Narrative:

History: I have brought what I thought were safety issues to my manager. She told me that my job is to 'protect the ego of the captain' and not to speak up unless I was about to die. If I report safety issues or point out a captain's mistake; I fear losing my job. We were assigned a flight from eqy to orl. While at eqy; the captain ordered me to order 150 gallons (1020 pounds) of jet-a fuel. We had approximately 1200 pounds of fuel prior to the 150 gallons. The flight was scheduled 1 hour 10 mins. For the learjet 31; the approximately fuel burn is 1500 pounds. We had 2200 pounds fuel on board. I felt that was not enough fuel; but was afraid to speak up because his attitude and that of management. Once airborne; the captain looked at the estimated fuel on arrival and became very irate. He told me to ask for a higher altitude. We were level at FL370 and we requested FL400. The controller hesitated; but after we told him the situation; he worked it out. Climbing towards FL400; the captain instructed me to figure out why we were showing landing fuel to be so low. He asked me to look at the FMS to see if we had it programmed; so that it would show low fuel. While verifying the FMS; I heard the altitude warning chime. I mentioned to the captain that we were above our assigned altitude and still climbing. After using abrasive language directed towards the autoplt; he clicked the autoplt off and started a descent. We climbed to approximately FL405. As we descended; I noticed that we had a high rate of descent and mentioned that we were assigned FL400. We descended past FL400 to approximately FL396 before returning to FL400. We were later assigned FL450 for fuel flow reasons. The controllers had to move other aircraft for us to obtain the altitude. We landed with approximately 25 mins of fuel on board. My recommendations: listen to first officer's and encourage them to speak up and don't get offended if they point out a mistake. Keep cool. Involve management in safety and adhering to far's and SOP's. CRM training; as it is now; we get the same training time after time. We need new; interesting material. Lots of times CRM is ran through quickly just to 'check a box' or something we just have to 'talk about.' callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter advised that this incident; in parallel with the management policy regarding the role of subordinate crew members; was the proverbial straw that drove him to resign. He is now employed by another company performing similar duties. He emphasized his belief that the carrier has no commitment to the value of CRM and appears to only give lip service to required training in that regard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FO OF CPR LJ31 RPTS POOR CRM AND MGMNT CULTURE RESULT IN POOR COCKPIT DISCIPLINE. POOR DECISION ON FUEL REQUIRED RESULTS IN DISTR; ALTDEVS; UNWARRANTED DEMANDS ON ATC FOR ALT RELIEF AND; ULTIMATELY; LNDG WITH WELL UNDER FAR RESERVES.

Narrative: HISTORY: I HAVE BROUGHT WHAT I THOUGHT WERE SAFETY ISSUES TO MY MGR. SHE TOLD ME THAT MY JOB IS TO 'PROTECT THE EGO OF THE CAPT' AND NOT TO SPEAK UP UNLESS I WAS ABOUT TO DIE. IF I RPT SAFETY ISSUES OR POINT OUT A CAPT'S MISTAKE; I FEAR LOSING MY JOB. WE WERE ASSIGNED A FLT FROM EQY TO ORL. WHILE AT EQY; THE CAPT ORDERED ME TO ORDER 150 GALLONS (1020 LBS) OF JET-A FUEL. WE HAD APPROX 1200 LBS OF FUEL PRIOR TO THE 150 GALLONS. THE FLT WAS SCHEDULED 1 HR 10 MINS. FOR THE LEARJET 31; THE APPROX FUEL BURN IS 1500 LBS. WE HAD 2200 LBS FUEL ON BOARD. I FELT THAT WAS NOT ENOUGH FUEL; BUT WAS AFRAID TO SPEAK UP BECAUSE HIS ATTITUDE AND THAT OF MGMNT. ONCE AIRBORNE; THE CAPT LOOKED AT THE ESTIMATED FUEL ON ARR AND BECAME VERY IRATE. HE TOLD ME TO ASK FOR A HIGHER ALT. WE WERE LEVEL AT FL370 AND WE REQUESTED FL400. THE CTLR HESITATED; BUT AFTER WE TOLD HIM THE SIT; HE WORKED IT OUT. CLBING TOWARDS FL400; THE CAPT INSTRUCTED ME TO FIGURE OUT WHY WE WERE SHOWING LNDG FUEL TO BE SO LOW. HE ASKED ME TO LOOK AT THE FMS TO SEE IF WE HAD IT PROGRAMMED; SO THAT IT WOULD SHOW LOW FUEL. WHILE VERIFYING THE FMS; I HEARD THE ALT WARNING CHIME. I MENTIONED TO THE CAPT THAT WE WERE ABOVE OUR ASSIGNED ALT AND STILL CLBING. AFTER USING ABRASIVE LANGUAGE DIRECTED TOWARDS THE AUTOPLT; HE CLICKED THE AUTOPLT OFF AND STARTED A DSCNT. WE CLBED TO APPROX FL405. AS WE DSNDED; I NOTICED THAT WE HAD A HIGH RATE OF DSCNT AND MENTIONED THAT WE WERE ASSIGNED FL400. WE DSNDED PAST FL400 TO APPROX FL396 BEFORE RETURNING TO FL400. WE WERE LATER ASSIGNED FL450 FOR FUEL FLOW REASONS. THE CTLRS HAD TO MOVE OTHER ACFT FOR US TO OBTAIN THE ALT. WE LANDED WITH APPROX 25 MINS OF FUEL ON BOARD. MY RECOMMENDATIONS: LISTEN TO FO'S AND ENCOURAGE THEM TO SPEAK UP AND DON'T GET OFFENDED IF THEY POINT OUT A MISTAKE. KEEP COOL. INVOLVE MGMNT IN SAFETY AND ADHERING TO FAR'S AND SOP'S. CRM TRAINING; AS IT IS NOW; WE GET THE SAME TRAINING TIME AFTER TIME. WE NEED NEW; INTERESTING MATERIAL. LOTS OF TIMES CRM IS RAN THROUGH QUICKLY JUST TO 'CHK A BOX' OR SOMETHING WE JUST HAVE TO 'TALK ABOUT.' CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT THIS INCIDENT; IN PARALLEL WITH THE MGMNT POLICY REGARDING THE ROLE OF SUBORDINATE CREW MEMBERS; WAS THE PROVERBIAL STRAW THAT DROVE HIM TO RESIGN. HE IS NOW EMPLOYED BY ANOTHER COMPANY PERFORMING SIMILAR DUTIES. HE EMPHASIZED HIS BELIEF THAT THE CARRIER HAS NO COMMITMENT TO THE VALUE OF CRM AND APPEARS TO ONLY GIVE LIP SVC TO REQUIRED TRAINING IN THAT REGARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.