Narrative:

Our takeoff clearance from runway 8R at mia was with an initial heading of 120 degrees. First officer called departure as we were climbing through 1500 ft on a 120 degree heading; on our way to 5000 ft; having just reduced to climb power and raised the flaps from 15 to 5. Departure responded normally; then added a traffic call -- 2 O'clock position; 2 miles; maneuvering at 2500 ft. We recognized the threat immediately and started looking. The controller then asked if we could stop climb at 2000 ft; but we were already through 2200 ft and still climbing. At this point; TCAS showed nothing at that position -- not 'other traffic;' not 'proximate traffic;' or anything. I started reducing power and our climb rate; pending finding the airplane; in order to not reach 2500 ft and; hopefully; get started back down before reaching the traffic. The TCAS finally said; 'traffic; traffic;' at about the time first officer acquired him visually at a mile or less converging. As I started turning away from the traffic; a TCAS RA commanded greater than 1500 ft per min down; 'descend; descend now.' since we could see the traffic; I only turned and descended enough to make sure that he could not hit us. I gave him a bit of a wide berth because he was on the other side of the airplane and I could not keep him in sight. First officer advised the controller of what we were doing; and after we had passed him; we resumed our 120 degree heading and our climb. Subsequent discussion with the facility operations manager revealed that the cessna caravan had been orbiting south of the airport at 2500 ft for a while; gradually drifting east over time. He had moved to a point 3 miles or so southeast of the airport and was on the arrival controller's frequency; not tower or departure. The tower controller got relived just before we took off and did not brief the relieving controller on the presence of the cessna; since he was no longer in the 'local controller's' airspace. Thus; the tower controller was unaware of the hazardous situation he was putting us in with a 120 degree heading and a climb to 5000 ft -- which turned out to run us right through the cessna. I believe we would have been very lucky not to hit the cessna if it were not for both the controller's timely traffic call and the TCAS alert. The combination of the two allowed us to find the traffic early enough so as to allow gentle maneuvering to miss instead of violent maneuvering; which would have been required with just a few seconds' more delay in action. A complicating factor was the presence of small airplane traffic at 10 O'clock at 2 or 3 miles; which made us wonder for a moment if the controller's initial traffic call was accurate and distracted our attention until the TCAS traffic call -- which; as a side note; was unacceptably late; in my opinion. This is not the first situation where TCAS has not shown traffic at all until it was an imminent hazard.

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Original NASA ASRS Text

Title: B757 DEP FROM MIA; ISSUED TFC AND RECEIVED TCAS RA RESULTING IN NMAC RPT BEING FILED.

Narrative: OUR TKOF CLRNC FROM RWY 8R AT MIA WAS WITH AN INITIAL HDG OF 120 DEGS. FO CALLED DEP AS WE WERE CLBING THROUGH 1500 FT ON A 120 DEG HDG; ON OUR WAY TO 5000 FT; HAVING JUST REDUCED TO CLB POWER AND RAISED THE FLAPS FROM 15 TO 5. DEPARTURE RESPONDED NORMALLY; THEN ADDED A TFC CALL -- 2 O'CLOCK POSITION; 2 MILES; MANEUVERING AT 2500 FT. WE RECOGNIZED THE THREAT IMMEDIATELY AND STARTED LOOKING. THE CTLR THEN ASKED IF WE COULD STOP CLB AT 2000 FT; BUT WE WERE ALREADY THROUGH 2200 FT AND STILL CLBING. AT THIS POINT; TCAS SHOWED NOTHING AT THAT POSITION -- NOT 'OTHER TFC;' NOT 'PROXIMATE TFC;' OR ANYTHING. I STARTED REDUCING POWER AND OUR CLB RATE; PENDING FINDING THE AIRPLANE; IN ORDER TO NOT REACH 2500 FT AND; HOPEFULLY; GET STARTED BACK DOWN BEFORE REACHING THE TFC. THE TCAS FINALLY SAID; 'TFC; TFC;' AT ABOUT THE TIME FO ACQUIRED HIM VISUALLY AT A MILE OR LESS CONVERGING. AS I STARTED TURNING AWAY FROM THE TFC; A TCAS RA COMMANDED GREATER THAN 1500 FT PER MIN DOWN; 'DSND; DSND NOW.' SINCE WE COULD SEE THE TFC; I ONLY TURNED AND DSNDED ENOUGH TO MAKE SURE THAT HE COULD NOT HIT US. I GAVE HIM A BIT OF A WIDE BERTH BECAUSE HE WAS ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE AIRPLANE AND I COULD NOT KEEP HIM IN SIGHT. FO ADVISED THE CTLR OF WHAT WE WERE DOING; AND AFTER WE HAD PASSED HIM; WE RESUMED OUR 120 DEG HDG AND OUR CLB. SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION WITH THE FACILITY OPS MANAGER REVEALED THAT THE CESSNA CARAVAN HAD BEEN ORBITING S OF THE ARPT AT 2500 FT FOR A WHILE; GRADUALLY DRIFTING E OVER TIME. HE HAD MOVED TO A POINT 3 MILES OR SO SE OF THE ARPT AND WAS ON THE ARR CTLR'S FREQ; NOT TWR OR DEP. THE TWR CTLR GOT RELIVED JUST BEFORE WE TOOK OFF AND DID NOT BRIEF THE RELIEVING CTLR ON THE PRESENCE OF THE CESSNA; SINCE HE WAS NO LONGER IN THE 'LOCAL CTLR'S' AIRSPACE. THUS; THE TWR CTLR WAS UNAWARE OF THE HAZARDOUS SITUATION HE WAS PUTTING US IN WITH A 120 DEG HDG AND A CLB TO 5000 FT -- WHICH TURNED OUT TO RUN US RIGHT THROUGH THE CESSNA. I BELIEVE WE WOULD HAVE BEEN VERY LUCKY NOT TO HIT THE CESSNA IF IT WERE NOT FOR BOTH THE CTLR'S TIMELY TFC CALL AND THE TCAS ALERT. THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO ALLOWED US TO FIND THE TFC EARLY ENOUGH SO AS TO ALLOW GENTLE MANEUVERING TO MISS INSTEAD OF VIOLENT MANEUVERING; WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN REQUIRED WITH JUST A FEW SECONDS' MORE DELAY IN ACTION. A COMPLICATING FACTOR WAS THE PRESENCE OF SMALL AIRPLANE TFC AT 10 O'CLOCK AT 2 OR 3 MILES; WHICH MADE US WONDER FOR A MOMENT IF THE CTLR'S INITIAL TFC CALL WAS ACCURATE AND DISTRACTED OUR ATTENTION UNTIL THE TCAS TFC CALL -- WHICH; AS A SIDE NOTE; WAS UNACCEPTABLY LATE; IN MY OPINION. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST SITUATION WHERE TCAS HAS NOT SHOWN TFC AT ALL UNTIL IT WAS AN IMMINENT HAZARD.

Data retrieved from NASA's ASRS site as of January 2009 and automatically converted to unabbreviated mixed upper/lowercase text. This report is for informational purposes with no guarantee of accuracy. See NASA's ASRS site for official report.