Narrative:

I was the PF. As we approached msp; we got the ATIS; which indicated good visibility; winds of 9 KTS; scattered clouds at 2700 ft; with runways 12L and 12R in use. So; I planned on making a visual approach to runway 12R with ILS back-up. Somewhere around the time we were issued our initial descent clearance from center; we received another report from our company via ACARS that thunderstorms were approaching the field. Center advised that aircraft were getting in using runway 4. The general feeling I got from center was that if we kept our speed up we could beat the storm to the field and land. As we approached the field; I briefed the ILS runway 4 approach. We were given vectors onto a base leg for runway 4 and told to reduce to 210 KTS. Our radar showed heavy precipitation to the left of the approach course. I advised the first officer we would fly the approach a little faster (vref +10 KTS) due to conditions. I also had the first officer advise ATC that if we made a missed approach; we wanted to turn right instead of left; as published. We were turned onto final and told to reduce to 170 KTS. The autoplt was coupled. We were told to maintain 170 KTS to the FAF and were cleared for the approach. At vagey; I called for flaps 40 degrees and the landing check and reduced to vga (140 KTS). At that point there were dark clouds to our left; we were in light rain; and the turbulence was light with occasional moderate. The tower then reported the wind as about a 15 KT crosswind. The aircraft ahead of us landed and said he had broken out at minimums (200 ft AGL). The tower then reported the winds as a 17 KT crosswind. It seemed suitable to continue the approach at this point. We were stabilized on the approach with the autoplt coupled. The rain intensity then increased to moderate and we turned on the wipers. The tower then reported a windshear with a loss of 15 KTS. We did not see any indication of windshear on our airspeed indicators during the approach. At or slightly prior to the decision altitude of 1032 ft; the first officer called the approach lights in sight. I also saw them and called landing. We saw the runway lights shortly thereafter. I disconnected the autoplt at about 75 ft AGL. As we descended through about 50 ft; the rain intensity increased again. However; I could still see the runway lights; though with great difficulty. I considered going around at that point but felt that at that ht; landing would be the safest course of action. And if I did make a missed approach; I wasn't sure of what we would be flying into at that point. On touchdown; the spoilers deployed normally and I pulled the reverser levers to the detents. However; immediately after touchdown; we began drifting to the right. The aircraft seemed to be sliding with the tail out to the right a few degrees. I was applying left rudder; but didn't want to put too much rudder in because I thought it would increase the slide. I could see us right on the edge of the runway; and felt what I assumed to be the right main gear hitting the runway lights. The aircraft began responding back toward the center of the runway and I applied maximum reverse. The rollout from that point on was relatively normal; though it was raining very heavily. I called our maintenance; explained the situation and asked to be towed to the gate. After parking the aircraft at the gate; I inspected the right main gear. The brake lines had been torn loose. Also; there was a dent in the right inboard part of the flap. I think this incident was caused by the greatly increased rain intensity at approximately 50 ft AGL; coupled with a strong crosswind from the left. I think the airplane was hydroplaning initially; which allowed the wind to blow us to the right. Also; the heavy rain made it quite difficult to judge the airplane's position relative to the centerline prior to touchdown. My actions during the approach were based on the belief that we could beat the storm to the field. And; based on the WX information we were receiving as the approach progressed; as well as what we were seeing from the cockpit; a mandatory go around was not required. If I would have known what was coming at 50 ft AGL over the runway; I would have broken off the approach. But I didn't. In the future; I am never; ever going to try and beat an approaching storm into an airport if there's any question whatsoever of the outcome. And; if I get into a situation of ever-worsening conditions as the approach progresses; I'll go around. Supplemental information from acn 668550: we touched down in the touchdown zone. I looked up and saw that the plane was drifting to the right and announced ot the captain 'we're drifting to the right.' we continued to drift to the right and I announced 'we're drifting to the right; push on the left rudder.' finally; to help stop the drift; I stepped on the left rudder as hard as I could to help out. The plane started to go back toward the center of the runway.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: DC9 FLT CREW ELECTED TO CONTINUE WITH LNDG DESPITE HVY RAIN; XWIND; AND RPTED WINDSHEAR. ACFT DRIFTED R ON ROLLOUT; STRIKING RWY EDGE LIGHTS; BEFORE BEING BROUGHT BACK TO CTRLINE.

Narrative: I WAS THE PF. AS WE APCHED MSP; WE GOT THE ATIS; WHICH INDICATED GOOD VISIBILITY; WINDS OF 9 KTS; SCATTERED CLOUDS AT 2700 FT; WITH RWYS 12L AND 12R IN USE. SO; I PLANNED ON MAKING A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 12R WITH ILS BACK-UP. SOMEWHERE AROUND THE TIME WE WERE ISSUED OUR INITIAL DSCNT CLRNC FROM CTR; WE RECEIVED ANOTHER RPT FROM OUR COMPANY VIA ACARS THAT TSTMS WERE APCHING THE FIELD. CTR ADVISED THAT ACFT WERE GETTING IN USING RWY 4. THE GENERAL FEELING I GOT FROM CTR WAS THAT IF WE KEPT OUR SPD UP WE COULD BEAT THE STORM TO THE FIELD AND LAND. AS WE APCHED THE FIELD; I BRIEFED THE ILS RWY 4 APCH. WE WERE GIVEN VECTORS ONTO A BASE LEG FOR RWY 4 AND TOLD TO REDUCE TO 210 KTS. OUR RADAR SHOWED HVY PRECIP TO THE L OF THE APCH COURSE. I ADVISED THE FO WE WOULD FLY THE APCH A LITTLE FASTER (VREF +10 KTS) DUE TO CONDITIONS. I ALSO HAD THE FO ADVISE ATC THAT IF WE MADE A MISSED APCH; WE WANTED TO TURN R INSTEAD OF L; AS PUBLISHED. WE WERE TURNED ONTO FINAL AND TOLD TO REDUCE TO 170 KTS. THE AUTOPLT WAS COUPLED. WE WERE TOLD TO MAINTAIN 170 KTS TO THE FAF AND WERE CLRED FOR THE APCH. AT VAGEY; I CALLED FOR FLAPS 40 DEGS AND THE LNDG CHK AND REDUCED TO VGA (140 KTS). AT THAT POINT THERE WERE DARK CLOUDS TO OUR L; WE WERE IN LIGHT RAIN; AND THE TURB WAS LIGHT WITH OCCASIONAL MODERATE. THE TWR THEN RPTED THE WIND AS ABOUT A 15 KT XWIND. THE ACFT AHEAD OF US LANDED AND SAID HE HAD BROKEN OUT AT MINIMUMS (200 FT AGL). THE TWR THEN RPTED THE WINDS AS A 17 KT XWIND. IT SEEMED SUITABLE TO CONTINUE THE APCH AT THIS POINT. WE WERE STABILIZED ON THE APCH WITH THE AUTOPLT COUPLED. THE RAIN INTENSITY THEN INCREASED TO MODERATE AND WE TURNED ON THE WIPERS. THE TWR THEN RPTED A WINDSHEAR WITH A LOSS OF 15 KTS. WE DID NOT SEE ANY INDICATION OF WINDSHEAR ON OUR AIRSPD INDICATORS DURING THE APCH. AT OR SLIGHTLY PRIOR TO THE DECISION ALT OF 1032 FT; THE FO CALLED THE APCH LIGHTS IN SIGHT. I ALSO SAW THEM AND CALLED LNDG. WE SAW THE RWY LIGHTS SHORTLY THEREAFTER. I DISCONNECTED THE AUTOPLT AT ABOUT 75 FT AGL. AS WE DSNDED THROUGH ABOUT 50 FT; THE RAIN INTENSITY INCREASED AGAIN. HOWEVER; I COULD STILL SEE THE RWY LIGHTS; THOUGH WITH GREAT DIFFICULTY. I CONSIDERED GOING AROUND AT THAT POINT BUT FELT THAT AT THAT HT; LNDG WOULD BE THE SAFEST COURSE OF ACTION. AND IF I DID MAKE A MISSED APCH; I WASN'T SURE OF WHAT WE WOULD BE FLYING INTO AT THAT POINT. ON TOUCHDOWN; THE SPOILERS DEPLOYED NORMALLY AND I PULLED THE REVERSER LEVERS TO THE DETENTS. HOWEVER; IMMEDIATELY AFTER TOUCHDOWN; WE BEGAN DRIFTING TO THE R. THE ACFT SEEMED TO BE SLIDING WITH THE TAIL OUT TO THE R A FEW DEGS. I WAS APPLYING L RUDDER; BUT DIDN'T WANT TO PUT TOO MUCH RUDDER IN BECAUSE I THOUGHT IT WOULD INCREASE THE SLIDE. I COULD SEE US RIGHT ON THE EDGE OF THE RWY; AND FELT WHAT I ASSUMED TO BE THE R MAIN GEAR HITTING THE RWY LIGHTS. THE ACFT BEGAN RESPONDING BACK TOWARD THE CTR OF THE RWY AND I APPLIED MAX REVERSE. THE ROLLOUT FROM THAT POINT ON WAS RELATIVELY NORMAL; THOUGH IT WAS RAINING VERY HEAVILY. I CALLED OUR MAINT; EXPLAINED THE SITUATION AND ASKED TO BE TOWED TO THE GATE. AFTER PARKING THE ACFT AT THE GATE; I INSPECTED THE R MAIN GEAR. THE BRAKE LINES HAD BEEN TORN LOOSE. ALSO; THERE WAS A DENT IN THE R INBOARD PART OF THE FLAP. I THINK THIS INCIDENT WAS CAUSED BY THE GREATLY INCREASED RAIN INTENSITY AT APPROX 50 FT AGL; COUPLED WITH A STRONG XWIND FROM THE L. I THINK THE AIRPLANE WAS HYDROPLANING INITIALLY; WHICH ALLOWED THE WIND TO BLOW US TO THE R. ALSO; THE HVY RAIN MADE IT QUITE DIFFICULT TO JUDGE THE AIRPLANE'S POS RELATIVE TO THE CTRLINE PRIOR TO TOUCHDOWN. MY ACTIONS DURING THE APCH WERE BASED ON THE BELIEF THAT WE COULD BEAT THE STORM TO THE FIELD. AND; BASED ON THE WX INFO WE WERE RECEIVING AS THE APCH PROGRESSED; AS WELL AS WHAT WE WERE SEEING FROM THE COCKPIT; A MANDATORY GAR WAS NOT REQUIRED. IF I WOULD HAVE KNOWN WHAT WAS COMING AT 50 FT AGL OVER THE RWY; I WOULD HAVE BROKEN OFF THE APCH. BUT I DIDN'T. IN THE FUTURE; I AM NEVER; EVER GOING TO TRY AND BEAT AN APCHING STORM INTO AN ARPT IF THERE'S ANY QUESTION WHATSOEVER OF THE OUTCOME. AND; IF I GET INTO A SITUATION OF EVER-WORSENING CONDITIONS AS THE APCH PROGRESSES; I'LL GO AROUND. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 668550: WE TOUCHED DOWN IN THE TOUCHDOWN ZONE. I LOOKED UP AND SAW THAT THE PLANE WAS DRIFTING TO THE R AND ANNOUNCED OT THE CAPT 'WE'RE DRIFTING TO THE R.' WE CONTINUED TO DRIFT TO THE R AND I ANNOUNCED 'WE'RE DRIFTING TO THE R; PUSH ON THE L RUDDER.' FINALLY; TO HELP STOP THE DRIFT; I STEPPED ON THE L RUDDER AS HARD AS I COULD TO HELP OUT. THE PLANE STARTED TO GO BACK TOWARD THE CTR OF THE RWY.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.