Narrative:

This encompasses 3 flts. The APU failed to start in ZZZ1. After coordination with maintenance; it was determined that the APU starter had failed and the APU was deferred. We received a new MEL; pulled and collared the applicable circuit breakers; and coordination with dispatch for release to ZZZ2. Dispatch said ZZZ2 could not accept aircraft with the APU deferred. Maintenance coordination with operations and said ZZZ2 did indeed have a gpu for starting. After some discussion; we departed for ZZZ2. The following morning; after exactly 9 hours at the hotel and our report time reduced to 30 mins; we were ready for a ground pneumatic air start. At starter rotation; pneumatic pressure decreased from 40 psi to 10 psi and the start automatic aborted due to a hung start. We checked the gpu -- it was for an rj; not an airbus; and had insufficient volume of air to turn the engine. Again; after much coordination with maintenance and the station; an air bottle was obtained from another carrier and we performed a manual start using a stored air bottle. We were able to keep all engine parameters within limits for the start; but just barely. We flew from ZZZ2 to ZZZ1 and then had to consider whether or not to take the airplane from ZZZ1 to ZZZ3. It had a deferred APU; deferred hot air valve; and deferred pack #2 primary controller. (Both packs were operating.) after coordinating with dispatch; we flew the aircraft to ZZZ3. Reasons for report: 1) the flight crew is taking on increased maintenance responsibility. Not just for verifying the status of the airplane; but for coordinating MEL compliance; and working with the ground crew to get the airplane going. 2) the ground personnel are not trained (not well trained?) in pneumatic air starts and the importance of keeping the air pressure up. What happened to the idea of scheduling an aircraft appropriate for the flight instead of putting the captain in a position to refuse the airplane close to departure time? 3) ZZZ2 does not have the appropriate ground equipment to accept an airbus with an inoperative APU. 4) minimum rest; numerous maintenance issues; additional procedures; and normal preflight planning duties coupled with a 30 min reduced report time are conspiring to set us up for an incident. This is becoming a 'normal operation' as opposed to an unusual series of events. And it is a primary reason for this report.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A PLT EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE COMPANY'S VARIOUS MAINT AND DISPATCH DECISIONS DISREGARDING THE UNDUE PRESSURE PUT ON PLTS.

Narrative: THIS ENCOMPASSES 3 FLTS. THE APU FAILED TO START IN ZZZ1. AFTER COORD WITH MAINT; IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE APU STARTER HAD FAILED AND THE APU WAS DEFERRED. WE RECEIVED A NEW MEL; PULLED AND COLLARED THE APPLICABLE CIRCUIT BREAKERS; AND COORD WITH DISPATCH FOR RELEASE TO ZZZ2. DISPATCH SAID ZZZ2 COULD NOT ACCEPT ACFT WITH THE APU DEFERRED. MAINT COORD WITH OPS AND SAID ZZZ2 DID INDEED HAVE A GPU FOR STARTING. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION; WE DEPARTED FOR ZZZ2. THE FOLLOWING MORNING; AFTER EXACTLY 9 HRS AT THE HOTEL AND OUR RPT TIME REDUCED TO 30 MINS; WE WERE READY FOR A GND PNEUMATIC AIR START. AT STARTER ROTATION; PNEUMATIC PRESSURE DECREASED FROM 40 PSI TO 10 PSI AND THE START AUTO ABORTED DUE TO A HUNG START. WE CHKED THE GPU -- IT WAS FOR AN RJ; NOT AN AIRBUS; AND HAD INSUFFICIENT VOLUME OF AIR TO TURN THE ENG. AGAIN; AFTER MUCH COORD WITH MAINT AND THE STATION; AN AIR BOTTLE WAS OBTAINED FROM ANOTHER CARRIER AND WE PERFORMED A MANUAL START USING A STORED AIR BOTTLE. WE WERE ABLE TO KEEP ALL ENG PARAMETERS WITHIN LIMITS FOR THE START; BUT JUST BARELY. WE FLEW FROM ZZZ2 TO ZZZ1 AND THEN HAD TO CONSIDER WHETHER OR NOT TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE FROM ZZZ1 TO ZZZ3. IT HAD A DEFERRED APU; DEFERRED HOT AIR VALVE; AND DEFERRED PACK #2 PRIMARY CONTROLLER. (BOTH PACKS WERE OPERATING.) AFTER COORDINATING WITH DISPATCH; WE FLEW THE ACFT TO ZZZ3. REASONS FOR RPT: 1) THE FLT CREW IS TAKING ON INCREASED MAINT RESPONSIBILITY. NOT JUST FOR VERIFYING THE STATUS OF THE AIRPLANE; BUT FOR COORDINATING MEL COMPLIANCE; AND WORKING WITH THE GND CREW TO GET THE AIRPLANE GOING. 2) THE GND PERSONNEL ARE NOT TRAINED (NOT WELL TRAINED?) IN PNEUMATIC AIR STARTS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF KEEPING THE AIR PRESSURE UP. WHAT HAPPENED TO THE IDEA OF SCHEDULING AN ACFT APPROPRIATE FOR THE FLT INSTEAD OF PUTTING THE CAPT IN A POS TO REFUSE THE AIRPLANE CLOSE TO DEP TIME? 3) ZZZ2 DOES NOT HAVE THE APPROPRIATE GND EQUIP TO ACCEPT AN AIRBUS WITH AN INOP APU. 4) MINIMUM REST; NUMEROUS MAINT ISSUES; ADDITIONAL PROCS; AND NORMAL PREFLT PLANNING DUTIES COUPLED WITH A 30 MIN REDUCED RPT TIME ARE CONSPIRING TO SET US UP FOR AN INCIDENT. THIS IS BECOMING A 'NORMAL OP' AS OPPOSED TO AN UNUSUAL SERIES OF EVENTS. AND IT IS A PRIMARY REASON FOR THIS RPT.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.