Narrative:

The problem arose when the aircraft became starved of fuel causing the forced landing of the aircraft. We were on a long IFR cross country flight. The aircraft held 5 hours of fuel and the time en route was to be 4 hours. Along the route; we experienced some greater than planned headwinds which slowed our ground speed. After some in-flight computations; we determined that we still had adequate fuel to make it to our destination with reserves. The majority of the flight was conducted in IMC except the last 30 mins when we entered a broken to scattered layer in the vicinity of our destination. We were still under IFR but in VMC when we began the ILS approach with radar vectors from center. Approximately 15 mi from the airport; the engine began to sputter and stopped producing power. We notified center and informed them that we were going to set it down on a road. The landing was uneventful and no damage occurred to the aircraft or property. Contributing factors to the event were the use of carburetor heat during the flight which after the fact was determined to use more fuel. The greater than planned winds and the less than minimum landing ceilings along the route preventing a closer fuel stop were all factors. Another factor has to do with the calibration of the fuel dipstick in that it was recently re-calibrated to a greater quantity than I thought was in the fuel tank. I went against my better judgement and used what was said on the stick. Finally; since I was with a private pilot who was doing most of the flying; I allowed him to perform the preflight on the aircraft and check fuel quantities. I did not doublechk his preflight but trust him to do a good job. Corrective action would have been to make a no-go decision from the start. While en route; we determined that our ground speed was less than planned; we could have turned around. I should have gone with my better judgement and I should have performed my own preflight. After reviewing the flight planning; after the fact; we determined that we had planned for enough fuel. However; with the use of the carburetor heat and the age of the engine; the aircraft was most likely using more fuel than we had planned. Again; the best action would have been not to go or to have a better idea of the actual range of the aircraft and the inaction would have been to land sooner if WX cooperated. This was a bit of a training flight for the private pilot who was with me. The majority of my attention was in teaching him about flying on instruments. My mind did not think too much about the fuel since we preplanned for enough fuel to make it to our destination plus required reserves. Since my attention was with the student; it distraction me from the other factors listed above.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FUEL STARVATION FOLLOWING A LONG IFR XCOUNTRY RESULTS IN EMER OFF ARPT LNDG BY C182 CREWED BY AN INSTRUCTOR PLT AND HIS STUDENT.

Narrative: THE PROB AROSE WHEN THE ACFT BECAME STARVED OF FUEL CAUSING THE FORCED LNDG OF THE ACFT. WE WERE ON A LONG IFR XCOUNTRY FLT. THE ACFT HELD 5 HRS OF FUEL AND THE TIME ENRTE WAS TO BE 4 HRS. ALONG THE RTE; WE EXPERIENCED SOME GREATER THAN PLANNED HEADWINDS WHICH SLOWED OUR GND SPD. AFTER SOME INFLT COMPUTATIONS; WE DETERMINED THAT WE STILL HAD ADEQUATE FUEL TO MAKE IT TO OUR DEST WITH RESERVES. THE MAJORITY OF THE FLT WAS CONDUCTED IN IMC EXCEPT THE LAST 30 MINS WHEN WE ENTERED A BROKEN TO SCATTERED LAYER IN THE VICINITY OF OUR DEST. WE WERE STILL UNDER IFR BUT IN VMC WHEN WE BEGAN THE ILS APCH WITH RADAR VECTORS FROM CTR. APPROX 15 MI FROM THE ARPT; THE ENG BEGAN TO SPUTTER AND STOPPED PRODUCING PWR. WE NOTIFIED CTR AND INFORMED THEM THAT WE WERE GOING TO SET IT DOWN ON A ROAD. THE LNDG WAS UNEVENTFUL AND NO DAMAGE OCCURRED TO THE ACFT OR PROPERTY. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE EVENT WERE THE USE OF CARB HEAT DURING THE FLT WHICH AFTER THE FACT WAS DETERMINED TO USE MORE FUEL. THE GREATER THAN PLANNED WINDS AND THE LESS THAN MINIMUM LNDG CEILINGS ALONG THE RTE PREVENTING A CLOSER FUEL STOP WERE ALL FACTORS. ANOTHER FACTOR HAS TO DO WITH THE CALIBRATION OF THE FUEL DIPSTICK IN THAT IT WAS RECENTLY RE-CALIBRATED TO A GREATER QUANTITY THAN I THOUGHT WAS IN THE FUEL TANK. I WENT AGAINST MY BETTER JUDGEMENT AND USED WHAT WAS SAID ON THE STICK. FINALLY; SINCE I WAS WITH A PVT PLT WHO WAS DOING MOST OF THE FLYING; I ALLOWED HIM TO PERFORM THE PREFLT ON THE ACFT AND CHK FUEL QUANTITIES. I DID NOT DOUBLECHK HIS PREFLT BUT TRUST HIM TO DO A GOOD JOB. CORRECTIVE ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO MAKE A NO-GO DECISION FROM THE START. WHILE ENRTE; WE DETERMINED THAT OUR GND SPD WAS LESS THAN PLANNED; WE COULD HAVE TURNED AROUND. I SHOULD HAVE GONE WITH MY BETTER JUDGEMENT AND I SHOULD HAVE PERFORMED MY OWN PREFLT. AFTER REVIEWING THE FLT PLANNING; AFTER THE FACT; WE DETERMINED THAT WE HAD PLANNED FOR ENOUGH FUEL. HOWEVER; WITH THE USE OF THE CARB HEAT AND THE AGE OF THE ENG; THE ACFT WAS MOST LIKELY USING MORE FUEL THAN WE HAD PLANNED. AGAIN; THE BEST ACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN NOT TO GO OR TO HAVE A BETTER IDEA OF THE ACTUAL RANGE OF THE ACFT AND THE INACTION WOULD HAVE BEEN TO LAND SOONER IF WX COOPERATED. THIS WAS A BIT OF A TRAINING FLT FOR THE PVT PLT WHO WAS WITH ME. THE MAJORITY OF MY ATTN WAS IN TEACHING HIM ABOUT FLYING ON INSTS. MY MIND DID NOT THINK TOO MUCH ABOUT THE FUEL SINCE WE PREPLANNED FOR ENOUGH FUEL TO MAKE IT TO OUR DEST PLUS REQUIRED RESERVES. SINCE MY ATTN WAS WITH THE STUDENT; IT DISTR ME FROM THE OTHER FACTORS LISTED ABOVE.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.