Narrative:

The following is an account of the events involving an avro RJ85 on mar/mon/05. The flight was normal on departure; initial climb and cruise. Somewhere around the vicinity of ZZZ1 at FL240; the captain and I smelled something. Approximately 2 mins later; both the captain and I looked at each other and noticed smoke filling the cockpit. At this time we knew something was burning somewhere and promptly started the memory items for smoke in the cockpit and started the emergency descent. About 20-30 seconds after we noticed the smoke; the forward flight attendant notified us the cabin was quickly filling with smoke. We let them know that we saw it too and were taking measures. At this time the captain already had the aircraft properly configured for an emergency descent and was trying to communicate with center; while I was repositioning my mask and goggles; without any results. I noticed his inability and tried on my side. Again the controller couldn't understand the request. During this time; the flight attendants attempted to contact us 2-3 more times without us being able to communicate. We both then rechked the confign of the audio control panel for suggested positioning and they were both set properly. After reaching frustration; I resigned to having to talk with one hand on the handheld microphone and one on the oxygen mask. While this solved the communication problem; it proved to be extremely costly as far as utilizing my hands for other tasks such as opening the manual to the proper pages. The captain noticed that the only way for us to communicate with each other was to lift the mask with 1 hand. He was able to communicate to me that I should get the emergency checklist that is provided in the stowage bin to the first officer's right. I retrieved the list and noticed that checklist for smoke in the cockpit is the memory items. I showed the captain the completed list and put the checklist away. At this time; the captain had his hands full flying the plane and I had my hands full communicating with controllers and attempting to read the checklists for descent and landing when I could. At this time; both the captain and I reverted back to just being pilots and doing our job with what we had available. This includes information that we didn't have. At no time during this ordeal did we have any indication of where the smoke was coming from and; in my mind; not having any clues from the airplane via the multi-function warning system made it worse because we couldn't even attempt to add logic to the situation other than something is burning and it very well could be close to the cockpit if we were getting that much smoke. At around this point; we broke out into visual conditions and started looking for the field that the controller was attempting to send us to. After failing to initially find the intended field; we noticed the race track and the airfield associated with it. At this point the captain made the decision that we would land there and I agreed. It was obvious that the strip was long enough to not be an issue. The controller then informed us that it was a 6000 ft runway and gave us the appropriate frequencys. We then completed the final checklist and made the landing. We discussed; in the air; if an emergency evacuate/evacuation should be executed after stopping and the captain decided to examine the situation further before ordering the evacuate/evacuation. I completely agreed. After stopping on the ramp; I opened the cockpit door to find that most of the smoke was at the top of the cabin and didn't have any indication that any passenger was in any immediate danger. We then had the flight attendants open the doors. Once we opened the doors; we noticed fluid flowing from the #2 engine drain mast. Further examination showed it was oil. Again; the multi-function warning system never once gave any indications. Personally; I feel that the emergency was handled well by all 4 members of the flight crew; given the hurdles that we had to deal with. Without help from the airplane; information and communication alike; and with the short amount of time that it took from the beginning of the emergency to shutdown; I can't stress enough how difficult it was to get every suggested procedure completed. We did what we could with the given variables. Both of the flight attendants remained extremely calm and; therefore; represented the appropriate demeanor to keep the passenger calm. This assessment was verified later by many passenger.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN AVRO 85 (BAE146) EXPERIENCED COCKPIT CABIN SMOKE. THE CREW COMPLETED AN EMER DSCNT TO AND LNDG AT OUTLYING ARPT.

Narrative: THE FOLLOWING IS AN ACCOUNT OF THE EVENTS INVOLVING AN AVRO RJ85 ON MAR/MON/05. THE FLT WAS NORMAL ON DEP; INITIAL CLB AND CRUISE. SOMEWHERE AROUND THE VICINITY OF ZZZ1 AT FL240; THE CAPT AND I SMELLED SOMETHING. APPROX 2 MINS LATER; BOTH THE CAPT AND I LOOKED AT EACH OTHER AND NOTICED SMOKE FILLING THE COCKPIT. AT THIS TIME WE KNEW SOMETHING WAS BURNING SOMEWHERE AND PROMPTLY STARTED THE MEMORY ITEMS FOR SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT AND STARTED THE EMER DSCNT. ABOUT 20-30 SECONDS AFTER WE NOTICED THE SMOKE; THE FORWARD FLT ATTENDANT NOTIFIED US THE CABIN WAS QUICKLY FILLING WITH SMOKE. WE LET THEM KNOW THAT WE SAW IT TOO AND WERE TAKING MEASURES. AT THIS TIME THE CAPT ALREADY HAD THE ACFT PROPERLY CONFIGURED FOR AN EMER DSCNT AND WAS TRYING TO COMMUNICATE WITH CTR; WHILE I WAS REPOSITIONING MY MASK AND GOGGLES; WITHOUT ANY RESULTS. I NOTICED HIS INABILITY AND TRIED ON MY SIDE. AGAIN THE CTLR COULDN'T UNDERSTAND THE REQUEST. DURING THIS TIME; THE FLT ATTENDANTS ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT US 2-3 MORE TIMES WITHOUT US BEING ABLE TO COMMUNICATE. WE BOTH THEN RECHKED THE CONFIGN OF THE AUDIO CTL PANEL FOR SUGGESTED POSITIONING AND THEY WERE BOTH SET PROPERLY. AFTER REACHING FRUSTRATION; I RESIGNED TO HAVING TO TALK WITH ONE HAND ON THE HANDHELD MIKE AND ONE ON THE OXYGEN MASK. WHILE THIS SOLVED THE COM PROB; IT PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY COSTLY AS FAR AS UTILIZING MY HANDS FOR OTHER TASKS SUCH AS OPENING THE MANUAL TO THE PROPER PAGES. THE CAPT NOTICED THAT THE ONLY WAY FOR US TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER WAS TO LIFT THE MASK WITH 1 HAND. HE WAS ABLE TO COMMUNICATE TO ME THAT I SHOULD GET THE EMER CHKLIST THAT IS PROVIDED IN THE STOWAGE BIN TO THE FO'S R. I RETRIEVED THE LIST AND NOTICED THAT CHKLIST FOR SMOKE IN THE COCKPIT IS THE MEMORY ITEMS. I SHOWED THE CAPT THE COMPLETED LIST AND PUT THE CHKLIST AWAY. AT THIS TIME; THE CAPT HAD HIS HANDS FULL FLYING THE PLANE AND I HAD MY HANDS FULL COMMUNICATING WITH CTLRS AND ATTEMPTING TO READ THE CHKLISTS FOR DSCNT AND LNDG WHEN I COULD. AT THIS TIME; BOTH THE CAPT AND I REVERTED BACK TO JUST BEING PLTS AND DOING OUR JOB WITH WHAT WE HAD AVAILABLE. THIS INCLUDES INFO THAT WE DIDN'T HAVE. AT NO TIME DURING THIS ORDEAL DID WE HAVE ANY INDICATION OF WHERE THE SMOKE WAS COMING FROM AND; IN MY MIND; NOT HAVING ANY CLUES FROM THE AIRPLANE VIA THE MULTI-FUNCTION WARNING SYS MADE IT WORSE BECAUSE WE COULDN'T EVEN ATTEMPT TO ADD LOGIC TO THE SIT OTHER THAN SOMETHING IS BURNING AND IT VERY WELL COULD BE CLOSE TO THE COCKPIT IF WE WERE GETTING THAT MUCH SMOKE. AT AROUND THIS POINT; WE BROKE OUT INTO VISUAL CONDITIONS AND STARTED LOOKING FOR THE FIELD THAT THE CTLR WAS ATTEMPTING TO SEND US TO. AFTER FAILING TO INITIALLY FIND THE INTENDED FIELD; WE NOTICED THE RACE TRACK AND THE AIRFIELD ASSOCIATED WITH IT. AT THIS POINT THE CAPT MADE THE DECISION THAT WE WOULD LAND THERE AND I AGREED. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THE STRIP WAS LONG ENOUGH TO NOT BE AN ISSUE. THE CTLR THEN INFORMED US THAT IT WAS A 6000 FT RWY AND GAVE US THE APPROPRIATE FREQS. WE THEN COMPLETED THE FINAL CHKLIST AND MADE THE LNDG. WE DISCUSSED; IN THE AIR; IF AN EMER EVAC SHOULD BE EXECUTED AFTER STOPPING AND THE CAPT DECIDED TO EXAMINE THE SIT FURTHER BEFORE ORDERING THE EVAC. I COMPLETELY AGREED. AFTER STOPPING ON THE RAMP; I OPENED THE COCKPIT DOOR TO FIND THAT MOST OF THE SMOKE WAS AT THE TOP OF THE CABIN AND DIDN'T HAVE ANY INDICATION THAT ANY PAX WAS IN ANY IMMEDIATE DANGER. WE THEN HAD THE FLT ATTENDANTS OPEN THE DOORS. ONCE WE OPENED THE DOORS; WE NOTICED FLUID FLOWING FROM THE #2 ENG DRAIN MAST. FURTHER EXAMINATION SHOWED IT WAS OIL. AGAIN; THE MULTI-FUNCTION WARNING SYS NEVER ONCE GAVE ANY INDICATIONS. PERSONALLY; I FEEL THAT THE EMER WAS HANDLED WELL BY ALL 4 MEMBERS OF THE FLT CREW; GIVEN THE HURDLES THAT WE HAD TO DEAL WITH. WITHOUT HELP FROM THE AIRPLANE; INFO AND COM ALIKE; AND WITH THE SHORT AMOUNT OF TIME THAT IT TOOK FROM THE BEGINNING OF THE EMER TO SHUTDOWN; I CAN'T STRESS ENOUGH HOW DIFFICULT IT WAS TO GET EVERY SUGGESTED PROC COMPLETED. WE DID WHAT WE COULD WITH THE GIVEN VARIABLES. BOTH OF THE FLT ATTENDANTS REMAINED EXTREMELY CALM AND; THEREFORE; REPRESENTED THE APPROPRIATE DEMEANOR TO KEEP THE PAX CALM. THIS ASSESSMENT WAS VERIFIED LATER BY MANY PAX.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.