Narrative:

This violation occurred because of a communication breakdown or 'glitch.' as our operation is currently configured; the accuracy of weight and balance figures depends on coordination among gate agents; baggage handlers; and assistant dispatchers. When this violation occurred; the responsible assistant dispatcher was trying to communication to the flight crew regarding discrepancies among the various types of data entry items on his computer screen. I became involved when the assistant dispatcher who had planned this load came to me for help in restoring communication with the flight crew -- the flight was under my operational control; and headed for jamestown; nd. When I checked my plot (co flight monitoring system); the aircraft had pushed back; my display (computer program) indicated it was still on the ground in minneapolis. In other words; he was 'out' but not 'off.' repeated attempts to raise the flight crew on the radio were to no avail -- it is not unusual for aircrews to be very busy at push time; and the cross traffic on the frequencies they monitor could very easily be such that our hails were not getting through. Our first idea was to get the plane back to the gate for a bag check -- the question being which set the load figures were accurate: the 'finalized' figures based on SOP routine? Last-second entries made by the gate agent? A 'guesstimate' based on what ramp personnel recalled seeing on the baggage cart? Was it possible the aircraft had been loaded in such a fashion that no accurate weight and balance data was on hand? The assistant dispatcher was trying to reconstruct events in order to pin down precisely how the airplane had actually been loaded. The assistant dispatcher -- who also holds a commercial pilot's rating -- thought the flight was lighter than the official load plan indicated. The real concern was whether the load was distributed according the that plan; or whether the aircraft was out of its center of gravity limit. Unstated between us was the fear that the aircraft (a saab 340); if loaded improperly; could even take off within the load envelope but burn fuel off into an out-of-limit condition at some point en route. Proper load planning -- assuming the cabin crew and baggage handlers follow that load plan ensures that this will not happen. It was clear to both of us that the flight crew was most likely convinced they had proper numbers; and either unaware of or unconcerned about whatever discrepancies there might have been. The flight became airborne while we were still trying to reach them on the radio to get them back to the gate. My understanding of our procedure at this point is that; in the event the flight crew experienced any pitch instability on takeoff or climb; the PIC could request a 'bag audit.' this would be a formal inspection of the aircraft as loaded; and could trigger such actions as safety counseling; retraining; maintenance inspections; company reporting; or the removal of passenger or cargo. It is not something management likes to get into. Since we had no indication the flight crew had encountered any difficulty in the takeoff; we concluded that a quick 'bag check' should be performed at the destination; since the plane was scheduled to continue on from there on one last leg of flying. At the very least; we might gain some information that would help determine how the mistake was made; and which figures were correct. It would also prevent the flight from very possibly taking off a second time in an out-of-limit condition. The bag check revealed a 150 pound discrepancy between the final figures and the actual loading of the aircraft -- the flight was 150 pounds lighter than the numbers showed it to be. It turned out to be loaded within center of gravity limits; but the truth of the matter was nobody knew that at the time it took off. Undoubtedly; among the contributing factors here was the fact that there had been a flurry of 'eleventh hour' aircraft swaps -- airplanes fueled for one trip were suddenly assigned to different legs. Differences in aircraft empty weight; a passenger added or removed from the manifest; gate changes; lack of understanding of flight mechanics on thepart of ramp and gate personnel (in particular the physics of weight and balance as they apply to airline transport loading practices); 'user surly' computer interfaces and non-intuitive data entry procedures may well have added to the confusion. The organizational culture does place and emphasis on staying on-schedule; and this time-pressure can translate into 'short cutting' or cutting corners especially when procedures and the reasons behind them are not well understood. The fact that assistant dispatchers -- who are dedicated to the load control function -- have limited communication options can tend to frustrate their attempts to reach crews. If they need to radio a flight; they must work with a dispatcher -- they have no radio equipment at their workstations. Our airline has an as soon as possible program in place -- however; it is not open to participation by dispatchers or assistant dispatchers at this time. While some load control issues have found their way into as soon as possible reports; this aspect of our operation and the challenges it represents might benefit from the additional scrutiny a more inclusive as soon as possible process could bring to bear. An internal report on the incident was filed by the assistant dispatcher.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DISPATCHER FOR A REGIONAL ACR DISCUSSES THE PROBS ASSOCIATED WITH GETTING ACCURATE REVISIONS TO TKOF WT AND BAL DATA TO FLT CREWS.

Narrative: THIS VIOLATION OCCURRED BECAUSE OF A COM BREAKDOWN OR 'GLITCH.' AS OUR OP IS CURRENTLY CONFIGURED; THE ACCURACY OF WT AND BALANCE FIGURES DEPENDS ON COORD AMONG GATE AGENTS; BAGGAGE HANDLERS; AND ASSISTANT DISPATCHERS. WHEN THIS VIOLATION OCCURRED; THE RESPONSIBLE ASSISTANT DISPATCHER WAS TRYING TO COM TO THE FLT CREW REGARDING DISCREPANCIES AMONG THE VARIOUS TYPES OF DATA ENTRY ITEMS ON HIS COMPUTER SCREEN. I BECAME INVOLVED WHEN THE ASSISTANT DISPATCHER WHO HAD PLANNED THIS LOAD CAME TO ME FOR HELP IN RESTORING COM WITH THE FLT CREW -- THE FLT WAS UNDER MY OPERATIONAL CTL; AND HEADED FOR JAMESTOWN; ND. WHEN I CHKED MY PLOT (CO FLT MONITORING SYS); THE ACFT HAD PUSHED BACK; MY DISPLAY (COMPUTER PROGRAM) INDICATED IT WAS STILL ON THE GND IN MINNEAPOLIS. IN OTHER WORDS; HE WAS 'OUT' BUT NOT 'OFF.' REPEATED ATTEMPTS TO RAISE THE FLT CREW ON THE RADIO WERE TO NO AVAIL -- IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR AIRCREWS TO BE VERY BUSY AT PUSH TIME; AND THE CROSS TFC ON THE FREQUENCIES THEY MONITOR COULD VERY EASILY BE SUCH THAT OUR HAILS WERE NOT GETTING THROUGH. OUR FIRST IDEA WAS TO GET THE PLANE BACK TO THE GATE FOR A BAG CHECK -- THE QUESTION BEING WHICH SET THE LOAD FIGURES WERE ACCURATE: THE 'FINALIZED' FIGURES BASED ON SOP ROUTINE? LAST-SECOND ENTRIES MADE BY THE GATE AGENT? A 'GUESSTIMATE' BASED ON WHAT RAMP PERSONNEL RECALLED SEEING ON THE BAGGAGE CART? WAS IT POSSIBLE THE ACFT HAD BEEN LOADED IN SUCH A FASHION THAT NO ACCURATE WT AND BAL DATA WAS ON HAND? THE ASSISTANT DISPATCHER WAS TRYING TO RECONSTRUCT EVENTS IN ORDER TO PIN DOWN PRECISELY HOW THE AIRPLANE HAD ACTUALLY BEEN LOADED. THE ASSISTANT DISPATCHER -- WHO ALSO HOLDS A COMMERCIAL PLT'S RATING -- THOUGHT THE FLT WAS LIGHTER THAN THE OFFICIAL LOAD PLAN INDICATED. THE REAL CONCERN WAS WHETHER THE LOAD WAS DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING THE THAT PLAN; OR WHETHER THE ACFT WAS OUT OF ITS CTR OF GRAVITY LIMIT. UNSTATED BETWEEN US WAS THE FEAR THAT THE ACFT (A SAAB 340); IF LOADED IMPROPERLY; COULD EVEN TAKE OFF WITHIN THE LOAD ENVELOPE BUT BURN FUEL OFF INTO AN OUT-OF-LIMIT CONDITION AT SOME POINT ENRTE. PROPER LOAD PLANNING -- ASSUMING THE CABIN CREW AND BAGGAGE HANDLERS FOLLOW THAT LOAD PLAN ENSURES THAT THIS WILL NOT HAPPEN. IT WAS CLR TO BOTH OF US THAT THE FLT CREW WAS MOST LIKELY CONVINCED THEY HAD PROPER NUMBERS; AND EITHER UNAWARE OF OR UNCONCERNED ABOUT WHATEVER DISCREPANCIES THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN. THE FLT BECAME AIRBORNE WHILE WE WERE STILL TRYING TO REACH THEM ON THE RADIO TO GET THEM BACK TO THE GATE. MY UNDERSTANDING OF OUR PROC AT THIS POINT IS THAT; IN THE EVENT THE FLT CREW EXPERIENCED ANY PITCH INSTABILITY ON TAKEOFF OR CLB; THE PIC COULD REQUEST A 'BAG AUDIT.' THIS WOULD BE A FORMAL INSPECTION OF THE ACFT AS LOADED; AND COULD TRIGGER SUCH ACTIONS AS SAFETY COUNSELING; RETRAINING; MAINT INSPECTIONS; COMPANY RPTING; OR THE REMOVAL OF PAX OR CARGO. IT IS NOT SOMETHING MANAGEMENT LIKES TO GET INTO. SINCE WE HAD NO INDICATION THE FLT CREW HAD ENCOUNTERED ANY DIFFICULTY IN THE TAKEOFF; WE CONCLUDED THAT A QUICK 'BAG CHK' SHOULD BE PERFORMED AT THE DEST; SINCE THE PLANE WAS SCHEDULED TO CONTINUE ON FROM THERE ON ONE LAST LEG OF FLYING. AT THE VERY LEAST; WE MIGHT GAIN SOME INFO THAT WOULD HELP DETERMINE HOW THE MISTAKE WAS MADE; AND WHICH FIGURES WERE CORRECT. IT WOULD ALSO PREVENT THE FLT FROM VERY POSSIBLY TAKING OFF A SECOND TIME IN AN OUT-OF-LIMIT CONDITION. THE BAG CHECK REVEALED A 150 LB DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE FINAL FIGURES AND THE ACTUAL LOADING OF THE ACFT -- THE FLT WAS 150 LBS LIGHTER THAN THE NUMBERS SHOWED IT TO BE. IT TURNED OUT TO BE LOADED WITHIN CTR OF GRAVITY LIMITS; BUT THE TRUTH OF THE MATTER WAS NOBODY KNEW THAT AT THE TIME IT TOOK OFF. UNDOUBTEDLY; AMONG THE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS HERE WAS THE FACT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A FLURRY OF 'ELEVENTH HOUR' ACFT SWAPS -- AIRPLANES FUELED FOR ONE TRIP WERE SUDDENLY ASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT LEGS. DIFFERENCES IN ACFT EMPTY WEIGHT; A PAX ADDED OR REMOVED FROM THE MANIFEST; GATE CHANGES; LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF FLT MECHANICS ON THEPART OF RAMP AND GATE PERSONNEL (IN PARTICULAR THE PHYSICS OF WT AND BAL AS THEY APPLY TO AIRLINE TRANSPORT LOADING PRACTICES); 'USER SURLY' COMPUTER INTERFACES AND NON-INTUITIVE DATA ENTRY PROCS MAY WELL HAVE ADDED TO THE CONFUSION. THE ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE DOES PLACE AND EMPHASIS ON STAYING ON-SCHEDULE; AND THIS TIME-PRESSURE CAN TRANSLATE INTO 'SHORT CUTTING' OR CUTTING CORNERS ESPECIALLY WHEN PROCS AND THE REASONS BEHIND THEM ARE NOT WELL UNDERSTOOD. THE FACT THAT ASSISTANT DISPATCHERS -- WHO ARE DEDICATED TO THE LOAD CTL FUNCTION -- HAVE LIMITED COM OPTIONS CAN TEND TO FRUSTRATE THEIR ATTEMPTS TO REACH CREWS. IF THEY NEED TO RADIO A FLT; THEY MUST WORK WITH A DISPATCHER -- THEY HAVE NO RADIO EQUIPMENT AT THEIR WORKSTATIONS. OUR AIRLINE HAS AN ASAP PROGRAM IN PLACE -- HOWEVER; IT IS NOT OPEN TO PARTICIPATION BY DISPATCHERS OR ASSISTANT DISPATCHERS AT THIS TIME. WHILE SOME LOAD CTL ISSUES HAVE FOUND THEIR WAY INTO ASAP RPTS; THIS ASPECT OF OUR OP AND THE CHALLENGES IT REPRESENTS MIGHT BENEFIT FROM THE ADDITIONAL SCRUTINY A MORE INCLUSIVE ASAP PROCESS COULD BRING TO BEAR. AN INTERNAL RPT ON THE INCIDENT WAS FILED BY THE ASSISTANT DISPATCHER.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.