Narrative:

Flight X was scheduled service from nrt with a B777-200 aircraft. It is a double augmented flight with 1 captain and 3 type rated first officer's. The 'flying' first officer was the designated pilot for this leg. The flight departed nrt on time at XA19 in nrt. The active runway at nrt was runway 16R which is over 13000 ft long. There was a 3 KT headwind and the runway surface was dry. Takeoff commenced at XA35. The initial portion of the takeoff roll was normal. At 115-120 KTS; the master warning system activated with a 'confign gear steering EICAS' message. After a 2-3 second delay; the captain assumed control of the aircraft and began rejected takeoff procedures. The speed at initiation of rejection was 125-130 KTS. Computed V1 was 171 KTS. The captain deactivated the autobrakes rejected takeoff feature with foot pressure and slowed the aircraft using minimal braking and reverse thrust over the remaining 7000 ft of runway. The aircraft was taxied clear of the runway and stopped on the parallel taxiway. The brakes were left off. The crew consulted the flight manual for brake cooling considerations and procedures. Local operations were notified of the situation. Mechanics came out to the aircraft to make an initial determination of potential damage to the landing gear and brakes. No damage was observed. The crew contacted air carrier dispatch and maintenance for discussion of the situation. After a suitable delay to allow brake cooling; the aircraft was taxied to the terminal for further inspection of the tires; landing gear and brakes. It was determined that there was no damage to the aircraft as a result of the rejected takeoff. It was also determined that there was no structural failure of the main gear steering unit. The main gear steering was deactivated and plans were made to redispatch the aircraft and crew. At XC18 the flight departed the gate. A normal takeoff and flight began at XC40. The subsequent flight was normal. Procedures are in place to prevent unnecessary aborts at high speeds. I make a point of briefing the decision points between low speed and high speed aborts on every flight. This speed normally coincides with the '80 KTS thrust set' call. I brief that before this point we are in a 'stop' mode to a degree; but once the 80 KTS call is made; we are definitely in the 'go' mode unless the aircraft is deemed unsafe to fly. When I reflect on my decision to abort at a speed higher than 80 KTS; I recall several thoughts going through my mind in the 2-3 seconds before the takeoff was rejected. These were: 1) in my mind; we had barely gone past the 80 KTS call and when I began the rejection procedure; I truly believed the speed was no more than 100-110 KTS; leaving sufficient runway to stop without using maximum energy braking. Both non flying first officer's remember seeing the speed in the 125-130 KT range; so our speed was higher than I thought. The resulting stopping maneuver did not require unusual braking forces. In fact; I was thinking that we might not have heated the brakes to the point of requiring a delay. The brakes did; however; heat up to the point that a delay of slightly over 1 hour was required to allow cooling. 2) it occurred to me that if we became airborne and had a serious main landing gear problem; we would have to deal with a high speed landing. I would rather deal with it on the ground; given what I felt was a relatively low speed. 3) the confign gear steering warning is very loud and repetitive. It cannot be silenced. It is; by design; meant to grab the crew's attention. I found the warning so loud and distracting that it may have been a factor in making my decision to abort. It would not deactivate until V1. It is a very compelling warning. Pilots are conditioned to stop when they hear it since it normally occurs when takeoff thrust is set. I had this warning once before at a speed of 50 KTS and rejected that takeoff also. I find myself thinking that warnings like this should be inhibited earlier in the takeoff roll so they will not occur at speeds at which aborting is not appropriate. 4) after the fact; I realized very quickly that all my reasoning did not put me on the right side of air carrier policy. I should have continued the takeoff. I was very surprised in that I thought all my reasoning was correct at the moment of decision. It is very difficult for anyone to really stay on top of the situation given the nature of our widebody transport international flying. That is; very few legs and flying most of our takeoffs if far away time zones. I have proven to myself that practice in simulators and briefing procedures will not always overcome human instincts.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A B777 CAPT QUESTIONS; AFTER THE FACT; HIS DECISION TO ABORT A TKOF IN WHAT MIGHT BE PERCEIVED AS NON COMPLIANCE WITH COMPANY POLICY REGARDING HIGH SPD ABORTS.

Narrative: FLT X WAS SCHEDULED SVC FROM NRT WITH A B777-200 ACFT. IT IS A DOUBLE AUGMENTED FLT WITH 1 CAPT AND 3 TYPE RATED FO'S. THE 'FLYING' FO WAS THE DESIGNATED PLT FOR THIS LEG. THE FLT DEPARTED NRT ON TIME AT XA19 IN NRT. THE ACTIVE RWY AT NRT WAS RWY 16R WHICH IS OVER 13000 FT LONG. THERE WAS A 3 KT HEADWIND AND THE RWY SURFACE WAS DRY. TKOF COMMENCED AT XA35. THE INITIAL PORTION OF THE TKOF ROLL WAS NORMAL. AT 115-120 KTS; THE MASTER WARNING SYS ACTIVATED WITH A 'CONFIGN GEAR STEERING EICAS' MESSAGE. AFTER A 2-3 SECOND DELAY; THE CAPT ASSUMED CTL OF THE ACFT AND BEGAN REJECTED TKOF PROCS. THE SPD AT INITIATION OF REJECTION WAS 125-130 KTS. COMPUTED V1 WAS 171 KTS. THE CAPT DEACTIVATED THE AUTOBRAKES REJECTED TKOF FEATURE WITH FOOT PRESSURE AND SLOWED THE ACFT USING MINIMAL BRAKING AND REVERSE THRUST OVER THE REMAINING 7000 FT OF RWY. THE ACFT WAS TAXIED CLR OF THE RWY AND STOPPED ON THE PARALLEL TXWY. THE BRAKES WERE LEFT OFF. THE CREW CONSULTED THE FLT MANUAL FOR BRAKE COOLING CONSIDERATIONS AND PROCS. LCL OPS WERE NOTIFIED OF THE SIT. MECHS CAME OUT TO THE ACFT TO MAKE AN INITIAL DETERMINATION OF POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO THE LNDG GEAR AND BRAKES. NO DAMAGE WAS OBSERVED. THE CREW CONTACTED ACR DISPATCH AND MAINT FOR DISCUSSION OF THE SIT. AFTER A SUITABLE DELAY TO ALLOW BRAKE COOLING; THE ACFT WAS TAXIED TO THE TERMINAL FOR FURTHER INSPECTION OF THE TIRES; LNDG GEAR AND BRAKES. IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO DAMAGE TO THE ACFT AS A RESULT OF THE REJECTED TKOF. IT WAS ALSO DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS NO STRUCTURAL FAILURE OF THE MAIN GEAR STEERING UNIT. THE MAIN GEAR STEERING WAS DEACTIVATED AND PLANS WERE MADE TO REDISPATCH THE ACFT AND CREW. AT XC18 THE FLT DEPARTED THE GATE. A NORMAL TKOF AND FLT BEGAN AT XC40. THE SUBSEQUENT FLT WAS NORMAL. PROCS ARE IN PLACE TO PREVENT UNNECESSARY ABORTS AT HIGH SPDS. I MAKE A POINT OF BRIEFING THE DECISION POINTS BTWN LOW SPD AND HIGH SPD ABORTS ON EVERY FLT. THIS SPD NORMALLY COINCIDES WITH THE '80 KTS THRUST SET' CALL. I BRIEF THAT BEFORE THIS POINT WE ARE IN A 'STOP' MODE TO A DEGREE; BUT ONCE THE 80 KTS CALL IS MADE; WE ARE DEFINITELY IN THE 'GO' MODE UNLESS THE ACFT IS DEEMED UNSAFE TO FLY. WHEN I REFLECT ON MY DECISION TO ABORT AT A SPD HIGHER THAN 80 KTS; I RECALL SEVERAL THOUGHTS GOING THROUGH MY MIND IN THE 2-3 SECONDS BEFORE THE TKOF WAS REJECTED. THESE WERE: 1) IN MY MIND; WE HAD BARELY GONE PAST THE 80 KTS CALL AND WHEN I BEGAN THE REJECTION PROC; I TRULY BELIEVED THE SPD WAS NO MORE THAN 100-110 KTS; LEAVING SUFFICIENT RWY TO STOP WITHOUT USING MAX ENERGY BRAKING. BOTH NON FLYING FO'S REMEMBER SEEING THE SPD IN THE 125-130 KT RANGE; SO OUR SPD WAS HIGHER THAN I THOUGHT. THE RESULTING STOPPING MANEUVER DID NOT REQUIRE UNUSUAL BRAKING FORCES. IN FACT; I WAS THINKING THAT WE MIGHT NOT HAVE HEATED THE BRAKES TO THE POINT OF REQUIRING A DELAY. THE BRAKES DID; HOWEVER; HEAT UP TO THE POINT THAT A DELAY OF SLIGHTLY OVER 1 HR WAS REQUIRED TO ALLOW COOLING. 2) IT OCCURRED TO ME THAT IF WE BECAME AIRBORNE AND HAD A SERIOUS MAIN LNDG GEAR PROB; WE WOULD HAVE TO DEAL WITH A HIGH SPD LNDG. I WOULD RATHER DEAL WITH IT ON THE GND; GIVEN WHAT I FELT WAS A RELATIVELY LOW SPD. 3) THE CONFIGN GEAR STEERING WARNING IS VERY LOUD AND REPETITIVE. IT CANNOT BE SILENCED. IT IS; BY DESIGN; MEANT TO GRAB THE CREW'S ATTN. I FOUND THE WARNING SO LOUD AND DISTRACTING THAT IT MAY HAVE BEEN A FACTOR IN MAKING MY DECISION TO ABORT. IT WOULD NOT DEACTIVATE UNTIL V1. IT IS A VERY COMPELLING WARNING. PLTS ARE CONDITIONED TO STOP WHEN THEY HEAR IT SINCE IT NORMALLY OCCURS WHEN TKOF THRUST IS SET. I HAD THIS WARNING ONCE BEFORE AT A SPD OF 50 KTS AND REJECTED THAT TKOF ALSO. I FIND MYSELF THINKING THAT WARNINGS LIKE THIS SHOULD BE INHIBITED EARLIER IN THE TKOF ROLL SO THEY WILL NOT OCCUR AT SPDS AT WHICH ABORTING IS NOT APPROPRIATE. 4) AFTER THE FACT; I REALIZED VERY QUICKLY THAT ALL MY REASONING DID NOT PUT ME ON THE RIGHT SIDE OF ACR POLICY. I SHOULD HAVE CONTINUED THE TKOF. I WAS VERY SURPRISED IN THAT I THOUGHT ALL MY REASONING WAS CORRECT AT THE MOMENT OF DECISION. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ANYONE TO REALLY STAY ON TOP OF THE SIT GIVEN THE NATURE OF OUR WDB INTL FLYING. THAT IS; VERY FEW LEGS AND FLYING MOST OF OUR TKOFS IF FAR AWAY TIME ZONES. I HAVE PROVEN TO MYSELF THAT PRACTICE IN SIMULATORS AND BRIEFING PROCS WILL NOT ALWAYS OVERCOME HUMAN INSTINCTS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.