Narrative:

This situation illustrates the growing tension between fueling for economic considerations versus fueling with a strict focus on safety of flight. At the time I originally fuel-planned my flight; reported WX (on the order of 10 mi with scattered layers at 6000 ft and 8000 ft and 11000 ft broken with a 4 point spread) and forecasts for destination triggered a 2500 pound ramp; per the company's fuel policy currently in force. This included a taxi out allowance of 200 pounds and 20 mins holding at 10000 ft. (The actual flight plan result was 2498 pounds; but policy advises us to round up to the nearest 50; even though the software only recognizes increments of 100). Because ZZZ is a busy hub; notorious for long taxi-out times; and with nexrad painting a line of level 4 convective activity; I added 300 pounds on my own initiative; bringing the ramp fuel to 2800 pounds. The senior duty supervisor on duty at the time wondered aloud; to no one in particular; if there might be some issues with destinations fogging up (this was his idea of providing his dispatchers with 'hints' on fueling). Shortly before departure; the high minimums PIC called to confer with me about the advisability of an alternate. I explained to him that there was nothing in the forecast that would trigger a legal need to list an alternate; and that he was in fact carrying 300 pounds of extra fuel (this is not readily obvious from the fuel plan summary on his release). His concern -- and I believe it was quite legitimate -- was the ever-present possibility the WX could deteriorate below the forecast. What then? We agreed to list an alternate; since the WX; easting at 24-40 KTS (with some individual cells clocked at 48 KTS and even 50 KTS); would be well out of vicinity by the time he would get there (assuming he ended up having to do that). The flight ended up ramped at 3000 pounds; to provide ample fuel for any en route deviations; along with flight time to the alternate. While I had anticipated the flight having to come as far west as ZZZ2 before proceeding north to ZZZ1; it in fact penetrated the tip of the convective line. The entire trip itself proceeded without incident of any kind. I believe blind adherence to the new fuel policy; under conditions such as these; can and will result in substantive violations of 121.647. My own shortcomings in this instance raise the question of whether I was sufficiently on top of the reported and forecast WX at the outset (121.599) and operating within the spirit (and not just the letter) of 121.619. A sidebar on contributing factors -- with exhibits: when I joined this carrier; there was a well-entrenched culture that regarded fuel in terms of safety of flight first and foremost. While over-fueling was; theoretically; something to be avoided; you were much more likely to be criticized for being on the 'thin' side. The philosophy might be summed up in the phrase; 'fuel equals time; time equals options.' in any given scenario; we were to ensure that the PIC always had an 'out.' we fueled not only to optimize the safety of flight; timeliness and overall efficiency of operation were also legitimate objectives. As we moved into the 4TH quarter of 2005; there was a marked shift. I believe the communication that most clearly denotes this shift is a memo. The second paragraph makes it clear that the preferred metric is fuel on board on touchdown. My response to the idea -- that our operation needs to look more like that of other carriers -- would be whether that also applies to our safety record (not that I am qualified to demonstrate; statistically; a direct correlation between fuel on board measured in mins of flight time remaining and accident rates). Another memo covers the transition from calculating hold fuels in pounds to calculating it in mins -- potentially an operational improvement. The problem that emerged; however; was that flight crews continued to see hold in pounds with no 'translation' to mins. Also; it has happened that software glitches could result in under-calculation of hold fuels; ie; an entry for 30 mins would produce; in pounds; something equivalent to perhaps 1/2 that flight time. Because dispatchers don't necessarily carry an intuitive feel for this X mins = Y pounds relationship; the result can be (and has been) fuelings substantially lower than planned. Finally; there is a bulletin which '...replaces section X in its entirety...' including taxi fuel tables; manual fuel computation as a back-up methodology; which references 'operational considerations.' combined with the fuel exception report; with its emphasis on reporting fuel increases; and its relative lack of focus on fuel decreases; and the still-to-be-constituted committee to review fuel use on a weekly basis; I believe the overall effect of this initiative is to move toward a much more consciously cost-driven approach to fuel planning. The result isn't a culture that ignores safety -- rather it's a culture in which the tension between economics and safety has been demonstrably intensified. We're leaving the realm of 'time is options;' and moving into the world of 'time is money.'

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: A DISPATCHER NOTES HIS ACR'S 'OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS' AND FUEL POLICIES.

Narrative: THIS SITUATION ILLUSTRATES THE GROWING TENSION BTWN FUELING FOR ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS VERSUS FUELING WITH A STRICT FOCUS ON SAFETY OF FLT. AT THE TIME I ORIGINALLY FUEL-PLANNED MY FLT; RPTED WX (ON THE ORDER OF 10 MI WITH SCATTERED LAYERS AT 6000 FT AND 8000 FT AND 11000 FT BROKEN WITH A 4 POINT SPREAD) AND FORECASTS FOR DESTINATION TRIGGERED A 2500 LB RAMP; PER THE COMPANY'S FUEL POLICY CURRENTLY IN FORCE. THIS INCLUDED A TAXI OUT ALLOWANCE OF 200 LBS AND 20 MINS HOLDING AT 10000 FT. (THE ACTUAL FLT PLAN RESULT WAS 2498 LBS; BUT POLICY ADVISES US TO ROUND UP TO THE NEAREST 50; EVEN THOUGH THE SOFTWARE ONLY RECOGNIZES INCREMENTS OF 100). BECAUSE ZZZ IS A BUSY HUB; NOTORIOUS FOR LONG TAXI-OUT TIMES; AND WITH NEXRAD PAINTING A LINE OF LEVEL 4 CONVECTIVE ACTIVITY; I ADDED 300 LBS ON MY OWN INITIATIVE; BRINGING THE RAMP FUEL TO 2800 LBS. THE SENIOR DUTY SUPVR ON DUTY AT THE TIME WONDERED ALOUD; TO NO ONE IN PARTICULAR; IF THERE MIGHT BE SOME ISSUES WITH DESTS FOGGING UP (THIS WAS HIS IDEA OF PROVIDING HIS DISPATCHERS WITH 'HINTS' ON FUELING). SHORTLY BEFORE DEP; THE HIGH MINIMUMS PIC CALLED TO CONFER WITH ME ABOUT THE ADVISABILITY OF AN ALTERNATE. I EXPLAINED TO HIM THAT THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE FORECAST THAT WOULD TRIGGER A LEGAL NEED TO LIST AN ALTERNATE; AND THAT HE WAS IN FACT CARRYING 300 LBS OF EXTRA FUEL (THIS IS NOT READILY OBVIOUS FROM THE FUEL PLAN SUMMARY ON HIS RELEASE). HIS CONCERN -- AND I BELIEVE IT WAS QUITE LEGITIMATE -- WAS THE EVER-PRESENT POSSIBILITY THE WX COULD DETERIORATE BELOW THE FORECAST. WHAT THEN? WE AGREED TO LIST AN ALTERNATE; SINCE THE WX; EASTING AT 24-40 KTS (WITH SOME INDIVIDUAL CELLS CLOCKED AT 48 KTS AND EVEN 50 KTS); WOULD BE WELL OUT OF VICINITY BY THE TIME HE WOULD GET THERE (ASSUMING HE ENDED UP HAVING TO DO THAT). THE FLT ENDED UP RAMPED AT 3000 LBS; TO PROVIDE AMPLE FUEL FOR ANY ENRTE DEVS; ALONG WITH FLT TIME TO THE ALTERNATE. WHILE I HAD ANTICIPATED THE FLT HAVING TO COME AS FAR W AS ZZZ2 BEFORE PROCEEDING N TO ZZZ1; IT IN FACT PENETRATED THE TIP OF THE CONVECTIVE LINE. THE ENTIRE TRIP ITSELF PROCEEDED WITHOUT INCIDENT OF ANY KIND. I BELIEVE BLIND ADHERENCE TO THE NEW FUEL POLICY; UNDER CONDITIONS SUCH AS THESE; CAN AND WILL RESULT IN SUBSTANTIVE VIOLATIONS OF 121.647. MY OWN SHORTCOMINGS IN THIS INSTANCE RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER I WAS SUFFICIENTLY ON TOP OF THE RPTED AND FORECAST WX AT THE OUTSET (121.599) AND OPERATING WITHIN THE SPIRIT (AND NOT JUST THE LETTER) OF 121.619. A SIDEBAR ON CONTRIBUTING FACTORS -- WITH EXHIBITS: WHEN I JOINED THIS CARRIER; THERE WAS A WELL-ENTRENCHED CULTURE THAT REGARDED FUEL IN TERMS OF SAFETY OF FLT FIRST AND FOREMOST. WHILE OVER-FUELING WAS; THEORETICALLY; SOMETHING TO BE AVOIDED; YOU WERE MUCH MORE LIKELY TO BE CRITICIZED FOR BEING ON THE 'THIN' SIDE. THE PHILOSOPHY MIGHT BE SUMMED UP IN THE PHRASE; 'FUEL EQUALS TIME; TIME EQUALS OPTIONS.' IN ANY GIVEN SCENARIO; WE WERE TO ENSURE THAT THE PIC ALWAYS HAD AN 'OUT.' WE FUELED NOT ONLY TO OPTIMIZE THE SAFETY OF FLT; TIMELINESS AND OVERALL EFFICIENCY OF OP WERE ALSO LEGITIMATE OBJECTIVES. AS WE MOVED INTO THE 4TH QUARTER OF 2005; THERE WAS A MARKED SHIFT. I BELIEVE THE COMMUNICATION THAT MOST CLRLY DENOTES THIS SHIFT IS A MEMO. THE SECOND PARAGRAPH MAKES IT CLR THAT THE PREFERRED METRIC IS FUEL ON BOARD ON TOUCHDOWN. MY RESPONSE TO THE IDEA -- THAT OUR OP NEEDS TO LOOK MORE LIKE THAT OF OTHER CARRIERS -- WOULD BE WHETHER THAT ALSO APPLIES TO OUR SAFETY RECORD (NOT THAT I AM QUALIFIED TO DEMONSTRATE; STATISTICALLY; A DIRECT CORRELATION BTWN FUEL ON BOARD MEASURED IN MINS OF FLT TIME REMAINING AND ACCIDENT RATES). ANOTHER MEMO COVERS THE TRANSITION FROM CALCULATING HOLD FUELS IN LBS TO CALCULATING IT IN MINS -- POTENTIALLY AN OPERATIONAL IMPROVEMENT. THE PROB THAT EMERGED; HOWEVER; WAS THAT FLT CREWS CONTINUED TO SEE HOLD IN LBS WITH NO 'TRANSLATION' TO MINS. ALSO; IT HAS HAPPENED THAT SOFTWARE GLITCHES COULD RESULT IN UNDER-CALCULATION OF HOLD FUELS; IE; AN ENTRY FOR 30 MINS WOULD PRODUCE; IN LBS; SOMETHING EQUIVALENT TO PERHAPS 1/2 THAT FLT TIME. BECAUSE DISPATCHERS DON'T NECESSARILY CARRY AN INTUITIVE FEEL FOR THIS X MINS = Y LBS RELATIONSHIP; THE RESULT CAN BE (AND HAS BEEN) FUELINGS SUBSTANTIALLY LOWER THAN PLANNED. FINALLY; THERE IS A BULLETIN WHICH '...REPLACES SECTION X IN ITS ENTIRETY...' INCLUDING TAXI FUEL TABLES; MANUAL FUEL COMPUTATION AS A BACK-UP METHODOLOGY; WHICH REFS 'OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.' COMBINED WITH THE FUEL EXCEPTION RPT; WITH ITS EMPHASIS ON RPTING FUEL INCREASES; AND ITS RELATIVE LACK OF FOCUS ON FUEL DECREASES; AND THE STILL-TO-BE-CONSTITUTED COMMITTEE TO REVIEW FUEL USE ON A WKLY BASIS; I BELIEVE THE OVERALL EFFECT OF THIS INITIATIVE IS TO MOVE TOWARD A MUCH MORE CONSCIOUSLY COST-DRIVEN APCH TO FUEL PLANNING. THE RESULT ISN'T A CULTURE THAT IGNORES SAFETY -- RATHER IT'S A CULTURE IN WHICH THE TENSION BTWN ECONOMICS AND SAFETY HAS BEEN DEMONSTRABLY INTENSIFIED. WE'RE LEAVING THE REALM OF 'TIME IS OPTIONS;' AND MOVING INTO THE WORLD OF 'TIME IS MONEY.'

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.