Narrative:

Evacuate/evacuation flight. I was notified of this assignment at around XA30. The initial plan was an XK25 deadhead to aus and then 2 msy turns that evening. I met the captain on the bus and we went over the situation in msy en route to the airport. We pulled up flight papers and an aircraft performance message for msy as we were advised ACARS was OTS. We were delayed about 30 mins waiting for mechanics. Upon arrival at aus; we learned our turns to msy were canceled for the evening and that we would go the following morning at XA00. We made hotel arrangements; which were changed again and left with the flight attendants for the layover hotel. I got to my room some time after XO00. There was a group of people and a convention at my end of the hall. Unable to sleep; I got up around XQ00 and put in earplugs in order to get some sleep. I woke up at XV00 for an XW00 pick-up. We went to aus operations and pulled up paperwork for our flight to msy. We were initially planning on returning to aus but were subsequently told to plan on crp. Dispatch faxed us charts for crp and navy corpus (ngp); which we reviewed. We were told at that time that msy operations was open and ACARS was up. Our flight left from the hard stand with a mix of company personnel in the back and was uneventful. We landed at msy and after about a 30 min delay; blocked in at XH03. The next 4 hours can only be described as surreal. I think I made more decisions in those 4 hours than in the last 4 yrs at air carrier. After securing the airplane and heading to msy operations; it was clear that we would be there for a while. The computer was unavailable; there were no phones working in operations; and operations had no VHF radio. We were told air carrier wanted us to use our onboard fuel to return from crp to aus if possible. I asked if flying overwater to shorten the distance to crp was an option under part 91 with my captain and with the flight manager. He approved this for our specific flight. He told us to do what made sense; as we would obviously have to be flexible given the situation. We headed back to the jet planning on going to crp. Our destination soon changed to navy corpus christi; then to aus; then to elp; then to elp with a fuel stop in lubbock. At some point; fuel became available and our destination changed to elp with no fuel stop; this changed to launch and go to elp but be ready to divert to bif. Each change created the need to return to operations and get as much information as possible. We eventually ended up diverting to bif once airborne. Between flight plans; we lost power to the jet at least once; resulting in a new alignment and FMC load. We had a steady stream of company and government people coming on board to ask questions. We picked up 4 federal air marshals who gave me an extensive brief on what had occurred at the airport to that point and the fact that they would ride along. (They had confiscated over 300 guns in the preceding 24 hours; there had been some stabbings outside the terminal and some beatings.) tsa somehow got involved in where the federal air marshals would situation in the jet. This conflicted with federal air marshal SOP and I needed to get involved to sort that out. Each trip to meet someone new; or into operations to call dispatch resulted in a trip to the lavatory to wash our hands per our briefings. While most of this was going on; the captain was trying to talk to dispatch on the sometimes working blackberry or get people from the tsa give us some passenger to evacuate/evacuation before our APU burn further limited our destination options. We finally got some fuel; but tsa only wanted to give us 50 passenger despite having room for 123. The captain literally negotiated for the rest. Somewhere in this process; it came to our attention that we had a passenger with 5 kids and a 6TH in the hospital in sat. The captain began working with headquarters for permission to take this family back to aus on our return from elp/bif. My cell phone was intermittent; but the system was so busy I only got 1 call through to dispatch before being cut off. The captain's blackberry was intermittent. ACARS could receive but not send. We kept getting questions that we couldn't answer; so iwas off to try and find my captain or someone with a phone to relay answers back to dispatch. At some point (I've lost track of time by now) we got some passenger and a destination confirmed and began boarding. The FMC was loaded and ready; so I assisted with boarding and helping to track the number of open seats and the number of wheelchairs we would need in elp/bif. The physical state of the passenger was shocking. There were federal air marshals; tsa's; airport; emergency team; 2 in-flight supervisors; and mechanics in the boarding area. Everyone was trying to tell the flight attendants how to board and they needed someone to keep the many 'chiefs' at bay. Needless to say; this was not a standard boarding. Before we were fully loaded; tsa told us we had to leave the airport as other airplanes needed to get to the gate. We left; a bit rushed; with 8 open seats. When we briefed; we were on release #5. We discussed fatigue and the irregular operations as CRM issues for the flight. We had a normal start and taxi. Ground operations looked like something out of apocalypse now. There was a non-stop flow of helicopters on the airport. Some flying; some taxiing; many passing low enough over our aircraft to make the jet physically shudder. It was a bit unnerving to have the airplane shudder and suddenly see a shadow out of the corner of your eye. The first couple of times I thought we'd been hit by something; it was just a shadow of the rotors over the ground and rotor wash. Trying to get a word in to ground frequency was worse than trying to talk to ord ground. On the taxi out; we lost all ACARS communication. We had no radio communications with operations; and knew their phone was down. It was clear we weren't going to get final weights from the company; there just wasn't a communications link. Our count was below our planned weight manifest by 8. We had performance data for runways 1 and 28. Runway 28 would be legal based on the preflight data. We conservatively planned on 200 pounds per passenger and estimated our takeoff weight at 124200 pounds. 2000 pounds below our performance limit weight; and well above our planned weight. Our passenger only had a few trash bags of clothes in the pits so we knew we had no cargo to speak of. (Actual takeoff weight came up on ACARS right after takeoff at 119000 pounds.) based on our understanding of part 91 rules (we thought we could go in this case); and the need to evacuate/evacuation the people on board; we elected to take off without final weights. We felt our weight would only have changed slightly from the plan since we were supposed to come in and pick up just people. We used our planned trim setting and used maximum thrust with the captain flying. The takeoff was uneventful. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. In retrospect; it might have been better for us to coordination with another agency to make a phone call to dispatch for us; but the 'who' was lost on me. I was pretty overwhelmed by everything that I'd seen there. We really couldn't get a word in with ground because of the help operations and tower was equally busy. This situation provides an example; albeit rare; of the need to put additional performance data in the flight manual so the crew can calculate weight and balance information. It also highlights the need for reliable communications between the company and its aircraft given the way we normally operate our jets. We rely on an infrastructure that is not present in an operation like this.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: FLT CREW OF B737-300 RELATE HARROWING TALE OF EVAC FLT.

Narrative: EVAC FLT. I WAS NOTIFIED OF THIS ASSIGNMENT AT AROUND XA30. THE INITIAL PLAN WAS AN XK25 DEADHEAD TO AUS AND THEN 2 MSY TURNS THAT EVENING. I MET THE CAPT ON THE BUS AND WE WENT OVER THE SIT IN MSY ENRTE TO THE ARPT. WE PULLED UP FLT PAPERS AND AN ACFT PERFORMANCE MESSAGE FOR MSY AS WE WERE ADVISED ACARS WAS OTS. WE WERE DELAYED ABOUT 30 MINS WAITING FOR MECHS. UPON ARR AT AUS; WE LEARNED OUR TURNS TO MSY WERE CANCELED FOR THE EVENING AND THAT WE WOULD GO THE FOLLOWING MORNING AT XA00. WE MADE HOTEL ARRANGEMENTS; WHICH WERE CHANGED AGAIN AND LEFT WITH THE FLT ATTENDANTS FOR THE LAYOVER HOTEL. I GOT TO MY ROOM SOME TIME AFTER XO00. THERE WAS A GROUP OF PEOPLE AND A CONVENTION AT MY END OF THE HALL. UNABLE TO SLEEP; I GOT UP AROUND XQ00 AND PUT IN EARPLUGS IN ORDER TO GET SOME SLEEP. I WOKE UP AT XV00 FOR AN XW00 PICK-UP. WE WENT TO AUS OPS AND PULLED UP PAPERWORK FOR OUR FLT TO MSY. WE WERE INITIALLY PLANNING ON RETURNING TO AUS BUT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY TOLD TO PLAN ON CRP. DISPATCH FAXED US CHARTS FOR CRP AND NAVY CORPUS (NGP); WHICH WE REVIEWED. WE WERE TOLD AT THAT TIME THAT MSY OPS WAS OPEN AND ACARS WAS UP. OUR FLT LEFT FROM THE HARD STAND WITH A MIX OF COMPANY PERSONNEL IN THE BACK AND WAS UNEVENTFUL. WE LANDED AT MSY AND AFTER ABOUT A 30 MIN DELAY; BLOCKED IN AT XH03. THE NEXT 4 HRS CAN ONLY BE DESCRIBED AS SURREAL. I THINK I MADE MORE DECISIONS IN THOSE 4 HRS THAN IN THE LAST 4 YRS AT ACR. AFTER SECURING THE AIRPLANE AND HEADING TO MSY OPS; IT WAS CLR THAT WE WOULD BE THERE FOR A WHILE. THE COMPUTER WAS UNAVAILABLE; THERE WERE NO PHONES WORKING IN OPS; AND OPS HAD NO VHF RADIO. WE WERE TOLD ACR WANTED US TO USE OUR ONBOARD FUEL TO RETURN FROM CRP TO AUS IF POSSIBLE. I ASKED IF FLYING OVERWATER TO SHORTEN THE DISTANCE TO CRP WAS AN OPTION UNDER PART 91 WITH MY CAPT AND WITH THE FLT MGR. HE APPROVED THIS FOR OUR SPECIFIC FLT. HE TOLD US TO DO WHAT MADE SENSE; AS WE WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE FLEXIBLE GIVEN THE SIT. WE HEADED BACK TO THE JET PLANNING ON GOING TO CRP. OUR DEST SOON CHANGED TO NAVY CORPUS CHRISTI; THEN TO AUS; THEN TO ELP; THEN TO ELP WITH A FUEL STOP IN LUBBOCK. AT SOME POINT; FUEL BECAME AVAILABLE AND OUR DEST CHANGED TO ELP WITH NO FUEL STOP; THIS CHANGED TO LAUNCH AND GO TO ELP BUT BE READY TO DIVERT TO BIF. EACH CHANGE CREATED THE NEED TO RETURN TO OPS AND GET AS MUCH INFO AS POSSIBLE. WE EVENTUALLY ENDED UP DIVERTING TO BIF ONCE AIRBORNE. BTWN FLT PLANS; WE LOST PWR TO THE JET AT LEAST ONCE; RESULTING IN A NEW ALIGNMENT AND FMC LOAD. WE HAD A STEADY STREAM OF COMPANY AND GOV PEOPLE COMING ON BOARD TO ASK QUESTIONS. WE PICKED UP 4 FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS WHO GAVE ME AN EXTENSIVE BRIEF ON WHAT HAD OCCURRED AT THE ARPT TO THAT POINT AND THE FACT THAT THEY WOULD RIDE ALONG. (THEY HAD CONFISCATED OVER 300 GUNS IN THE PRECEDING 24 HRS; THERE HAD BEEN SOME STABBINGS OUTSIDE THE TERMINAL AND SOME BEATINGS.) TSA SOMEHOW GOT INVOLVED IN WHERE THE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS WOULD SIT IN THE JET. THIS CONFLICTED WITH FEDERAL AIR MARSHAL SOP AND I NEEDED TO GET INVOLVED TO SORT THAT OUT. EACH TRIP TO MEET SOMEONE NEW; OR INTO OPS TO CALL DISPATCH RESULTED IN A TRIP TO THE LAVATORY TO WASH OUR HANDS PER OUR BRIEFINGS. WHILE MOST OF THIS WAS GOING ON; THE CAPT WAS TRYING TO TALK TO DISPATCH ON THE SOMETIMES WORKING BLACKBERRY OR GET PEOPLE FROM THE TSA GIVE US SOME PAX TO EVAC BEFORE OUR APU BURN FURTHER LIMITED OUR DEST OPTIONS. WE FINALLY GOT SOME FUEL; BUT TSA ONLY WANTED TO GIVE US 50 PAX DESPITE HAVING ROOM FOR 123. THE CAPT LITERALLY NEGOTIATED FOR THE REST. SOMEWHERE IN THIS PROCESS; IT CAME TO OUR ATTN THAT WE HAD A PAX WITH 5 KIDS AND A 6TH IN THE HOSPITAL IN SAT. THE CAPT BEGAN WORKING WITH HEADQUARTERS FOR PERMISSION TO TAKE THIS FAMILY BACK TO AUS ON OUR RETURN FROM ELP/BIF. MY CELL PHONE WAS INTERMITTENT; BUT THE SYS WAS SO BUSY I ONLY GOT 1 CALL THROUGH TO DISPATCH BEFORE BEING CUT OFF. THE CAPT'S BLACKBERRY WAS INTERMITTENT. ACARS COULD RECEIVE BUT NOT SEND. WE KEPT GETTING QUESTIONS THAT WE COULDN'T ANSWER; SO IWAS OFF TO TRY AND FIND MY CAPT OR SOMEONE WITH A PHONE TO RELAY ANSWERS BACK TO DISPATCH. AT SOME POINT (I'VE LOST TRACK OF TIME BY NOW) WE GOT SOME PAX AND A DEST CONFIRMED AND BEGAN BOARDING. THE FMC WAS LOADED AND READY; SO I ASSISTED WITH BOARDING AND HELPING TO TRACK THE NUMBER OF OPEN SEATS AND THE NUMBER OF WHEELCHAIRS WE WOULD NEED IN ELP/BIF. THE PHYSICAL STATE OF THE PAX WAS SHOCKING. THERE WERE FEDERAL AIR MARSHALS; TSA'S; ARPT; EMER TEAM; 2 INFLT SUPVRS; AND MECHS IN THE BOARDING AREA. EVERYONE WAS TRYING TO TELL THE FLT ATTENDANTS HOW TO BOARD AND THEY NEEDED SOMEONE TO KEEP THE MANY 'CHIEFS' AT BAY. NEEDLESS TO SAY; THIS WAS NOT A STANDARD BOARDING. BEFORE WE WERE FULLY LOADED; TSA TOLD US WE HAD TO LEAVE THE ARPT AS OTHER AIRPLANES NEEDED TO GET TO THE GATE. WE LEFT; A BIT RUSHED; WITH 8 OPEN SEATS. WHEN WE BRIEFED; WE WERE ON RELEASE #5. WE DISCUSSED FATIGUE AND THE IRREGULAR OPS AS CRM ISSUES FOR THE FLT. WE HAD A NORMAL START AND TAXI. GND OPS LOOKED LIKE SOMETHING OUT OF APOCALYPSE NOW. THERE WAS A NON-STOP FLOW OF HELIS ON THE ARPT. SOME FLYING; SOME TAXIING; MANY PASSING LOW ENOUGH OVER OUR ACFT TO MAKE THE JET PHYSICALLY SHUDDER. IT WAS A BIT UNNERVING TO HAVE THE AIRPLANE SHUDDER AND SUDDENLY SEE A SHADOW OUT OF THE CORNER OF YOUR EYE. THE FIRST COUPLE OF TIMES I THOUGHT WE'D BEEN HIT BY SOMETHING; IT WAS JUST A SHADOW OF THE ROTORS OVER THE GND AND ROTOR WASH. TRYING TO GET A WORD IN TO GND FREQ WAS WORSE THAN TRYING TO TALK TO ORD GND. ON THE TAXI OUT; WE LOST ALL ACARS COM. WE HAD NO RADIO COMS WITH OPS; AND KNEW THEIR PHONE WAS DOWN. IT WAS CLR WE WEREN'T GOING TO GET FINAL WTS FROM THE COMPANY; THERE JUST WASN'T A COMS LINK. OUR COUNT WAS BELOW OUR PLANNED WT MANIFEST BY 8. WE HAD PERFORMANCE DATA FOR RWYS 1 AND 28. RWY 28 WOULD BE LEGAL BASED ON THE PREFLT DATA. WE CONSERVATIVELY PLANNED ON 200 LBS PER PAX AND ESTIMATED OUR TKOF WT AT 124200 LBS. 2000 LBS BELOW OUR PERFORMANCE LIMIT WT; AND WELL ABOVE OUR PLANNED WT. OUR PAX ONLY HAD A FEW TRASH BAGS OF CLOTHES IN THE PITS SO WE KNEW WE HAD NO CARGO TO SPEAK OF. (ACTUAL TKOF WT CAME UP ON ACARS RIGHT AFTER TKOF AT 119000 LBS.) BASED ON OUR UNDERSTANDING OF PART 91 RULES (WE THOUGHT WE COULD GO IN THIS CASE); AND THE NEED TO EVAC THE PEOPLE ON BOARD; WE ELECTED TO TAKE OFF WITHOUT FINAL WTS. WE FELT OUR WT WOULD ONLY HAVE CHANGED SLIGHTLY FROM THE PLAN SINCE WE WERE SUPPOSED TO COME IN AND PICK UP JUST PEOPLE. WE USED OUR PLANNED TRIM SETTING AND USED MAX THRUST WITH THE CAPT FLYING. THE TKOF WAS UNEVENTFUL. THE REMAINDER OF THE FLT WAS UNEVENTFUL. IN RETROSPECT; IT MIGHT HAVE BEEN BETTER FOR US TO COORD WITH ANOTHER AGENCY TO MAKE A PHONE CALL TO DISPATCH FOR US; BUT THE 'WHO' WAS LOST ON ME. I WAS PRETTY OVERWHELMED BY EVERYTHING THAT I'D SEEN THERE. WE REALLY COULDN'T GET A WORD IN WITH GND BECAUSE OF THE HELP OPS AND TWR WAS EQUALLY BUSY. THIS SIT PROVIDES AN EXAMPLE; ALBEIT RARE; OF THE NEED TO PUT ADDITIONAL PERFORMANCE DATA IN THE FLT MANUAL SO THE CREW CAN CALCULATE WT AND BAL INFO. IT ALSO HIGHLIGHTS THE NEED FOR RELIABLE COMS BTWN THE COMPANY AND ITS ACFT GIVEN THE WAY WE NORMALLY OPERATE OUR JETS. WE RELY ON AN INFRASTRUCTURE THAT IS NOT PRESENT IN AN OP LIKE THIS.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.