Narrative:

Early morning departure on sep/fri/05. Power swap from external at 5-10 mins from out time of XA20 local seemed harder than normal; but no indications of problem at that time. On pushback; we get an 'initialization not complete' message. First officer enters gallons boarded. On taxi out after second engine start power swap; we get mcdu scratch pad message 'FMS #1/FMS #2 gross weight difference.' first officer checks gross weight data on FMS #2 versus FMS #1 and says they match; so we continue. My leg to lax and out of 3000 ft AGL; I call for managed speed. It doesn't engage and a quick glance at the mcdu #1 reveals no calculated data on the ensuing points. Mcdu #2 does show data. I call for speed 250 KTS; and tell the first officer we will deal with the problem above 10000 ft. At 10000 ft; 280 KTS speed is selected and we climb to intermediate leveloff altitude of 16000 ft. I tell the copilot to take the airplane; disengage the autoplt #1; fly for a second and engage autoplt #2; which he does. I then am able to engage managed speed mode. Now airborne; we are unable to re-enter the missing fuel weight data into the orange boxes on the FMS #1. There are no other indications of problems with the FMS or related system and all circuit breakers check good. Approaching descent point on the pdz arrival in lax; we are slowed to 220 KTS for sequencing and then given 250 KTS a short while later for the descent; both of which are set in the selected speed window. During the arrival; I disengage the autoplt #2 and hand fly the airplane. The approach mode is activated and confirmed by the copilot on the FMS #2. During the later portions of the arrival; I call for 200 KTS and then 180 KTS to be in a gear down; spoilers; flaps 2 degree confign near fuelr intersection. The copilot read the v-apch speed off of the FMS #2 and then set 130 KTS for the final slow-down. We are slightly high still; but coming down nicely to glide path and visual with the runway. Pitch is shallowed; flaps 3 degrees lowered at 175 KTS and flaps full lowered at 167 KTS. I am holding 140-145 KTS in the final few hundred ft above capturing GS; slightly inside the marker and well above 1000 ft AGL; VMC. At this point I am flying pitch for airspeed in idle power. Somewhere around 800 ft; the picture begins to change and over the span of maybe 3-5 seconds the pitch requires a shallowing to avoid increasing speed. Up to this point; my left side mfd and its speed tape indications have all been normal. Now I see a fairly large increasing speed trend arrow at which point my next outside visual xchk shows the nose higher than it should be and the aircraft position relative to the runway and desired path going to the high side. Almost immediately I hear the engines spool up. The throttles are still in automatic mode and power should be at idle but a glance at the EPR gauges shows the power is up now; commensurate with the sound; the power is way up. The copilot hits the performance key on FMS #2 to verify the aircraft is in fact in the approach mode. Airspeed is now rapidly increasing; so I raise the nose and catch it at about 180-182 KTS. I also disengage the autothrottles with a double click to the red thumb button; and I pull both throttles to idle. The power does not come back. Now we are obviously no longer in a position to land the aircraft; so I initiate the go around and tell the copilot to tell the tower. I advance both throttles from the idle setting all the way to toga power and back 2 notches to the 'climb' position. This regains control of the autothrottles in the speed mode at our current speed of about 180 KTS. Tower gives us a turn to the left and a climb to 5000 ft. We remain configured at flaps 2 degrees and 180 KTS for the downwind; at which point I again tell the copilot to take the airplane and engage autoplt #2. Performance page on both FMS's then shows orange boxes for entry of new data for approach. I enter data on the FMS #1 and confirm that it xfers to FMS #2; which it does. The copilot hand flies the second approach using a selected speed of 130 KTS to an uneventful touchdown and rollout. Callback conversation with reporter revealed the following information: reporter stated that during the pushback following the 'hard' ground power shift; the crew entered the requested data and then did a quick review of the route but found no other discrepancies. After takeoff; the orange FMGC boxes on the performance page indicated the left FMGC's missing data which they were restr from re-entering because they were in-flight. The transcontinental flight was normal and the captain flew the descent and arrival by hand using the left FMGC. The application of maximum continuous power was not accompanied by a 'power lock' indication but was reset by selecting 'go around' then the flight detent. The reporter believes that the left FMGC lost confidence in the gross weight calculations being used for the v-spds and so rather than let the aircraft stall; the logic initiated the power application that would put it in a safe regime. They did not have a low vls or stall indication. Because most data entry is via the first officer's right FMGC; the reporter stated that the 'hard' power shift may have inhibited the normal 'cross talk' between the left and right FMGC's and so having not received the right FMGC's data; the left FMGC was not fully operational. Reporter has recommended that a simple checklist be developed for the crew to accomplish after the 'initialization not complete' message. He also suggested that if there is a problem with a particular FMGC; that unit not be selected for an approach.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: AN A319 EXPERIENCED A HARD ELECTRICAL SHIFT FROM GND TO SHIP'S PWR THEN EXPERIENCED AN FMGC GROSS WT DISCREPANCY RESULTING IN A GAR ON APCH.

Narrative: EARLY MORNING DEP ON SEP/FRI/05. PWR SWAP FROM EXTERNAL AT 5-10 MINS FROM OUT TIME OF XA20 LCL SEEMED HARDER THAN NORMAL; BUT NO INDICATIONS OF PROB AT THAT TIME. ON PUSHBACK; WE GET AN 'INITIALIZATION NOT COMPLETE' MESSAGE. FO ENTERS GALLONS BOARDED. ON TAXI OUT AFTER SECOND ENG START PWR SWAP; WE GET MCDU SCRATCH PAD MESSAGE 'FMS #1/FMS #2 GROSS WT DIFFERENCE.' FO CHKS GROSS WT DATA ON FMS #2 VERSUS FMS #1 AND SAYS THEY MATCH; SO WE CONTINUE. MY LEG TO LAX AND OUT OF 3000 FT AGL; I CALL FOR MANAGED SPD. IT DOESN'T ENGAGE AND A QUICK GLANCE AT THE MCDU #1 REVEALS NO CALCULATED DATA ON THE ENSUING POINTS. MCDU #2 DOES SHOW DATA. I CALL FOR SPD 250 KTS; AND TELL THE FO WE WILL DEAL WITH THE PROB ABOVE 10000 FT. AT 10000 FT; 280 KTS SPD IS SELECTED AND WE CLB TO INTERMEDIATE LEVELOFF ALT OF 16000 FT. I TELL THE COPLT TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE; DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT #1; FLY FOR A SECOND AND ENGAGE AUTOPLT #2; WHICH HE DOES. I THEN AM ABLE TO ENGAGE MANAGED SPD MODE. NOW AIRBORNE; WE ARE UNABLE TO RE-ENTER THE MISSING FUEL WT DATA INTO THE ORANGE BOXES ON THE FMS #1. THERE ARE NO OTHER INDICATIONS OF PROBS WITH THE FMS OR RELATED SYS AND ALL CIRCUIT BREAKERS CHK GOOD. APCHING DSCNT POINT ON THE PDZ ARR IN LAX; WE ARE SLOWED TO 220 KTS FOR SEQUENCING AND THEN GIVEN 250 KTS A SHORT WHILE LATER FOR THE DSCNT; BOTH OF WHICH ARE SET IN THE SELECTED SPD WINDOW. DURING THE ARR; I DISENGAGE THE AUTOPLT #2 AND HAND FLY THE AIRPLANE. THE APCH MODE IS ACTIVATED AND CONFIRMED BY THE COPLT ON THE FMS #2. DURING THE LATER PORTIONS OF THE ARR; I CALL FOR 200 KTS AND THEN 180 KTS TO BE IN A GEAR DOWN; SPOILERS; FLAPS 2 DEG CONFIGN NEAR FUELR INTXN. THE COPLT READ THE V-APCH SPD OFF OF THE FMS #2 AND THEN SET 130 KTS FOR THE FINAL SLOW-DOWN. WE ARE SLIGHTLY HIGH STILL; BUT COMING DOWN NICELY TO GLIDE PATH AND VISUAL WITH THE RWY. PITCH IS SHALLOWED; FLAPS 3 DEGS LOWERED AT 175 KTS AND FLAPS FULL LOWERED AT 167 KTS. I AM HOLDING 140-145 KTS IN THE FINAL FEW HUNDRED FT ABOVE CAPTURING GS; SLIGHTLY INSIDE THE MARKER AND WELL ABOVE 1000 FT AGL; VMC. AT THIS POINT I AM FLYING PITCH FOR AIRSPD IN IDLE PWR. SOMEWHERE AROUND 800 FT; THE PICTURE BEGINS TO CHANGE AND OVER THE SPAN OF MAYBE 3-5 SECONDS THE PITCH REQUIRES A SHALLOWING TO AVOID INCREASING SPD. UP TO THIS POINT; MY L SIDE MFD AND ITS SPD TAPE INDICATIONS HAVE ALL BEEN NORMAL. NOW I SEE A FAIRLY LARGE INCREASING SPD TREND ARROW AT WHICH POINT MY NEXT OUTSIDE VISUAL XCHK SHOWS THE NOSE HIGHER THAN IT SHOULD BE AND THE ACFT POS RELATIVE TO THE RWY AND DESIRED PATH GOING TO THE HIGH SIDE. ALMOST IMMEDIATELY I HEAR THE ENGS SPOOL UP. THE THROTTLES ARE STILL IN AUTO MODE AND PWR SHOULD BE AT IDLE BUT A GLANCE AT THE EPR GAUGES SHOWS THE PWR IS UP NOW; COMMENSURATE WITH THE SOUND; THE PWR IS WAY UP. THE COPLT HITS THE PERFORMANCE KEY ON FMS #2 TO VERIFY THE ACFT IS IN FACT IN THE APCH MODE. AIRSPD IS NOW RAPIDLY INCREASING; SO I RAISE THE NOSE AND CATCH IT AT ABOUT 180-182 KTS. I ALSO DISENGAGE THE AUTOTHROTTLES WITH A DOUBLE CLICK TO THE RED THUMB BUTTON; AND I PULL BOTH THROTTLES TO IDLE. THE PWR DOES NOT COME BACK. NOW WE ARE OBVIOUSLY NO LONGER IN A POS TO LAND THE ACFT; SO I INITIATE THE GAR AND TELL THE COPLT TO TELL THE TWR. I ADVANCE BOTH THROTTLES FROM THE IDLE SETTING ALL THE WAY TO TOGA PWR AND BACK 2 NOTCHES TO THE 'CLB' POS. THIS REGAINS CTL OF THE AUTOTHROTTLES IN THE SPD MODE AT OUR CURRENT SPD OF ABOUT 180 KTS. TWR GIVES US A TURN TO THE L AND A CLB TO 5000 FT. WE REMAIN CONFIGURED AT FLAPS 2 DEGS AND 180 KTS FOR THE DOWNWIND; AT WHICH POINT I AGAIN TELL THE COPLT TO TAKE THE AIRPLANE AND ENGAGE AUTOPLT #2. PERFORMANCE PAGE ON BOTH FMS'S THEN SHOWS ORANGE BOXES FOR ENTRY OF NEW DATA FOR APCH. I ENTER DATA ON THE FMS #1 AND CONFIRM THAT IT XFERS TO FMS #2; WHICH IT DOES. THE COPLT HAND FLIES THE SECOND APCH USING A SELECTED SPD OF 130 KTS TO AN UNEVENTFUL TOUCHDOWN AND ROLLOUT. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATED THAT DURING THE PUSHBACK FOLLOWING THE 'HARD' GND PWR SHIFT; THE CREW ENTERED THE REQUESTED DATA AND THEN DID A QUICK REVIEW OF THE RTE BUT FOUND NO OTHER DISCREPANCIES. AFTER TKOF; THE ORANGE FMGC BOXES ON THE PERFORMANCE PAGE INDICATED THE L FMGC'S MISSING DATA WHICH THEY WERE RESTR FROM RE-ENTERING BECAUSE THEY WERE INFLT. THE TRANSCONTINENTAL FLT WAS NORMAL AND THE CAPT FLEW THE DSCNT AND ARR BY HAND USING THE L FMGC. THE APPLICATION OF MAX CONTINUOUS PWR WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY A 'PWR LOCK' INDICATION BUT WAS RESET BY SELECTING 'GAR' THEN THE FLT DETENT. THE RPTR BELIEVES THAT THE L FMGC LOST CONFIDENCE IN THE GROSS WT CALCULATIONS BEING USED FOR THE V-SPDS AND SO RATHER THAN LET THE ACFT STALL; THE LOGIC INITIATED THE PWR APPLICATION THAT WOULD PUT IT IN A SAFE REGIME. THEY DID NOT HAVE A LOW VLS OR STALL INDICATION. BECAUSE MOST DATA ENTRY IS VIA THE FO'S R FMGC; THE RPTR STATED THAT THE 'HARD' PWR SHIFT MAY HAVE INHIBITED THE NORMAL 'CROSS TALK' BTWN THE L AND R FMGC'S AND SO HAVING NOT RECEIVED THE R FMGC'S DATA; THE L FMGC WAS NOT FULLY OPERATIONAL. RPTR HAS RECOMMENDED THAT A SIMPLE CHKLIST BE DEVELOPED FOR THE CREW TO ACCOMPLISH AFTER THE 'INITIALIZATION NOT COMPLETE' MESSAGE. HE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT IF THERE IS A PROB WITH A PARTICULAR FMGC; THAT UNIT NOT BE SELECTED FOR AN APCH.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.