior to sunset and visibility was limited. Supplemental information from acn 639230: after shutdown at the gate at ewr, I explained to my senior flight attendant the reason for the maneuvering. I asked her if everyone was ok and were there any injuries. She said everyone was fine and no injuries. This situation may have been caused by a different aircraft, since there is a different sector for ATC above the sweet intersection area.

Related reports:

Google
 

Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B737-800 CREW DSNDING ON AN ARR INTO EWR RECEIVE AND RESPOND TO A TCASII RA (CONVERGING VFR TFC) THAT REQUIRED A CLB.

Narrative: THE CAPT AND I WERE OPERATING FLT FROM MDW TO EWR. WHILE DSNDING VIA THE FQM 1 STAR (WILLIAMSPORT 1 ARR) AT APPROX 10500 FT MSL WITH A XING RESTR OF SWEET INTXN AT 7000 FT, A ZNY ARTCC CTLR ON FREQ 127.50 MHZ IDENTED TFC TO US. THE TFC WAS CALLED AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS AND CLBING THROUGH WHAT I THOUGHT I HEARD AS 6900 FT MSL. NEITHER THE CAPT NOR I COULD SPOT THE TFC VISUALLY, AND WHEN THE CTLR MADE ANOTHER RPT TO US, HE REMARKED THAT THE TFC WAS A COMMANDER 690 AND WAS ON A NEBOUND CONVERGING COURSE WITH OURS. WE HAD THE TFC ON THE TCASII AND WERE UNEASY, AS THE TCASII HITS TRULY APPEARED TO BE ON A COURSE TO CONVERGE WITH US DURING OUR DSCNT. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 8500 FT, AND APPROX 1 MI W OF PENNS INTXN, THE TFC WAS WITHIN 1 1/2 MI AT OUR 2 O'CLOCK POS, AND THE TCASII RPTED IT AS A YELLOW TA WITH A DATA TAG OF -06 WITH AN UP ARROW (600 FT BELOW US AND CLBING AT MORE THAN 500 FPM). I WAS SCANNING EXTERNALLY AS WE DSNDED THROUGH 8300 FT WHEN THE CTLR STATED THAT THE TFC HAD US IN SIGHT. ALMOST CONCURRENT WITH THIS, WE RECEIVED AN RA WITH A 'CLB, CLB' INSTRUCTION. THE CAPT DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT, ADDED PWR AND PITCHED THE ACFT UP. I RESPONDED TO THE CTLR, SAYING 'IT DOESN'T MATTER NOW, WE'RE RESPONDING TO AN RA WITH THE TFC.' I ALTERNATED BTWN SCANNING OUTSIDE AND CHKING THE TCASII DISPLAY. THE CTLR RESPONDED TO MY RPT OF THE RA, SOMEWHAT DEFENSIVELY, BY SAYING 'HOW YOU REACT TO AN RA IS YOUR BUSINESS, THE TFC HAD YOU IN SIGHT, SO IT'S OUT OF MY HANDS,' OR SOMETHING TO THAT AFFECT. I NEVER SAW THE TFC, THOUGH AS OUR INDICATED POS MET, I SAW THE DATA TAG READ -01 WITH AN UP ARROW. AT ABOUT THIS TIME, WHILE THE CAPT HAD THE ACFT STABILIZED IN APPROX A 1000 FPM CLB OUTSIDE THE TCASII PITCH COMMAND INDICATORS, THE TCASII GAVE ANOTHER, CONFLICTING RA INSTRUCTING 'DSND, DSND.' THE CAPT REDUCED PWR, ROLLED THE ACFT INTO APPROX A 30 DEG BANK TO THE L TO MAINTAIN POSITIVE G FORCE ON THE ACFT AND THE FLT ATTENDANTS (WHO WERE STILL UP IN THE CABIN AT THIS TIME), AND LET THE NOSE OF THE ACFT FALL THROUGH THE HORIZON. THE TARGET ON THE TCASII DISPLAY DISAPPEARED AFTER OUR POS MET, BUT WHILE IN THE COMMANDED DSCNT THE TFC REAPPEARED APPROX 1/4 MI AWAY FROM US AT OUR 7 O'CLOCK POS AS A WHITE SQUARE (PROX TFC) WITH A DATA TAG OF '00' WITH AN UP ARROW. WITHIN 1 MIN OF THE RA, WE LEVELED OFF AT 7000 FT HEADING BACK DIRECT TO SWEET INTXN AND THE CTLR HANDED US OFF TO NEW YORK APCH CTL. IN RESPONSE TO OUR CHK-IN, THE NEW YORK APCH CTLR GAVE US A 080 DEG HDG FOR THE APCH, AS WE WERE ABOUT 1 MI FROM SWEET INTXN AT THE TIME. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THIS INCIDENT INCLUDE THE FACT THAT THE ZNY CTLR WAS NOT SPEAKING TO THE COMMANDER ON OUR FREQ, SO WE HAD NO IDEA WHAT WAS BEING SAID AND COULD NOT HEAR THE RESPONSES OF THE OTHER PLT. SECOND, THE CTLR SEEMED FIXATED ON OUR MAKING THE ALT RESTR OF XING SWEET AT 7000 FT TO ENABLE THE HDOF TO NEW YORK APCH. WE COULD HAVE LEVELED OFF AT AN INTERMEDIATE ALT OR TAKEN A TURN TO AVOID THE CONFLICT. THIRD, ASSUMING THE PLT OF THE COMMANDER ACTUALLY HAD US IN SIGHT, THE WILLFUL OP OF HIS ACFT IN SUCH CLOSE PROX TO A LARGE TRANSPORT CATEGORY ACFT IS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT. EVEN IF THE PLT WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE WOULD PASS BEHIND US, OUR RESPONSE TO A TCASII RA COULD HAVE EASILY CAUSED US TO CONTACT EACH OTHER. FOURTH, IT IS IRRESPONSIBLE (WHETHER LEGAL OR NOT) FOR A CTLR TO ALLOW 2 ACFT IN CONTACT WITH HIM TO CONTINUE TOWARD AN IMMINENT COLLISION, EVEN IF ONE ACFT ADVISES THE OTHER IN SIGHT. THERE WAS NO WAY TO KNOW IF THE PLT HAD OUR ACFT, OR SOME OTHER ONE IN ACTUAL VISUAL CONTACT. THE SECOND DSNDING RA COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN CAUSED BY ANOTHER ACFT ABOVE THE TCASII DISPLAY LIMIT OF 2700 FT OVERHEAD AND THIS COULD HAVE BEEN THE ACFT THE COMMANDER CALLED IN SIGHT, AS IT WAS JUST PRIOR TO SUNSET AND VISIBILITY WAS LIMITED. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 639230: AFTER SHUTDOWN AT THE GATE AT EWR, I EXPLAINED TO MY SENIOR FLT ATTENDANT THE REASON FOR THE MANEUVERING. I ASKED HER IF EVERYONE WAS OK AND WERE THERE ANY INJURIES. SHE SAID EVERYONE WAS FINE AND NO INJURIES. THIS SIT MAY HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A DIFFERENT ACFT, SINCE THERE IS A DIFFERENT SECTOR FOR ATC ABOVE THE SWEET INTXN AREA.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of July 2007 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.