Narrative:

Aircraft X had experienced a couple of in-flight stall warnings on #1 engine when throttles were retarded at top of climb. Various work directives were generated by maintenance control to determine the cause and accomplish an operational confirmation flight to try and verify the fix. Various components were changed and a missing snap ring installed; without conclusively finding a cause. A maintenance supervisor; a fleet engineer on site; an engine maintenance controller and myself; a lead amt; all agreed that a confirmation flight was prudent to try and verify a fix before revenue flight. Based on this decision; I signed the log write-up off documenting all the work performed and signed a maintenance release for a confirmation flight. The aircraft was scheduled for this confirmation flight. After an inbound flight was canceled that morning because of a mechanical problem up-line on another aircraft; aircraft X was rescheduled for a revenue flight out of ZZZ. The aircraft subsequently flew the trip and several others with no further stall indications. Maintenance operations procedures were followed in instituting the confirmation flight with maintenance control approval. There is no procedure for overriding that decision in the manual; nor was there any documentation to authority/authorized that change in procedures. I feel the danger to the passenger and crew was minimal in a worst case scenario; but I feel there was a serious breakdown in procedures. The maintenance release I signed does not differentiate the type of flight authority/authorized; so I had no control over the changes in scheduling implemented by operations control and maintenance control after I left work. I also feel the engine controller I had received authority/authorized from for the operations conference flight was also exposed to the same violations of procedures without any knowledge on his part. I have brought this matter to the attention of our chief inspector and the maintenance control quality assurance administrator in hopes of preventing similar occurrences.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A320 SCHEDULED FOR A TEST FLT TO CONFIRM FIX ON ENG STALL IS ROUTED ON A REVENUE FLT. MAINT RELEASE SIGNED BY LEAD TECHNICIAN INDICATED TEST FLT TO BE PERFORMED.

Narrative: ACFT X HAD EXPERIENCED A COUPLE OF INFLT STALL WARNINGS ON #1 ENG WHEN THROTTLES WERE RETARDED AT TOP OF CLB. VARIOUS WORK DIRECTIVES WERE GENERATED BY MAINT CTL TO DETERMINE THE CAUSE AND ACCOMPLISH AN OPERATIONAL CONFIRMATION FLT TO TRY AND VERIFY THE FIX. VARIOUS COMPONENTS WERE CHANGED AND A MISSING SNAP RING INSTALLED; WITHOUT CONCLUSIVELY FINDING A CAUSE. A MAINT SUPVR; A FLEET ENGINEER ON SITE; AN ENG MAINT CTLR AND MYSELF; A LEAD AMT; ALL AGREED THAT A CONFIRMATION FLT WAS PRUDENT TO TRY AND VERIFY A FIX BEFORE REVENUE FLT. BASED ON THIS DECISION; I SIGNED THE LOG WRITE-UP OFF DOCUMENTING ALL THE WORK PERFORMED AND SIGNED A MAINT RELEASE FOR A CONFIRMATION FLT. THE ACFT WAS SCHEDULED FOR THIS CONFIRMATION FLT. AFTER AN INBOUND FLT WAS CANCELED THAT MORNING BECAUSE OF A MECHANICAL PROB UP-LINE ON ANOTHER ACFT; ACFT X WAS RESCHEDULED FOR A REVENUE FLT OUT OF ZZZ. THE ACFT SUBSEQUENTLY FLEW THE TRIP AND SEVERAL OTHERS WITH NO FURTHER STALL INDICATIONS. MAINT OPS PROCS WERE FOLLOWED IN INSTITUTING THE CONFIRMATION FLT WITH MAINT CTL APPROVAL. THERE IS NO PROC FOR OVERRIDING THAT DECISION IN THE MANUAL; NOR WAS THERE ANY DOCUMENTATION TO AUTH THAT CHANGE IN PROCS. I FEEL THE DANGER TO THE PAX AND CREW WAS MINIMAL IN A WORST CASE SCENARIO; BUT I FEEL THERE WAS A SERIOUS BREAKDOWN IN PROCS. THE MAINT RELEASE I SIGNED DOES NOT DIFFERENTIATE THE TYPE OF FLT AUTH; SO I HAD NO CTL OVER THE CHANGES IN SCHEDULING IMPLEMENTED BY OPS CTL AND MAINT CTL AFTER I LEFT WORK. I ALSO FEEL THE ENG CONTROLLER I HAD RECEIVED AUTH FROM FOR THE OPS CONFERENCE FLT WAS ALSO EXPOSED TO THE SAME VIOLATIONS OF PROCS WITHOUT ANY KNOWLEDGE ON HIS PART. I HAVE BROUGHT THIS MATTER TO THE ATTN OF OUR CHIEF INSPECTOR AND THE MAINT CTL QUALITY ASSURANCE ADMINISTRATOR IN HOPES OF PREVENTING SIMILAR OCCURRENCES.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.