Narrative:

We pushed back from portland gate for runway 28L. I commented 'I wish we were on runway 10;' and also noticed that we were being pushed back as if we were to taxi to runway 10. (This would have been the most direct departure for ZZZ). Another carrier was taxiing in behind us in such a way that the unusual pushback direction made sense. After pushback we were heading at 340 degrees and I deliberately turned to my left because I could clear the taxiway sooner in that direction. I didn't verbalize this to my first officer. I noticed company had landed and would be clearing the runway as we taxied east on the ramp past B4. I commented that 'I should have used B4' but continued to B3 to avoid a hard left turn to reach B4. Ground then said to 'turn left on taxiway B3 and taxi to runway 28L.' I turned left onto taxiway B3 to join taxiway B; then initially turned right (west) to taxi (incorrectly) to runway 10. At the same time; my first officer and jumpseater said; 'you need runway 28L.' I started the turn back to my left to taxi east on taxiway B to runway 28L. I immediately saw that company was clearing the active runway 28L on high speed taxiway B3; so I stopped for them to clear. They also stopped for us. (They were in between the runway and taxiway B.) ground was transmitting something that seemed to take a long time to complete; especially because we saw another carrier A300 on takeoff roll. I wanted to tell company to 'pull forward immediately for aircraft on takeoff roll;' but the frequency was still in use. It seemed as if tower and ground did not see the approaching near miss. The other carrier took off at about the same time ground told us to continue to runway 28L. We departed a few mins later and I called pdx ground from ZZZ and talked to the controller who had been on the radio with us. I specifically asked if there were any problems or complications from what had taken place; and she said 'no.' this was a very eye-opening and frightening situation. I should have told my first officer why I was turning left leaving the gate area. My turn would still have been to the left for either runway because it was the fastest way for me to clear; but it may have resulted in a response from him that would have kept me from thinking 'runway 10.' ironically; if we would have continued taxiing west on taxiway B as if we were to use runway 10; the near miss would never have happened because company could have cleared expeditiously at high speed B3. I take full responsibility for trying to go to runway 10. I think I just had it in my mind because of the comment made earlier in the push. I don't think tower or ground saw the situation developing because the other carrier would never have been cleared for takeoff. I think this was a contributing factor as well since this other carrier had in fact been cleared for takeoff before company was completely clear. However; I don't know what was being said on tower frequency. There was no crew conflict in flying with my first officer. I felt well rested and the WX was good. This is an example of how quickly things can get very serious in a matter of seconds; even at a slow taxi speed. Supplemental information from acn 657610: after push from gate; we were given clearance to runway 28L. Captain mentioned 'I wish they would have given us runway 10.' I cleared the area to the right of the aircraft and was mildly surprised when he turned left instead of right; which would have been the shortest distance to runway 28L. Both were a ways out of the ramp though. At this point; a company aircraft was on landing roll on runway 28L and exited the high speed at taxiway B3. Tower noticed the direction we were taxiing and gave us explicit instructions to exit at taxiway B3 and turn left onto taxiway B for runway 28L. I wrote down and read back the instructions. As we approached taxiway B3; we began a left turn; then the captain turned right. At this point; I said (while pointing) 'no; left; left; left;' and the jumpseater said; 'you know we're going to runway 28L; right?' the company aircraft that exited at taxiway B3 held his position; still on the wrong side of the hold line (effectively still on the runway). Tower told us to 'hold your position.' we stopped; 1/2 way into the turn in time to see another air carrier A300 on takeoff roll. Company still had not exited the runway and we all held our breathas the A300 rotated and passed very; very close to company's tail. Company was on ground control and may not have even noticed the conflict. We did not hear anything from the other carrier; since they were on tower frequency. We then taxied by company; on taxiway B to runway 28L and company entered the ramp. It was clear what happened. My captain had taken the wrong route; the company aircraft saw a possible conflict and held his position (on the runway!). A common theme to stories like this is that crew members notice that they don't 'feel right' about the situation as it unfolds. I had been flying with this captain for almost 2 full days. He is very competent; flies by the book and is open to CRM. When he turned the way I wouldn't have turned on the ramp; I didn't say anything because I assumed he had a reason. I had just read back the correct runway; written it down and he had commented on how he wished we hadn't been assigned that particular runway. All this made me think he knew we were going to runway 28L. The unfortunate thing is; had he been less competent; or had he shown a tendency to make mistakes; I would have spoken up immediately; but he is such a good captain; I just assumed that he had a reason for going out the ramp the long way. Some capts don't like sweeping r-hand taxi turns on ramp areas because they can't see; so I'd seen that choice made before. What is inexplicable is why company didn't clear the runway all the way. 'Inexplicable' perhaps isn't the right word. I know he saw a potential taxi conflict and was being polite to let us go by; but the airplane was still on an active runway; still completely on the wrong side of the hold short line and on the wrong frequency. Luckily the high speed exit was long enough for a B737 tail and an A300 wing to pass. Although we caused the conflict; company had switched to ground control prior to exiting the runway; so he was no longer talking (or listening) to the tower controller who might very well have been yelling for him to exit immediately due to a widebody transport aircraft on takeoff roll. I would hope that this scary situation drives home: 1) the need to speak up when things don't 'feel right' even if your captain is great; and 2) exit the active immediately. There could be an A300 coming at you from behind that you don't know about because you switched frequencys while holding on the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A TAXI ERROR AT PDX RESULTS IN A GND CONFLICT THAT PREVENTS A B737 EXITING RWY 28L FROM COMPLETELY CLRING THE RWY WHILE AN A300 DEPARTED ON THE SAME RWY.

Narrative: WE PUSHED BACK FROM PORTLAND GATE FOR RWY 28L. I COMMENTED 'I WISH WE WERE ON RWY 10;' AND ALSO NOTICED THAT WE WERE BEING PUSHED BACK AS IF WE WERE TO TAXI TO RWY 10. (THIS WOULD HAVE BEEN THE MOST DIRECT DEP FOR ZZZ). ANOTHER CARRIER WAS TAXIING IN BEHIND US IN SUCH A WAY THAT THE UNUSUAL PUSHBACK DIRECTION MADE SENSE. AFTER PUSHBACK WE WERE HDG AT 340 DEGS AND I DELIBERATELY TURNED TO MY L BECAUSE I COULD CLR THE TXWY SOONER IN THAT DIRECTION. I DIDN'T VERBALIZE THIS TO MY FO. I NOTICED COMPANY HAD LANDED AND WOULD BE CLRING THE RWY AS WE TAXIED E ON THE RAMP PAST B4. I COMMENTED THAT 'I SHOULD HAVE USED B4' BUT CONTINUED TO B3 TO AVOID A HARD L TURN TO REACH B4. GND THEN SAID TO 'TURN L ON TXWY B3 AND TAXI TO RWY 28L.' I TURNED L ONTO TXWY B3 TO JOIN TXWY B; THEN INITIALLY TURNED R (W) TO TAXI (INCORRECTLY) TO RWY 10. AT THE SAME TIME; MY FO AND JUMPSEATER SAID; 'YOU NEED RWY 28L.' I STARTED THE TURN BACK TO MY L TO TAXI E ON TXWY B TO RWY 28L. I IMMEDIATELY SAW THAT COMPANY WAS CLRING THE ACTIVE RWY 28L ON HIGH SPD TXWY B3; SO I STOPPED FOR THEM TO CLR. THEY ALSO STOPPED FOR US. (THEY WERE IN BTWN THE RWY AND TXWY B.) GND WAS XMITTING SOMETHING THAT SEEMED TO TAKE A LONG TIME TO COMPLETE; ESPECIALLY BECAUSE WE SAW ANOTHER CARRIER A300 ON TKOF ROLL. I WANTED TO TELL COMPANY TO 'PULL FORWARD IMMEDIATELY FOR ACFT ON TKOF ROLL;' BUT THE FREQ WAS STILL IN USE. IT SEEMED AS IF TWR AND GND DID NOT SEE THE APCHING NEAR MISS. THE OTHER CARRIER TOOK OFF AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME GND TOLD US TO CONTINUE TO RWY 28L. WE DEPARTED A FEW MINS LATER AND I CALLED PDX GND FROM ZZZ AND TALKED TO THE CTLR WHO HAD BEEN ON THE RADIO WITH US. I SPECIFICALLY ASKED IF THERE WERE ANY PROBS OR COMPLICATIONS FROM WHAT HAD TAKEN PLACE; AND SHE SAID 'NO.' THIS WAS A VERY EYE-OPENING AND FRIGHTENING SIT. I SHOULD HAVE TOLD MY FO WHY I WAS TURNING L LEAVING THE GATE AREA. MY TURN WOULD STILL HAVE BEEN TO THE L FOR EITHER RWY BECAUSE IT WAS THE FASTEST WAY FOR ME TO CLR; BUT IT MAY HAVE RESULTED IN A RESPONSE FROM HIM THAT WOULD HAVE KEPT ME FROM THINKING 'RWY 10.' IRONICALLY; IF WE WOULD HAVE CONTINUED TAXIING W ON TXWY B AS IF WE WERE TO USE RWY 10; THE NEAR MISS WOULD NEVER HAVE HAPPENED BECAUSE COMPANY COULD HAVE CLRED EXPEDITIOUSLY AT HIGH SPD B3. I TAKE FULL RESPONSIBILITY FOR TRYING TO GO TO RWY 10. I THINK I JUST HAD IT IN MY MIND BECAUSE OF THE COMMENT MADE EARLIER IN THE PUSH. I DON'T THINK TWR OR GND SAW THE SIT DEVELOPING BECAUSE THE OTHER CARRIER WOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF. I THINK THIS WAS A CONTRIBUTING FACTOR AS WELL SINCE THIS OTHER CARRIER HAD IN FACT BEEN CLRED FOR TKOF BEFORE COMPANY WAS COMPLETELY CLR. HOWEVER; I DON'T KNOW WHAT WAS BEING SAID ON TWR FREQ. THERE WAS NO CREW CONFLICT IN FLYING WITH MY FO. I FELT WELL RESTED AND THE WX WAS GOOD. THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF HOW QUICKLY THINGS CAN GET VERY SERIOUS IN A MATTER OF SECONDS; EVEN AT A SLOW TAXI SPD. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 657610: AFTER PUSH FROM GATE; WE WERE GIVEN CLRNC TO RWY 28L. CAPT MENTIONED 'I WISH THEY WOULD HAVE GIVEN US RWY 10.' I CLRED THE AREA TO THE R OF THE ACFT AND WAS MILDLY SURPRISED WHEN HE TURNED L INSTEAD OF R; WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN THE SHORTEST DISTANCE TO RWY 28L. BOTH WERE A WAYS OUT OF THE RAMP THOUGH. AT THIS POINT; A COMPANY ACFT WAS ON LNDG ROLL ON RWY 28L AND EXITED THE HIGH SPD AT TXWY B3. TWR NOTICED THE DIRECTION WE WERE TAXIING AND GAVE US EXPLICIT INSTRUCTIONS TO EXIT AT TXWY B3 AND TURN L ONTO TXWY B FOR RWY 28L. I WROTE DOWN AND READ BACK THE INSTRUCTIONS. AS WE APCHED TXWY B3; WE BEGAN A L TURN; THEN THE CAPT TURNED R. AT THIS POINT; I SAID (WHILE POINTING) 'NO; L; L; L;' AND THE JUMPSEATER SAID; 'YOU KNOW WE'RE GOING TO RWY 28L; RIGHT?' THE COMPANY ACFT THAT EXITED AT TXWY B3 HELD HIS POS; STILL ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE HOLD LINE (EFFECTIVELY STILL ON THE RWY). TWR TOLD US TO 'HOLD YOUR POS.' WE STOPPED; 1/2 WAY INTO THE TURN IN TIME TO SEE ANOTHER ACR A300 ON TKOF ROLL. COMPANY STILL HAD NOT EXITED THE RWY AND WE ALL HELD OUR BREATHAS THE A300 ROTATED AND PASSED VERY; VERY CLOSE TO COMPANY'S TAIL. COMPANY WAS ON GND CTL AND MAY NOT HAVE EVEN NOTICED THE CONFLICT. WE DID NOT HEAR ANYTHING FROM THE OTHER CARRIER; SINCE THEY WERE ON TWR FREQ. WE THEN TAXIED BY COMPANY; ON TXWY B TO RWY 28L AND COMPANY ENTERED THE RAMP. IT WAS CLR WHAT HAPPENED. MY CAPT HAD TAKEN THE WRONG RTE; THE COMPANY ACFT SAW A POSSIBLE CONFLICT AND HELD HIS POS (ON THE RWY!). A COMMON THEME TO STORIES LIKE THIS IS THAT CREW MEMBERS NOTICE THAT THEY DON'T 'FEEL RIGHT' ABOUT THE SIT AS IT UNFOLDS. I HAD BEEN FLYING WITH THIS CAPT FOR ALMOST 2 FULL DAYS. HE IS VERY COMPETENT; FLIES BY THE BOOK AND IS OPEN TO CRM. WHEN HE TURNED THE WAY I WOULDN'T HAVE TURNED ON THE RAMP; I DIDN'T SAY ANYTHING BECAUSE I ASSUMED HE HAD A REASON. I HAD JUST READ BACK THE CORRECT RWY; WRITTEN IT DOWN AND HE HAD COMMENTED ON HOW HE WISHED WE HADN'T BEEN ASSIGNED THAT PARTICULAR RWY. ALL THIS MADE ME THINK HE KNEW WE WERE GOING TO RWY 28L. THE UNFORTUNATE THING IS; HAD HE BEEN LESS COMPETENT; OR HAD HE SHOWN A TENDENCY TO MAKE MISTAKES; I WOULD HAVE SPOKEN UP IMMEDIATELY; BUT HE IS SUCH A GOOD CAPT; I JUST ASSUMED THAT HE HAD A REASON FOR GOING OUT THE RAMP THE LONG WAY. SOME CAPTS DON'T LIKE SWEEPING R-HAND TAXI TURNS ON RAMP AREAS BECAUSE THEY CAN'T SEE; SO I'D SEEN THAT CHOICE MADE BEFORE. WHAT IS INEXPLICABLE IS WHY COMPANY DIDN'T CLR THE RWY ALL THE WAY. 'INEXPLICABLE' PERHAPS ISN'T THE RIGHT WORD. I KNOW HE SAW A POTENTIAL TAXI CONFLICT AND WAS BEING POLITE TO LET US GO BY; BUT THE AIRPLANE WAS STILL ON AN ACTIVE RWY; STILL COMPLETELY ON THE WRONG SIDE OF THE HOLD SHORT LINE AND ON THE WRONG FREQ. LUCKILY THE HIGH SPD EXIT WAS LONG ENOUGH FOR A B737 TAIL AND AN A300 WING TO PASS. ALTHOUGH WE CAUSED THE CONFLICT; COMPANY HAD SWITCHED TO GND CTL PRIOR TO EXITING THE RWY; SO HE WAS NO LONGER TALKING (OR LISTENING) TO THE TWR CTLR WHO MIGHT VERY WELL HAVE BEEN YELLING FOR HIM TO EXIT IMMEDIATELY DUE TO A WDB ACFT ON TKOF ROLL. I WOULD HOPE THAT THIS SCARY SIT DRIVES HOME: 1) THE NEED TO SPEAK UP WHEN THINGS DON'T 'FEEL RIGHT' EVEN IF YOUR CAPT IS GREAT; AND 2) EXIT THE ACTIVE IMMEDIATELY. THERE COULD BE AN A300 COMING AT YOU FROM BEHIND THAT YOU DON'T KNOW ABOUT BECAUSE YOU SWITCHED FREQS WHILE HOLDING ON THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.